MAURITANIAN ELECTION CHRONICLES FOR JUNE 28 -- A

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000420 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MR SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN ELECTION CHRONICLES FOR JUNE 28 -- A VERY SHORT HONEYMOON Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) One day into the new and internationally recognized transitional Government of National Unity, the inherent distrust of all the parties are already threatening collapse. The International Contact Group, that has agreed to meet twice daily into the foreseeable future, has its own divisions that threaten unity in dealing with technical and substantive problems as they arise. With events developing quickly, Post will provide a daily "election chronicle" as long as deemed necessary. ¶2. (C) ICG Tensions Flare: Under the chairmanship of the AU Ambassador to the EU Mahamet Saleh Annadif, the Contact Group June 28 held its first meeting following the creation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) the day before. Annadif told the ICG the first marathon meeting of the GNU had failed to agree on the membership of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and that the calendar of events leading to the elections on July 18 were in strong dispute as the opposition parties had started to call for a deal in accordance with the 42-day transition spelled out in the Dakar agreement. Annadif also raised his concern that, consensus or not, the Constitutional Commission might not allow the changes to Mauritanian electoral procedures needed for the accelerated elections calendar called for in the Dakar agreement. PolOff (representing the U.S. Mission) offered that, while the July 18 date for elections should be our accepted target, we should try to de-politicize the issue by dealing with it on a purely technical basis -- noting that, under the best of circumstances, things don't normally proceed as planned in Mauritania. Should the technical experts say minimally acceptable elections can not be done in the time available, PolOff argued that those technical findings should rule the day. The U.S. intervention was strongly rejected by the Europeans and even Annadif found it "obstructionist." ¶3. (C) Constitutional Council: At 10:00, representatives of the ICG (Annadif, Charge, Germany, Senegal and Libya) met with the members of the Constitutional Council. (The members of the Council all noted privately to Charge that this was the fifth U.S. visit to the Council in two years while none of the other diplomats present had ever been there) Annadif highlighted the importance of the engagements made in the Dakar agreement including the call for elections by July 18 and asked for confirmation that the Council would allow the necessary modifications to the Mauritanian electoral code to meet the tight deadline. The President of the Council responded that the resignation of President Abdallahi the day before had created a dejure vacancy of the presidency that served as a tripwire for the constitutional provisions for a transition government leading to new elections. The Council was well aware of the Dakar agreement and the political consensus it embodied. The Dakar agreement, however, is just a political engagement and, until ratified by the new GNU, did not constitute an official engagement. The President of the Council assured the ICG that the Council did not want to be an obstacle in the implementation of the Dakar agreement and that, if they saw an accelerated electoral plan proposed to them on the basis of political consensus, they would accept almost any change to the normal procedures. Without that consensus, however, they would stick to the 60-day transition schedule stipulated in the constitution. The President noted that the most significant issue for the Council was ensuring that candidates had sufficient time to submit their candidacies. The German Ambassador noted that the idea of extended filing periods was to ensure that no party was caught unawares by a snap election. He noted nobody could claim they didn't know elections were coming so some leeway should be given. Charge noted that the parties had, indeed, been working all out since the August 2008 coup and that the credible post-Dakar candidates were already known. Charge noted that technical aspects of the candidacies including the need to collect the necessary number of signature from municipal council members could pose a problem needing resolution. The meeting ended with no commitment but with the President of the Council calling in the ICG to find a calendar that could win consensus. ¶4. (C) Meeting with Annadif: Charge had a side meeting with Annadif to ensure him that the U.S. did not want to be obstructionist but, at the same time, did not want to have wasted all the efforts of the previous ten months only to have elections that would fail to meet domestic or international muster. While committed to Dakar and aware of the importance of the July 18 election date, we saw that as having to be depoliticized such that the date could move if, at some juncture, it is not deemed feasible. Annadif welcomed the Charge's comments and thanked him for what he had found helpful interventions with the Council. He agreed with the idea that July 18 should remain the target, but not to the extent that date could physically and technically not be met. ¶5. (C) Meeting with Prime Minister Laghdaf: The ICG met at 3:00 with Prime Minister Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf in what had been meant a courtesy call. Annadif told the ICG members present before the meeting that the FNDD and RFD had told him there was already a crisis in the GNU as Laghdaf had published unilaterally a decree convoking the