EUROPEANS ON NEXT STEPS IN MAURITANIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000037 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: EUROPEANS ON NEXT STEPS IN MAURITANIA Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The EC Representative in Nouakchott says no position has yet been taken on the significance of the National Dialogue on Democracy but does not believe the regime's actions will be sufficient to avoid negative European actions under Article 96 proceedings. European ambassadors agree that, absent significant improvements, the post-National Dialogue process will not meet international expectations. The EC expects the European Council will stop all new activities with the GIRM when the 120-day consultation period ends February 20 followed by a "lost year" as the EC refocuses its strategy to work with local governments and civil society rather than central authorities. The Europeans are debating whether to hold a final Article 96 consultation with the regime before the consultation period ends. There is also discussion of a multi-organization meeting (EU. AU, Arab League, OIC, Francophonie) in the next two weeks. The EC Representative (strictly protect) is concerned about the unilateral actions of the German Ambassador who will represent the European Union in Mauritania over the next six months. End Summary ¶2. (C) National Dialogue on Democracy Fails to Impress: Charge met January 11 with European Commission Delegate Geza Strammer and again, January 12, with Strammer as well as the French and Spanish Ambassadors, the German Charge d'Affaires, the UNDP ResRep and the IMF and World Bank representatives. On both days, Strammer said he personally did not see that the regime had gone far enough to avoid a negative result in the European Union's Article 96 consultations. While recognizing that the regime had released President Abdallahi, had held some form of national debate on the political situations, and had set a timeline for new elections, Strammer said the absence of President Abdallahi in the process meant that the results were insufficient. The Spanish Ambassador, generally quick to defend the regime, conceded that, "we (the Europeans) posed several questions to the regime and the answers were generally insufficient." The Europeans held that the regime's idea of heading to elections on May 30 could be made acceptable but only under certain conditions: (a) the new National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) would have to be exceedingly credible, (b) Aziz, when he resigns to campaign for president, would need to yield presidential authority to the President of the Senate and not to someone else on the High State Council, and, (c) the Mauritanians would have to accept and receive international electoral monitoring. On the last point, the French Ambassador said he had already recommended to Paris that the French support EU election monitoring regardless of how legitimate the process is seen. The UNDP ResRep said she was seeking guidance from New York whether to offer support to the CENI suggesting the Secretariat would likely look for guidance from member states. The European Commission Delegate cautioned that it was almost beyond the realm of possibility that the Commission would field a significant election monitoring team. ¶3. (C) Aziz No Better Off: Charge noted that the U.S. had not supported the National Dialogue process in the first place since it was organized by an illegitimate president and the government he had put in place. The Dialogue itself had not been representative, fell well short of being a true national debate, and was manipulated to produce the desired results. Charge added that rather than building national consensus around an exit strategy, the Dialogue seemed only to have hardened divisions as Aziz' intent became more clear -- forcing Ahmed Ould Daddah more firmly in the anti-coup camp. The French and Spanish ambassadors agreed that the Dialogue process had done little to help bolster Aziz' legitimacy. The Frenchman noted that an election campaign without a credible opponent -- either Ahmed Ould Daddah or someone representing the FNDD -- would leave a "victorious" Aziz no better off after the election than before. The Spaniard agreed saying "Aziz recognizes his weakness" but suggesting that Aziz is then faced with a choice between continuing with a strategy that leaves everything muddled or assume a more overt military posture and dispense with the election process altogether. ¶4. (C) But What Is The Option?: The Europeans bemoaned the lack of a clear counter-strategy from President Abdallahi and saw some growing tensions between Abdallahi and his loose FNDD political coalition. The French Ambassador dismissed the President's approach of letting things get worse before launching a political counter-offensive -- "that's not a 'strategy,' it's a 'posture.'" The Spaniard echoed that a strategy based on the hope of greater instability was reckless and risked results worse than the current situation. When pressed by the World Bank on what he would have Abdallahi do, French Ambassador Vandepoorter responded, "He can't just stay with his, 'Put me back in office and then we'll talk' approach because it's not going to happen. What he can and should do is insist on a political transition process that would lead to a true democratic decision and insist on a process that will get the military out of politics." Absent something concrete from Abdallahi, the Europeans assumed Aziz will go forward with elections and win and that, over time, Abdallahi will become less and less relevant. ¶5. (C) Next Steps for Europe: The German Charge and European Commission Delegate said they had yet to see how much emphasis the Czech Presidency of the European Union would give Mauritania. The German noted that her ambassador is in Prague briefing the Presidency on Mauritania as the proxy EU spokesperson in Mauritania during the Czech Presidency. She added that the Czechs had asked him to brief an EU Africa working group meeting to be held in Brussels on the 15th. The European Commissioner Delegate said there was a current debate within the Commission and with the Czechs whether to give Mauritania "one last chance" via a final Article 96 consultation. There was also discussion whether to hold another meeting of all concerned organizations (EU, AU, UN, OIC, Arab League and Francophonie) before the February 5 African Union deadline on actions against Mauritania. Assuming the status quo, Strammer said the Commission would start drafting a paper on "appropriate measures" by the end of January to be considered by the Council after the 120-day period for Article 96 dialogue expires on or about February 20. In his meeting with Charge on the 11th, Strammer said he thought the recommendations would be to cancel any new projects with the central government -- the most important being the modernization of the Port of Nouadhibou. Strammer thought there would be a desire to adjust the EC's workplan to avoid cooperation with the central government in favor of work with communities and civil society. Noting that most of the current workplan is infrastructure based, Strammer said such a significant rewrite would result in "a lost year" and yield a significantly more modest assistance package. ¶6. (C) German Concerns: European Commission Delegate Strammer (strictly protect) voiced worries about German Ambassador Schanze. On a bilateral basis, Strammer questioned whether the Ambassador actually reflected German national policy. He confided that "While I disagree, I understand that the French and Spaniards follow a so-called "pragmatic" approach dictated by specific national interests. Germany, however, has no real interests here and should be more in the "principled" camp like the U.S." Strammer saw German policy, as expressed by Ambassador Schanze, as inconsistent with more principled positions taken by the Germans in other countries. Noting Ambassador Schanze's extremely positive comments following the National Dialogue on Democracy, Strammer worried that the German would misrepresent the "European" viewpoint during his six months representing the Czech Presidency. He cautioned that Schanze had started his stint by unilaterally deciding to attend the closing ceremony of the Dialogue. This had forced the EC and the other European Missions to follow suit "to maintain some semblance of unity." He added that the ambassador's current trip to Prague to brief the Presidency was again a unilateral decision with no consultation with the Commission. He added he had drafted a Commission position paper to ensure the German Ambassador did not misrepresent the situation. However, he remains concerned HANKINS