HERDING CATS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAKAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000378

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: HERDING CATS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAKAR
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT MOVES AHEAD SLOWLY

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 369

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The tentative agreement reached in Dakar
was signed June 4 in Nouakchott by the three major sides to
the crisis in a sometimes raucous ceremony. After a meeting
with President Abdallahi in Lemden on June 6, International
Contact Group members and representatives of the three
political sides gathered at UN Headquarters in Nouakchott
June 7. Progress was good, but slow, and several outstanding
issues remain. Nevertheless, a national unity government is
scheduled to be finalized late on June 8. End summary.


2. (SBU) The signing: The tentative agreement reached in
Dakar on June 2 (Reftel),was finally signed June 4 in
Nouakchott at the Palais de Congres. Ambassador Boulware
attended the delayed, disorganized, and sometimes discordant
ceremony. A group of female Aziz supporters (bussed in for
the occasion) frequently drowned out the multiple speakers
from International Contact Group organizations and the three
sides to the crisis (General Aziz, Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD,
and the FNDD). On several occasions Aziz had to leave his
seat on the stage to exhort a minimum of decorum from his
followers. Only Senegalese President Wade commanded a
respectful silence during remarks that highlighted the
importance of the occasion, and that were generous in their
praise of President Abdallahi and the leaders and
representatives of the three political sides. Wade urged
that the spirit of compromise that prevailed in Dakar be
maintained, and that political actors work toward genuine
national unity. After drawing lots, the Chinese Ambassador
spoke on behalf of the UNSC P5.


3. (SBU) Visit to Lemden: On June 6, mediators and
International Contact Group members (with the Chinese
Ambassador still representing the UNSC P5) traveled to Lemden
to see President Abdallahi. They officially presented
Abdallahi with a copy of the accord, and discussed how to put
it into effect.


4. (SBU) The talks: Ambassador Boulware attended a day-long
meeting of representatives from the International Contact
Group on June 7 at UN Headquarters in Nouakchott. The group
was chaired by the African Union Ambassador to the EU, and
included the UNDP Resident Representative, the EU Commission
Representative, and Ambassadors from Senegal, France,
Germany, and Spain. Attendees who had not traveled to Lemden
were briefed on the visit and advised that President
Abdallahi expressed two preconditions he wanted fulfilled
before signing the decree establishing the national unity
government. First, the High State Council should be
dissolved. Second, the ceremonial signing should take place
at the Presidential Palace. German Ambassador Eberhard
Schanze, also representing the EU Presidency, opined that
these conditions might be difficult to arrange, and wondered
if there should not be a "Plan B" if Abdallahi did not
compromise. Ambassador Boulware underscored that for the
USG, Abdallahi's role was essential and constituted a
fundamental part of the accord. The AU chair noted that in
any event, such questions were being handled at President
Wade's level for the moment. (Note: The High State Council
was formerly the ruling junta, but after General Aziz's
resignation it has been nominally restricted to a purely
security role under General Ghazouani. End note.)


5. (SBU) Ministerial allocations: Representatives from the
three sides to the crisis also joined the discussions:
Aziz's camp was represented by Campaign Director and former
Finance Minister Sid'Ahmed Ould Raiss, the FNDD was
represented by co-leader and UFP president Mohamed Ould
Maouloud, and Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD party was represented
by Mohamed Abderrahmane Ould Moine. The group made good,
though slow progress towards assigning ministerial posts to
the three sides. Although the accord specifically provided

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that Aziz's group would name the Prime Minister after
consultation with the opposition parties, and that the
opposition parties would name the ministers of Interior,
Finance, and Communication, it did not specify exactly what
positions constituted the government. There was specific
concern about three ministerial-level positions that were not
members of the Council of Ministers; in particular, the
activities of the Commissioner of Food Security could easily
be politicized, they maintained. There was also disagreement
about the division of the four ministries deemed to
constitute "Ministries of National Sovereignty" -- Interior
(assigned to the FNDD/RFD by the accord),Justice, Defense,
and Foreign Affairs. Raiss argued that the ministries of
Defense and Foreign Affairs needed continuity and had little
involvement in elections and should therefore stay in the
Aziz camp. After breaking for a few hours for consultations,
consensus was reached in the evening on the distribution of
the 28 ministerial positions, with Defense (surprisingly) and
Interior allocated to the FNDD/RFD, and Justice and Foreign
Affairs allocated to the Aziz camp.


6. (SBU) Next steps: Political representatives promised
that when the group reconvened on June 8, they would have
names for all the ministerial positions, including the Prime
Minister. The question of the Commissioners (primarily Food
Security, but also Human Rights and Private Investment)
remains open, and the political groups appealed to the
International Contact Group for ideas about how to ensure
political neutrality in their activities. After the
political groups departed, International Contact Group
representatives discussed several ideas, particularly the
assignment of technical experts to monitor the implementation
of agreed upon work plans.


7. (SBU) The preliminary allocations for the ministerial
posts are as follows. (Note: "UPR" is Union Pour la
Republique, the political party formed in the wake of the
coup in support of Aziz. End note.)

Ministry of Justice - UPR and its allies
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation - UPR and its
allies
Ministry of Defense - FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Interior and Decentralization - FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Economy - UPR and its allies
Ministry of Finance - FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Education - UPR and its allies
Ministry of Islamic Affairs - FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Employment and Civil Service - UPR and its allies
Ministry of Health - FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy - FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Fishing and Maritime Economy - UPR and its allies
Ministry of Commerce, Crafts, and Tourism - UPR and its allies
Ministry of Housing, Urbanism, and Territorial Administration
- FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Rural Development - UPR and its allies
Ministry of Transportation - FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Hydrology - UPR and its allies
Ministry of Industry and Mines - FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sport - UPR and its allies
Ministry of Communication and Parliamentary Relations -
FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Social, Children, and Family Affairs - FNDD/RFD
Ministry of Environment - UPR and its allies
State Secretary of Modernization and Information Technology -
UPR and its allies
State Secretary of Professional Training - FNDD/RFD
Secretariat General of the Government - UPR and its allies
State Secretary of Maghreb Affairs - FNDD/RFD
Secretariat General of the Presidency - FNDD/RFD
Minister Counselor to the President - UPR and its allies


8. (SBU) Talks resumed June 8 but even with the opening
postponed for two hours, the FNDD and RFD were not ready to
present names for the ministries allocated to them nor had

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Aziz's camp yet been able to complete the required
consultations on their selection for Prime Minister. Ould
Maouloud did, however, report that he had confirmed with
President Abdallahi that he was ready to sign the decree
naming the government, but asked that he be given reasonable
advance notice. The contact group met separately with Aziz's
representative and those of the FNDD and RFD to explore
concerns about the activities of the three commissioners.
The group found a common interest in ensuring neutrality
during the transition period. All agreed to meet again
during the evening at which time political groups were
expected to bring names for all ministerial appointments and
the contact group promised a written proposal to deal with
the commissions. In departing RFD representative advised
that he expected difficulties with the nomination for Prime
Minister given his understanding that Aziz intended to
propose that current Prime Minister Laghdaf be carried over
into the unity government.


9. (C) Comment: The agreement, though officially signed,
remains tenuous. Implementation is difficult because some
aspects of the agreement remained verbal or vague. There is
still much pushing and pulling from the different parties to
the crisis that could potentially lead to a stalemate. We
have not "crossed the river yet" but the prospects still seem
positive if the parties keep acting in good faith and in the
interest of the country. Many Mauritanians have stressed the
crucial role of the international community and particularly
the United States in "accompanying" the agreement
implementation process and ensuring it goes smoothly. End
comment.
BOULWARE