ON THE EVE OF AN AGREEMENT, NOUADHIBOU "MOROSE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000370 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM MR SUBJECT: ON THE EVE OF AN AGREEMENT, NOUADHIBOU "MOROSE AND TENSE" REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 369 ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 366 ¶C. NOUAKCHOTT 361 Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: A day before a tentative agreement to the ongoing political crisis was reached in Dakar (Ref A), EmbOffs traveled to the economic capital of Nouadhibou to assess the mood and political situation ahead of elections. In meetings with both anti-coup and pro-coup political actors, the tension was evident. Divisions remained as sharp as ever, and EmbOffs were even assigned a "minder" in a sign of the regime's continuing unease regarding coup opponents. End summary. ¶2. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met with several political actors during a two-day trip to Nouadhibou, Mauritania's economic capital, on May 31 to June 1. Note: On the road to Nouadhibou, Embassy vehicles passed three new vans plastered with Aziz's image and slogans such as "Generation Aziz." Carrying Moroccan license plates with the Casablanca city code, these vans appeared to be well-equipped traveling medical clinics, and a component of Aziz's ongoing campaign to gain popular support through giveaways and free medical care (Ref B). End note. -------------- Meeting with Tawassoul -------------- ¶3. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met on May 31 with Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Ely, official in charge of the Tawassoul party's office in Nouadhibou. (Note: Tawassoul, a moderate Islamic political party, is a member of the FNDD and fierce opponents of the coup and military. Tawassoul currently holds the rotating presidency of the FNDD. Ely stated that Tawassoul had approximately 2,500 members in Nouadhibou, according to his member card lists. End note.) ¶4. (C) Describing the present period as "difficult," Ely remarked that the tone in Nouadhibou has hardened between sides since the start of the presidential campaign. Nevertheless, the campaign in Nouadhibou was practically a non-event. During previous campaigns, a festive atmosphere reigned during the evenings and nights, whereas now there was "nothing," he maintained. In reaction to the start of the campaign, there had been more marches, sit-ins, and police repression, Ely said. Asked if Aziz would be met by a large reception upon his arrival in Nouadhibou the next day, Ely laughed and said "I don't think so." (Comment: Indeed, as EmbOffs were leaving Nouadhibou the next day just ahead of Aziz's arrival, which had been delayed, there were only around 200 "supporters" at the airport to greet him. Most of these were apparently bussed in for the occasion, as there was row upon row of vans a short distance from the airport. End comment.) Regarding the ongoing Senegalese mediation, Ely expressed hope that there would be an accord, and thought "some sort of accord" would come out of the negotiations, but not one that would necessarily solve the crisis. -------------- Meeting with RFD -------------- ¶5. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met with approximately ten RFD officials at their packed Nouadhibou office on May 31. (Note: The number of people in the room fluctuated constantly as a result of the near continuous comings and goings of people stepping outside to answer their cell phones. End note.) The meeting bordered on chaotic at times, with people jumping in to offer their opinions on various subjects. ¶6. (C) Camara Moussa, representative of the RFD in NOUAKCHOTT 00000370 002 OF 003 Nouadhibou began the meeting by saying they were "under the boot of the military," and characterized the prevailing mood as "morose and tense." He went on to describe the joint FNDD/RFD sit-in at the UFP office a few days before (Ref C, para 7). The sit-in had involved loud-speakers and banners calling for the return of constitutional order; police tried to enter the building, but the protesters prevented them. He said several in the room had been injured during the sit-in, and several attendees pointed to where they had been struck by batons; one person had a bandage around his entire left forearm. ¶7. (C) Turning to the larger political scene, Moussa said they wanted a consensual solution, but Aziz must not be allowed to stand as a candidate. He noted the one-sided nature of the campaign thus far, with all the tents and publicity around town for Aziz, who he labeled "arrogant." "Our country doesn't need an uncultured president," he declared, taking another shot at Aziz. Regarding the ongoing Senegalese mediation efforts, representative of the RFD in Nouadhibou Moctar Ould Cheikh jumped in and said it was in the interests of all Mauritanians to find a solution, and that everyone had "great hopes" pinned on the mediation. Unfortunately, he said, Aziz has "not yet realized that this situation is not 2007 all over again." ¶8. (C) Hamada Ould Bakar, RFD member and counselor to the Mayor, frequently interjected during the meeting with strong statements. He slammed Qadhafi and Aziz for their "megalomania" and labeled Qadhafi a "connard" in French (which can be translated into English as "bastard," among other terms). When PolOff stated that the U.S. had maintained a clear, firm position since the August 2008 coup, Bakar diverged into a tangent regarding U.S. actions in Iraq. Comment: Bakar and some other RFD members present at the meeting frequently interrupted others to toss in extreme, even outlandish comments, such as "we will spill our blood for Mauritania!" End comment. -------------- Meeting with UFP -------------- ¶9. