MAURITANIA: DEFINING -- BUT UNPREDICTABLE --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NOUAKCHOTT 000462 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: DEFINING -- BUT UNPREDICTABLE -- ELECTIONS JULY 18 REF: A. 07NOUAKCHOTT 1193 ¶B. 07NOUAKCHOTT 334 ¶C. 07NOUAKCHOTT 78 ¶D. 07NOUAKCHOTT 33 ¶E. 09NOUAKCHOTT 369 ¶F. 09NOUAKCHOTT 419 ¶G. 09NOUAKCHOTT 375 ¶H. 09NOUAKCHOTT 420 ¶I. 09NOUAKCHOTT 227 ¶J. 09NOUAKCHOTT 366 ¶K. 09NOUAKCHOTT 443 ¶L. 09NOUAKCHOTT 172 ¶M. 09NOUAKCHOTT 455 ¶N. 09NOUAKCHOTT 440 Classified By: Ambassador Mark Boulware for reasons 1.4 (c) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As we approach the July 18 Presidential elections in Mauritania, there are too many unknowns to make any credible prediction about the outcome. Although Mauritania's elites have been enmeshed by over ten months of intense political struggle since the August 6, 2008, coup, the majority of Mauritanians are poor, illiterate, and traditionally preoccupied more with daily survival than politics. Assuming reasonably transparent elections, much will depend on the masses. Will they take a traditional path of following whoever is in power and vote for General Aziz, or have they been inspired by their first taste of democracy to support the opposition? There remains a very strong possibility that the Mauritanian people will vote for perceived stability over a more robust democracy. This may be an election with a reasonably large turnout, no significant manipulation of the vote count, and a victory for Aziz. Alternatively, the common Mauritanian may exercise his or her free will and vote to repudiate Aziz. This will be a historic vote for Mauritania -- one that marks its level of political maturity and puts to the test whether Mauritanians will break with the past. The role of the military is also a key question and security concerns will be very real as election results become clear. A victory for Aziz may reignite the anger of the opposition while a loss could provoke a third Aziz military coup. It remains possible, though, that Mauritanians, who are exhausted by political crisis and tired of international isolation may reject these extremes and will accept any results in the hope of moving on. End Summary ¶2. (C) 2007 sets the tone for 2009: The question of legitimacy is likely to re-emerge after the 2009 presidential elections. Following the Abdallahi victory in 2007, some Mauritanians felt that Abdallahi, despite having been democratically elected, had no legitimacy as he was the military's candidate. The military establishment, they argued, had improperly influenced his election. Even Abdallahi's closest supporters agree that the military contributed to Abdallahi's election. The former President told us he thought he could make a reasonable accommodation with the military by leaving security to them but realized too late that was impossible. An Aziz victory, even if seen as an accurate reflection of the electorate's choice, will pose new problems of legitimacy. If he wins, the opposition will say he stole the election. If he looses, few discount the possibility of him trying to launch a new coup. -------------- THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY -------------- ¶3. (C) Many Mauritanians -- on both the pro and anti-coup camps -- claim that the 2007 election won by former President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi was considered free and fair "in the letter of the law but not in the spirit of the law." During the past ten months, this distinction became a recurring theme for coup supporters and even for opposition leader and Rassemblement des Forces Democratiques (RFD) President Ahmed Ould Daddah, who supported the "rectification movement" until the month of April. While the Front National pour la Defense de la Democratie (FNDD) argued that President Abdallahi, as NOUAKCHOTT 00000462 002 OF 005 democratically elected president, had to play a central role in any political settlement, the other side questioned Abdallahi's legitimacy on the grounds that he was "the military's candidate," that he was elected in a "manipulated election" and that his electoral victory would have been impossible without the military's backing, consisting of a heavy dose of money, tribal politics and traffic of influence. For the military, this translated into the cynical view that "we put him in, so we can take him out" while politicians like Ould Daddah saw no need for a transition to democracy to pass through Abdallahi since he did not have true democratic credentials. ¶4. (C) Both Mauritanians and the international community recognized the 2007 elections as free and transparent (Ref A, B, C). The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) claimed that, technically, the election had been acceptable. International observers blessed the results and opposition leader Daddah conceded. A popular story that Mauritanians love telling, and that PolOff heard from Daddah's own lips, is that Daddah was furious with Abdallahi's victory because he had no political base and would have never won without military backing. Daddah held that Abdallahi won 40,000 votes more than him (out of 700,000 votes cast) only because the military bought up the electoral cards of many of his poorer supporters thus preventing their votes. Daddah, who seriously considered contesting the election, was dissuaded by influential Mauritanian figures, including imams, who said that his rejection of the election's outcome would unleash a civil war by posing the military against civilians. According to the story, he ended up conceding "for the greater good of the nation;" but his defeat became a bone of contention between him and Abdallahi. Daddah's grudge would become one of the catalysts of the Abdallahi government's failure and the August 6, 2008 coup d'etat. ¶5. (C) The initial hope seen by the first democratically elected president of Mauritania -- an election that took on greater meaning as an example for Africa and particularly for the Arab world -- was short lived. The President was never able to build effective ties to either the population as a whole or to Mauritania's traditional elites. As he refused to play the puppet role the military seemed to have in mind, he also lost their support. The international economic environment did