Electoral College for elections July 18 without gaining Council of Ministers consensus and without the requisite co-signature of the Minister of Interior or the interim President. Just prior to the meeting with the Prime Minister, the Constitutional Council called Annadif to say the two opposition groups had already lodged a formal complaint. The ICG met with Laghdaf who was accompanied by Foreign Minister Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou (Annadif told ICG members he had earlier rebuffed the Foreign Minister who had called on behalf of Aziz front. Annadif had told the Minister it was inappropriate for him, as a GNU Minister, to be representing on of the party's agenda). After congratulating the Prime Minister, Annadif asked what had transpired concerning the convocation of the electoral college. Laghdaf, with the Foreign Minister chiming in from time to time, said the Council of Ministers had met from 6:00 pm June 27 to 5:00 am June 28 in a marathon meeting. Prior to the Council of Ministers, there had been an inter-ministerial meeting of election-related ministries that had looked at a calendar of events that could meet the July 18 election date. In that meeting, Laghdaf said the opposition-designated Minister of Interior said the schedule was "challenging but doable." Laghdaf said that, after 11 hours of debate, all sides had had their chance to voice their concerns and that, recognizing the reserves of some -- including now the Minister of Interior -- the President had voiced his decision to go ahead and the Prime Minister had declared the decree adopted. ¶6. (C) Opposition says it Ain't So: At a 6:15 meeting with representatives of the three poles, the RFD and FNDD representatives said Laghdaf's description of events was not accurate. The said that the Minister of Interior, receiving a calendar developed by the Prime Minister's office had said he would need time for his staff to review. When he was called to the Council of Ministers, he was shocked to find the calendar was being presented as a decree. The opposition had assumed the first GNU Council of Ministers would be devoted to the naming of the CENI. As the decree was tabled, however, they made clear their sense that the Dakar agreement called for a transition period of 42 days between the formation of a GNU that had been set for June 6 and elections on July 18. Noting that the Dakar agreement called for an accelerated election process but specified the need for those elections to be viable and credible, the opposition argued the elections should be set 42 days from June 27. During the course of the marathon meeting, the opposition said they had kept an open mind on the July 18 but only if they could see how that date could be achieved while still providing viable and credible elections. They said President M'Bare adjourned the meeting for later in the day only to find Laghdaf claiming, after most of the ministers had departed, that the decree had been "adopted." The opposition told the ICG they were not contesting the July 18 election date per se but that the Prime Minister had already ignored his written commitment to govern impartially on the basis of consensus. The FNDD's Ould Maouloud said, "We had insisted on this because he is the deciding vote. If their idea of "consensus" is that he will just side with Aziz' 14 ministers against ours, then there is no way this will work." ¶7. (C) More ICG friction: The German Ambassador spoke first and said it was the universal position of the ICG that the July 18 election date was "non-negotiable" and accused the opposition of acting in bad faith. Charge was compelled to distance the U.S. position saying the U.S. agreed that the 18th was the target but did not see it as non-negotiable. The Charge noted that the Prime Minister had not acted as expected based on his commitments in that we did not see "consensus" meaning 50% plus 1. The Prime Minister had agreed that, if consensus could not be reached, he would seek the assistance of the ICG. The Charge urged the three parties to work together to see whether elections could be held on the 18th, but made clear having credible elections was more important than the date. Other speakers chimed in with the EC, AU, China, and Senegal coming in generally on the U.S. position (though not as bluntly) and France and Spain siding with the German (again, not as bluntly). Ould Maouloud said he recognized that all parties had emphasized the importance of July 18 and said, in the interest of depoliticizing the issue, he would prefer to wait for the decision of the Constitutional Council. He emphasized that the election process should be seen as a partnership between the GNU (acting consensually),the CENI and the ICG. ¶8. (C) Charge Comment: The first day of the GNU demonstrates that the political transition is far from assured. Already, both sides are threatening to walk out. While the July 18 electoral date is clearly very important to retain the cooperation of the Aziz camp, some of our international colleagues are too prone to rush forward no matter what the end result. Our German counterpart is the most blunt with statements like, "We need to close our eyes and move forward," and "between the Dakar agreement and the constitution, Dakar must take precedence." Should the Constitutional Court throw out any element to the time schedule put forward by Laghdaf (for instance his desire to limit the filing of candidacies to three days instead of fifteen) then the tight schedule for July 18 falls apart and the election will likely have to move back no matter what the mediators say. The Mission will continue to look at July 18 as an important date in the agreement but not a date that must be met if at the cost of credibility. End Comment. HANKINS