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met with UFP members N'Dongo Idrissa, counselor to the mayor, and Mohamed Ould El Mane, representative of the UFP on June 1. Idrissa described the current climate as "harsh" for the opposition. "We don't have the right to express ourselves," he declared. Although things were the worst under former President Taya, he said that the system now was not democratic either. Regarding the May 25 sit-in at the UFP office in Nouadhibou, Idrissa's account largely matched those provided by Tawassoul and RFD (see above). The additional details he provided were that six people were injured and the police used tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. ¶10. (C) Approximately 15 minutes into the meeting, a man appeared at the hotel and sat down on a couch next to EmbOffs, Idrissa, and El Mane without saying a word. When asked for his identity, he said he was Brigadier Abderrahmane Ould Habib of the police, and was there to "ensure the security of the Americans." (Comment: Habib later stated to PolOff that his specialty was illegal immigration. End comment.) El Mane disputed Habib's assertion, claiming that, as members of the opposition, they were constantly followed, and their telephones were monitored; therefore, the appearance of this "minder" was not too surprising. (Note: Habib also "provided security" for PAO on a recent trip to Nouadhibou. End note.) El Mane thanked the U.S. for its strong support, and speaking loudly so Habib could hear, declared "we have a bitter history with the military in this country" and "we only ask to be able to express our rights." He went on to label President Abdallahi the "current and legitimate president" who had to fulfill his original mandate of five years. Comment: El Mane appeared at times to be NOUAKCHOTT 00000370 003 OF 003 goading the "minder," at one point flat out calling him a "spy." Habib then retorted, "Without security, you wouldn't be able to say what you want. Liberty is respected, and Aziz is the biggest democrat of them all!" There were several similar such exchanges during the meeting -- a rare chance for the two sides to directly confront each other around a table, instead of during a demonstration or sit-in. End comment. -------------- Meeting with Mayor -------------- ¶11. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met with the Mayor of Nouadhibou, Mohamed Fadel Ould Aboubakrine, at his office. (Note: Aboubakrine, a native of Nouadhibou, is a staunch Aziz supporter and from the same tribe. Brigadier Habib sat in on this meeting as well, continuing to provide his "security," but remained silent the entire time. End note.) Saying that there were "no taboos," Aboubakrine encouraged EmbOffs to ask any question. He mentioned the need for decentralization in his town, and cited poverty and immigration as major issues that he faced. ¶12. (C) Turning to politics, Aboubakrine spoke in the language of Aziz supporters, saying change had been "imperative" and that the situation prior to Aziz taking power was "dangerous" and "explosive." Hinting, like many other coup supporters, that the U.S. didn't understand the "realities" of Mauritania's situation, he described this "great man" as the savior of the country. (Note: Aboubakrine rarely, if ever, mentioned Aziz by name, saying instead "this man." End note.) He stated several times the "great hope" that the "change" (i.e., coup) had aroused in Mauritanians. At about the moment he minimized the opposition as "two or three extremist groups," El Mane of the UFP, who is also a counselor to the mayor, entered the room to sit in on the meeting. Aboubakrine went on to say the Senegalese mediation was problematic, because opposition members were not honest negotiators; as soon as you gave them one concession, they asked for more, he maintained. Nevertheless, he portrayed Nouadhibou's town council as an inclusive "mosaic" that included nine political blocs. When PolOff inquired why certain political groups were repressed, Aboubakrine asserted that there comes a time when "civil order has to be preserved at any cost." Furthermore, one group could not "infringe" on other groups in expressing its ideas, implying that that was exactly what the opposition had done. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) The political divisions encountered in Nouakchott were just as evident in Nouadhibou. Clearly the recent demonstrations and subsequent police repression had generated anxiety among the political class. The muted enthusiasm for General Aziz's impending campaign stop only added to the sense of malaise. One can only hope that the agreement reached in Dakar (Ref A) will be formally signed in Nouakchott, and serve to dispel the instability, fear, and turmoil that has reigned in the country for the past ten months. BOULWARE