MAURITANIAN ELECTION CHRONICLES FOR JUNE 28 -- A

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000420

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN ELECTION CHRONICLES FOR JUNE 28 -- A
VERY SHORT HONEYMOON

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) One day into the new and internationally recognized
transitional Government of National Unity, the inherent
distrust of all the parties are already threatening collapse.
The International Contact Group, that has agreed to meet
twice daily into the foreseeable future, has its own
divisions that threaten unity in dealing with technical and
substantive problems as they arise. With events developing
quickly, Post will provide a daily "election chronicle" as
long as deemed necessary.


2. (C) ICG Tensions Flare: Under the chairmanship of the AU
Ambassador to the EU Mahamet Saleh Annadif, the Contact Group
June 28 held its first meeting following the creation of a
Government of National Unity (GNU) the day before. Annadif
told the ICG the first marathon meeting of the GNU had failed
to agree on the membership of the Independent National
Electoral Commission (CENI) and that the calendar of events
leading to the elections on July 18 were in strong dispute as
the opposition parties had started to call for a deal in
accordance with the 42-day transition spelled out in the
Dakar agreement. Annadif also raised his concern that,
consensus or not, the Constitutional Commission might not
allow the changes to Mauritanian electoral procedures needed
for the accelerated elections calendar called for in the
Dakar agreement. PolOff (representing the U.S. Mission)
offered that, while the July 18 date for elections should be
our accepted target, we should try to de-politicize the issue
by dealing with it on a purely technical basis -- noting
that, under the best of circumstances, things don't normally
proceed as planned in Mauritania. Should the technical
experts say minimally acceptable elections can not be done in
the time available, PolOff argued that those technical
findings should rule the day. The U.S. intervention was
strongly rejected by the Europeans and even Annadif found it
"obstructionist."


3. (C) Constitutional Council: At 10:00, representatives of
the ICG (Annadif, Charge, Germany, Senegal and Libya) met
with the members of the Constitutional Council. (The members
of the Council all noted privately to Charge that this was
the fifth U.S. visit to the Council in two years while none
of the other diplomats present had ever been there) Annadif
highlighted the importance of the engagements made in the
Dakar agreement including the call for elections by July 18
and asked for confirmation that the Council would allow the
necessary modifications to the Mauritanian electoral code to
meet the tight deadline. The President of the Council
responded that the resignation of President Abdallahi the day
before had created a dejure vacancy of the presidency that
served as a tripwire for the constitutional provisions for a
transition government leading to new elections. The Council
was well aware of the Dakar agreement and the political
consensus it embodied. The Dakar agreement, however, is just
a political engagement and, until ratified by the new GNU,
did not constitute an official engagement. The President of
the Council assured the ICG that the Council did not want to
be an obstacle in the implementation of the Dakar agreement
and that, if they saw an accelerated electoral plan proposed
to them on the basis of political consensus, they would
accept almost any change to the normal procedures. Without
that consensus, however, they would stick to the 60-day
transition schedule stipulated in the constitution. The
President noted that the most significant issue for the
Council was ensuring that candidates had sufficient time to
submit their candidacies. The German Ambassador noted that
the idea of extended filing periods was to ensure that no
party was caught unawares by a snap election. He noted
nobody could claim they didn't know elections were coming so
some leeway should be given. Charge noted that the parties
had, indeed, been working all out since the August 2008 coup
and that the credible post-Dakar candidates were already
known. Charge noted that technical aspects of the
candidacies including the need to collect the necessary
number of signature from municipal council members could pose
a problem needing resolution. The meeting ended with no
commitment but with the President of the Council calling in

the ICG to find a calendar that could win consensus.


4. (C) Meeting with Annadif: Charge had a side meeting with
Annadif to ensure him that the U.S. did not want to be
obstructionist but, at the same time, did not want to have
wasted all the efforts of the previous ten months only to
have elections that would fail to meet domestic or
international muster. While committed to Dakar and aware of
the importance of the July 18 election date, we saw that as
having to be depoliticized such that the date could move if,
at some juncture, it is not deemed feasible. Annadif
welcomed the Charge's comments and thanked him for what he
had found helpful interventions with the Council. He agreed
with the idea that July 18 should remain the target, but not
to the extent that date could physically and technically not
be met.


