ABDALLAHI'S POLITICAL STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000073 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: ABDALLAHI'S POLITICAL STRATEGY REF: NOUAKCHOTT 72 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Abdallahi's political base see the blockage of the President's return to Nouakchott on January 22 as evidence he is still under effective house arrest and prohibited from engaging in the political process. There are fears for his physical security if he tries to leave his home village of Lemden -- unless he leaves to go abroad. The President's exit strategy, released January 22, emphasizes the "constitutionalist" branch of the anti-coup opposition by allowing for early elections to be organized under a government of national unity. The approach is attractive to opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah, although Ould Daddah is having difficulty maintaining unity in his own party. The FNDD sees a potential opportunity in last weeks visit to Lemden by Aziz's principle financier. The role be played by Ely Vall remains subject to speculation. End Summary ¶2. (C) Aborted Return Proves A Point: Charge met January 23 with FNDD co-leader and effective Foreign Minister Mohamed Ould Maouloud to discuss the abortive attempt by President Abdallahi to return to Nouakchott on January 22. Per REFTEL, Maouloud confirmed the three-hour standoff by the side of the road 30 miles out of town where security forces prevented the President and his entourage from entering the city. At the same time, Ould Maouloud, President of the National Assembly Ould Boulkheir, and other FNDD dignitaries were being prevented from leaving the city to join up with the President. Ould Maouloud said the security force condition that the President could only enter the city in a single vehicle without his supporters signified that the regime would only let him circulate "under humiliating circumstances." Ould Maouloud added that the single-vehicle option would have also posed security risks since FNDD supporters said they had seen several vehicles of youths standing by to "greet" the President with rocks. Ould Maouloud noted that the incident had proven that Aziz' December statement that the President had been released without condition was a farce. He added that the events of January 22 had a strong effect on President of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir who gave a heated speech the evening of the 22nd (Comment -- Ould Boulkheir has generally limited his public participation in FNDD events to date). ¶3. (C) Safe only in Lemden or Abroad: Ould Maouloud told Charge the President would likely stay in Lemden for at least several days as they review options. The January 22 incidents had underlined FNDD concerns for Abdallahi's personal safety. "In Lemden, at least, we have an outlook system and can tell when someone outside those who are trusted is approaching" whereas they will be dependent on Mauritanian security forces if the President stays at his house in Nouakchott. "The security forces, of course, are the ones we are most concerned about." Ould Maouloud noted gravely, "Right now the President is the central constitutional issue. If he is eliminated, there is no issue." Ould Maouloud saw the premature release of the President's January 22 speech to pro-regime media as evidence, "the regime has active spies within the movement." Ould Maouloud said, "In my personal opinion, the President has to be outside Mauritania to be safe." Ould Maouloud hoped the President would be invited in some capacity to the African Union Summit since it would be difficult for the regime to block travel for that purpose without further invoking AU anger. He noted the ongoing issue related to Abdallahi's travel documents. The regime had indicated Abdallahi will be issued a new diplomatic passport annotated to show Abdallahi as "former President" but Ould Maouloud said that new passport had yet to be delivered. Ould Daddah said Abdallahi would prefer to travel on a regular passport without a title than accept travel on a diplomatic passport showing him as deposed. Charge noted the U.S. would be prepared to issue a diplomatic visa as "President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania" in either passport. NOUAKCHOTT 00000073 002 OF 003 ¶4. (C) The Abdallahi Exit Strategy: Ould Maouloud saw the exit strategy announced January 22 as a viable, constitutional, alternative to Aziz' plans. The main elements of the strategy are: (a) Withdrawal of the military from politics: Aside from the abolishment of the High State Council, Ould Maouloud said any credible transition requires defanging the military in its ability to hold the political class hostage. Most specifically, Ould Maouloud saw the necessity to dismantle the Presidential Security Battalion (BASEP) which serves as Aziz' power base which "Taya had modeled under Saddam Hussein's security system." (b) Re-establishment of constitutional order: Following the earlier plan put forward by Ould Boullkheir, this calls for the return of President Abdlallahi but reflects the President's acceptance that he cannot return to complete his mandate. The Waghef Government would be put aside for a new "Government of National Unity" with significant policy independence. (c) Estates General II: Once established, the Government of National Unity would again discuss the way forward with the anticipated decision to have new elections. For the FNDD, it is essential that this involve simultaneous Presidential and Legislative elections to establish an appropriate transition period -- the fear being the tainted parliament will want very rapid stand alone presidential elections and eventually wiggle out of having their own mandate renewed. Ould Maouloud saw the need for a decent length of transition to (a) calm the situation and (b) untangle "the mess Aziz has created" with financial irregularities and the appointment of dozens of cronies to key offices. (d) Early Elections: Ould Maouloud contended that the President and the FNDD had agreed to early elections but