nothing to help as the rapid rise in food and energy costs made life more difficult for Mauritanians. Economic conditions coupled with the long lead times for donor development projects denied a hoped for "democracy dividend." Despite what former CENI commissioner Sid'Ahmed Ould Habbott calls "the democratic rush" many Mauritanians knew at the time, no matter how democratic their discourse, that a sector of the military wanted to continue running the show and that this would be a considerable hurdle for the democratically elected government. Some in the military even questioned the ability of a civilian government to direct the country (Ref D). Former coup leader Vall told EmbOffs he had seen Abdallahi's election as a step towards democracy though an imperfect one. For him, "The Abdallahi presidency was 20% democratic. Had someone replaced him through the ballot in 2012, that person might have been 40% democratic. The coup, however, took us back to 0% democratic." -------------- BACK TO SQUARE ONE -------------- ¶6. (C) In 2009, Mauritania is back to square one. Once again there is a candidate clearly tied with the military (only more openly so than in 2007) against an array of candidates who say they want to put an end to the military's influence. ¶7. (C) The July 18 election date, a key demand of Aziz's camp, was accepted in the Dakar negotiations but remains a source of concern for the opposition. Even CENI officials agreed that the timeframes for election planning, particularly for the June 6 elections, were already too NOUAKCHOTT 00000462 003 OF 005 tight (Ref G). Many view the lack of time as transparency's biggest enemy. General Aziz, who stepped down from the presidency of the High State COUNCIL (HSC) in April, insisted on a tight schedule since many felt he could not risk being too far away from the formal reins of power. The tight deadlines forced the international community and the government to cut corners and find exceptions to Mauritanian electoral law (Ref H). The length of the crisis has made some members of the international community such as France and Spain, who have considerable interests in country, eager to move ahead with elections at whatever cost. Key concerns remain about the reliability of electoral lists, the undefined mechanics of the vote of Mauritanians abroad, the sufficiency of international observer missions, the effectiveness of the CENI that was reshuffled along partisan lines at the last minute, and the neutrality of provincial authorities named by Aziz. ¶8. (C) The opposition comes into the race disadvantaged by Aziz's eight months at the head of the government during which he made government appointments favorable to him and used patronage to build a support base. Food distributions, free health care to poor populations, gifts to hospitals, constant travels to towns in the interior of the country have been central features of his campaigning activities (Ref J). He started effectively campaigning well before the June 6 elections and continued his campaigning activities during the negotiation of the Dakar Accord and after its signature. 9 (C) Nonetheless, Aziz' advantages may also be his weaknesses. Ahmed Ould Daddah's campaign manager called Aziz "our best spokesman" noting that Aziz' abusive and threatening language tends to highlight his failures. Political leaders from Abdallahi to Vall have often cited Aziz as his own worse enemy, saying that his concentration of power around himself and his tribe can only alienate everyone else. Aziz has had 10 months to show his stuff, but the opposition has likewise had 10 months to mobilize political consciousness and highlight the choice in front of the Mauritanian people on the 18th. ¶10. (C) Many Mauritanians agree that, despite the flawed environment, technical fraud will be more difficult in this election because now there are checks and balances that did not exist during Taya's time. While all the walis were appointed by Aziz and he has effective control of the military and 50% of the government, the opposition controls the other half of the government as well as the all-important Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Communications and two-thirds of the CENI, which may offset the influence of Aziz's supporters. Voter rolls have changed very little from 2007 and are being audited by international experts. The vote tabulation itself is triple checked through the Ministry of Interior, CENI, and party observers. We judge the chance of successful (i.e. not easily identifiable) vote count fraud to be low. -------------- MAIN FRAUD SCHEMES -------------- ¶11. (C) Mauritanians are well versed in past tricks of the trade meant to subvert elections. In the current campaign, some of the traditional fraud schemes already reported or expected, both of a non-technical and technical nature, are: - Electoral and identity card "rentals": Political party representatives approach citizens known for supporting another candidate and offer them money in exchange for foregoing their right to vote. In order to ensure these people stick to their word, documents needed to vote such as electoral cards and identity cards are withheld until after the election. Mauritanians in poor neighborhoods have been known for "renting off" their cards for as little as 5,000 UM ($19 USD) per person. It is common for a whole family to participate in the scheme, which can bring NOUAKCHOTT 00000462 004 OF 005 considerable income to large families in a country where people scramble to make 1,000 UM ($3.70 USD) a day to fulfill their basic needs (Ref L.) Daddah's RFD talked about using this method to influence participation in the now canceled June 6 election that they were boycotting (noting that Daddah feels his 2007 victory was stolen by the military via this technique). Rumors state that the going rate for identity and electoral cards for the July 18 election is 50,000 UM ($185 USD) and that this technique will be widely used both by Aziz and the opposition. - Military electoral fraud: Many worry that Mauritanian soldiers will vote for whoever their hierarchy tells them to vote. Also, according to LES, Mauritanias 16,000 soldiers are not included in electoral lists for "security reasons" and because they are exempt to return to their home voting precinct for elections. In the past, the military