5. (C) Meeting with Prime Minister Laghdaf: The ICG met at
3:00 with Prime Minister Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf in what
had been meant a courtesy call. Annadif told the ICG members
present before the meeting that the FNDD and RFD had told him
there was already a crisis in the GNU as Laghdaf had
published unilaterally a decree convoking the Electoral
College for elections July 18 without gaining Council of
Ministers consensus and without the requisite co-signature of
the Minister of Interior or the interim President. Just
prior to the meeting with the Prime Minister, the
Constitutional Council called Annadif to say the two
opposition groups had already lodged a formal complaint. The
ICG met with Laghdaf who was accompanied by Foreign Minister
Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou (Annadif told ICG members he
had earlier rebuffed the Foreign Minister who had called on
behalf of Aziz front. Annadif had told the Minister it was
inappropriate for him, as a GNU Minister, to be representing
on of the party's agenda). After congratulating the Prime
Minister, Annadif asked what had transpired concerning the
convocation of the electoral college. Laghdaf, with the
Foreign Minister chiming in from time to time, said the
Council of Ministers had met from 6:00 pm June 27 to 5:00 am
June 28 in a marathon meeting. Prior to the Council of
Ministers, there had been an inter-ministerial meeting of
election-related ministries that had looked at a calendar of
events that could meet the July 18 election date. In that
meeting, Laghdaf said the opposition-designated Minister of
Interior said the schedule was "challenging but doable."
Laghdaf said that, after 11 hours of debate, all sides had
had their chance to voice their concerns and that,
recognizing the reserves of some -- including now the
Minister of Interior -- the President had voiced his decision
to go ahead and the Prime Minister had declared the decree
adopted.


6. (C) Opposition says it Ain't So: At a 6:15 meeting with
representatives of the three poles, the RFD and FNDD
representatives said Laghdaf's description of events was not
accurate. The said that the Minister of Interior, receiving
a calendar developed by the Prime Minister's office had said
he would need time for his staff to review. When he was
called to the Council of Ministers, he was shocked to find
the calendar was being presented as a decree. The opposition
had assumed the first GNU Council of Ministers would be
devoted to the naming of the CENI. As the decree was tabled,
however, they made clear their sense that the Dakar agreement
called for a transition period of 42 days between the
formation of a GNU that had been set for June 6 and elections
on July 18. Noting that the Dakar agreement called for an
accelerated election process but specified the need for those
elections to be viable and credible, the opposition argued
the elections should be set 42 days from June 27. During the
course of the marathon meeting, the opposition said they had
kept an open mind on the July 18 but only if they could see
how that date could be achieved while still providing viable
and credible elections. They said President M'Bare adjourned
the meeting for later in the day only to find Laghdaf
claiming, after most of the ministers had departed, that the
decree had been "adopted." The opposition told the ICG they
were not contesting the July 18 election date per se but that
the Prime Minister had already ignored his written commitment
to govern impartially on the basis of consensus. The FNDD's

Ould Maouloud said, "We had insisted on this because he is
the deciding vote. If their idea of "consensus" is that he
will just side with Aziz' 14 ministers against ours, then
there is no way this will work."


7. (C) More ICG friction: The German Ambassador spoke first
and said it was the universal position of the ICG that the
July 18 election date was "non-negotiable" and accused the
opposition of acting in bad faith. Charge was compelled to
distance the U.S. position saying the U.S. agreed that the
18th was the target but did not see it as non-negotiable.
The Charge noted that the Prime Minister had not acted as
expected based on his commitments in that we did not see
"consensus" meaning 50% plus 1. The Prime Minister had
agreed that, if consensus could not be reached, he would seek
the assistance of the ICG. The Charge urged the three
parties to work together to see whether elections could be
held on the 18th, but made clear having credible elections
was more important than the date. Other speakers chimed in
with the EC, AU, China, and Senegal coming in generally on
the U.S. position (though not as bluntly) and France and
Spain siding with the German (again, not as bluntly). Ould
Maouloud said he recognized that all parties had emphasized
the importance of July 18 and said, in the interest of
depoliticizing the issue, he would prefer to wait for the
decision of the Constitutional Council. He emphasized that
the election process should be seen as a partnership between
the GNU (acting consensually),the CENI and the ICG.


8. (C) Charge Comment: The first day of the GNU
demonstrates that the political transition is far from
assured. Already, both sides are threatening to walk out.
While the July 18 electoral date is clearly very important to
retain the cooperation of the Aziz camp, some of our
international colleagues are too prone to rush forward no
matter what the end result. Our German counterpart is the
most blunt with statements like, "We need to close our eyes
and move forward," and "between the Dakar agreement and the
constitution, Dakar must take precedence." Should the
Constitutional Court throw out any element to the time
schedule put forward by Laghdaf (for instance his desire to
limit the filing of candidacies to three days instead of
fifteen) then the tight schedule for July 18 falls apart and
the election will likely have to move back no matter what the
mediators say. The Mission will continue to look at July 18
as an important date in the agreement but not a date that
must be met if at the cost of credibility. End Comment.
HANKINS