had deferred to a later day their election strategy. He did not know, for instance, whether Abdallahi would want to present himself again. He thought not, but thought it would not be useful to say so until after he is back in office. For Ould Maouloud, personally, there should be no effort to exclude any constitutionally eligible candidate -- including Aziz as a civilian. ¶5. (C) Talks with Ahmed Ould Daddah: Ould Maouloud told Charge that he and Ahmed Ould Daddah had maintained an active dialogue since the coup. Ould Daddah had left the Estates General on Democracy feeling betrayed and absolutely certain Aziz "wants to install himself as dictator for the next 20 years." The two politicians had quickly come to agreement on their rejections of the Estates General and the regime's efforts to alter the constitution. Ould Maouloud lamented; however, that plans for a joint FNDD / RFD declaration had been stymied. Saying that "Ould Daddah has always been a lousy political manager," Ould Maouloud said Ould Daddah had felt obliged to run an agreed to text past the RFD executive board. That board, however, is already split between pro and anti-military supporters. Ould Maouloud thought that, as long as Ould Daddah tries to maintain party unity, they will be unable to form a coalition but, "at least they will declare themselves firmly against the military." Ould Maouloud underlined that the biggest RFD / FNDD difficulty was the personal enmity between Ould Daddah and Abdallahi. Had Abdallahi returned to Nouakchott on January 22, plans had been in place for a discrete meeting between the two. Ould Maouloud thought, "once they break the ice, we can get them to work together." Even with continued personal hard feelings, Ould Maouloud thought Ould Daddah was now firmly in the anti-coup camp adding that, with the President's new plan, "he has two transition options leading to early elections -- one controlled by the President and the other by the generals. Which one does he think offers the better chance of producing clean and winnable elections?" ¶6. (C) And What of Col. Vall? Charge asked about press reports that the FNDD was also in contact with former regime leader Col. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall. Ould Maouloud replied that Vall's game is very hard to discern but a game it is. He confirmed that Vall has sent a few emissaries saying he NOUAKCHOTT 00000073 003 OF 003 would like to talk with the FNDD leadership, but had offered little in detail. Before the December 6 meeting between Abdallahi and international organization representatives, Vall passed a message to Ould Maouloud to tell Abdallahi, "Aziz is completely crazy. The only way he will ever leave will be if you resign." Ould Maouloud noted that Vall is constantly traveling "running a presidential campaign with the international community." Vall contacts told Ould Maouloud he will formerly denounce Aziz but Ould Maouloud said, "we've been hearing that since September." Ould Maouloud opined, "Vall is using Aziz to destroy Abdallahi so he can emerge as the compromise." He did not discount that, despite the rumored enmity between Aziz and Vall, Aziz was in fact acting on behalf of Vall. Under this theory, Aziz will not present himself as a candidate for the summer Presidential elections "for the sake of democracy" leaving the door open to Vall. ¶7. (C) The Enigmatic Mr. Bouamatou: Ould Maouloud confirmed press reports that Aziz's top financier, Mohamed Hmayenne Bouamatou had been to visit the President in Lemden. When Charge asked, "Was he representing himself, Aziz or Vall?" Ould Maououd said he was asking himself the same question. Ould Maouloud noted Bouamatou is the ultimate connections guy -- cousin to Vall, Aziz and Abdallahi's wife as well as close to the powerful mayor of Nouakchott Ahmed Ould Hamza (who in turn is very close to Ahmed Ould Daddah). Ould Maouloud had spoken with Presidential Chief of Staff Ahmed Kaber Ould Hammoudi who had confirmed that Bouamatou had come on a "mission" that had kept him with the President until 3:00 a.m. Ould Hammoudi had not provided details of the conversation on an open line and will brief Ould Maouloud further on Saturday, January 24. Ould Maouloud was hopeful Bouamatou's visit was a sign that the strategy of isolating Aziz was starting to pay off as the moneymen behind the General begin to put out feelers. He noted, though, that this may have been an effort to pressure Abdallahi through his wife who he termed, "the President's biggest weakness." ¶8. (C) End Game: Ould Maouloud saw a number of things going in favor of democracy. By blocking Abdallahi's return, the regime had demonstrated that the President remains under effective house arrest and cannot participate in the political process. That will have a strong effect on African Union and European Union deliberations that might otherwise accepted as "progress" Abdallahi's "liberation" and the Estates General on Democracy. The fact that Ahmed Ould Daddah and his significant RFD party had denounced the Estates General has greatly increased the weight of internal defiance -- whether he can get Ould Daddah and Abdallahi back on speaking terms or not. The President's exit strategy offers something the whole FNDD can stand behind with a strong attraction for Ould Daddah as well (even if Ould Daddah may have to stomach Abdallahi as a "transition" President awhile longer). Ould Maouloud continues to see signs of fissures in Aziz' support base as seen in Bouamatou's trip to Lemden. Aziz' dangerous gambit of support to the Tuareg against the government in Bamako was cited by Ould Maouloud as sowing significant discontent in the military ranks. Ould Maouloud saw this all coming back to international pressure saying it was essential that the African Union take punitive measures against the regime in February. "The measures may have limited practical effect but they have a strong political and psychological effect on Aziz' base. The more substance there is to international condemnation, the greater the chance for a PEACEFUL return to democracy." HANKINS