had their own polling stations but at the same time they were also entitled to vote in the polls they protected. It would be possible for a group of soldiers to vote in their barracks and then be assigned to another polling station in which they would vote again. Also, it is rumored that the BASEP has their own polling station and that it is subject to insufficient controls. PolOff consulted with former CENI commissioner and President of the HUMAN RIGHTS Group RHADDO Habbott about this issue and he said military voting procedures had been changed for the 2007 elections. - Military and security forces pressure: Military officers have been known to campaign on behalf of Aziz and even intimidate and threaten regional leaders (Ref M). Many Mauritanians have stated the same intimidation techniques have been used in the past by policemen and gendarmes. - Wali influence: The walis, who have been all appointed by Aziz, have been known to campaign for their candidate as well as threaten and coerce individuals. For example, on a recent trip to Rosso and Nouadhibou, CENI officials told PolOff they knew the Wali had engaged in fish distributions (Ref G) meant to support Aziz. - Partisan CENI or government fraud: The large numbers of national and provincial officials named by Aziz raises obvious concerns that (since their onward employment is almost certainly dependent upon an Aziz victory) they will turn a blind eye to any election trickery. Likewise, the heavily partisan nature of the CENI (in this case skewed to the opposition) raises questions of whether they will certify an Aziz victory even if the win is legitimate. - Transportation blockages: In the past candidates have been known for "renting" all taxis and minivans in a region or town favorable to another candidate to make it more difficult for people to go to polling stations. Given the large distances that people have to travel in the interior of the country, transportation availability is a key issue. - Legal loopholes: It is possible for a judge to add voters to the electoral list at the last minute without any explanation and without CENI being able to question these additions. This was a common fraud scheme during Taya's time. - Overseas embassy fraud: The vote of Mauritanians abroad is a source of concern for many. It is the first time in history that Mauritanians abroad are allowed to vote and the mechanics of this exercise are not well defined. Many parties do not have the resources to send observers abroad. -------------- -------------- HOLD YOUR BREATH FOR THE MILITARY REACTION IN AN AZIZ LOSS -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Now, as in 2007, the military holds the key to NOUAKCHOTT 00000462 005 OF 005 Mauritania's democratic future. There are signs of deep divisions in the military. Habbott told PolOff on July 14 that he had information from high-level military officers that the military are "done" with Aziz. He said many felt insulted at Aziz's comments implying that he could do another coup d'etat if he so wished (Ref N). These officers stressed the military "is not at Aziz's -- nor Ely Vall's -- beck and call." Habbot also highlighted that the BASEP has been assimilated to Army headquarters and that two colonels who were very close to Aziz have been replaced. Note: BASEP used to be under the special chief of staff to the President "aka" Aziz. End note. Habbott is convinced that Aziz is loosing military support and that the military will not back up another coup d'etat. According to Habbot, there have always been divisions within the military regarding democratic government. Some officers would rather see civilians run the country and focus on their security mission whereas others, of Baathist and Nasserist tendencies, still want to keep a tight grip on power. These divisions are not apparent as the military is not given to publicly display disagreements but Habbott claims they exist. On August 6, the military may have been willing to support Aziz despite doubts but the ultimate proof of schisms for Habbott is that Aziz was unable to consolidate his power in 10 months and that he had to make concessions. Habbott claims the reason is that there are elements of the military that do not entirely agree with Aziz's program and forced him to back down. "With all the electoral competition, Aziz is in for a big surprise," said Habbott. "There will not be another coup d'etat because the military will not spill blood for him." ¶13. (C) Others, like businessman Ould Lemrabott who paid a courtesy visit to the Ambassador on July 14, are convinced that Aziz still has a tight hold on the military and that the Ouled Bisbaa are planning to do another coup d'etat on the eve of July 18 if they realize Aziz will not make it to the second round. According to Lemrabott, Aziz's tribe prefers that Aziz comes out as full-fledged dictator and uses his military might to secure political power even at the expense of international isolation. The stakes for the tribe and people like businessman Mohamed Ould Bouamatou are too high at this point and they are willing to fight to stay in power even if they put themselves and the country on the path of destruction (septel). Many also believe that Aziz could fraud the first round of the election to ensure his victory in what would be a "coup d'etat by the urns." ¶14. (C) While the rumors run rampant, Post has no solid information suggesting any planning for a potential third coup nor any solid information of sufficient divisions in the security hierarchy to suggest the military would turn on him if he did try. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Two days before the election, Mauritanians and the international community are worried about the outcome. Many wonder whether the election will be transparent and what will be Aziz's and the military's reaction if Aziz looses. One thing is clear, this election is an important chapter in Mauritania's long struggle between military and civilian forces. The question of legitimacy is at the core of the election. If whoever wins does not gain legitimacy in the eyes of the political class, the military, and the people, Mauritania will be trapped in a "Groundhog Day" situation where the resolution of Mauritania's political crisis is merely postponed to be addressed again at a later date. BOULWARE