EUROPEANS ON NEXT STEPS IN MAURITANIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000037

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: EUROPEANS ON NEXT STEPS IN MAURITANIA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: The EC Representative in Nouakchott says no
position has yet been taken on the significance of the
National Dialogue on Democracy but does not believe the
regime's actions will be sufficient to avoid negative
European actions under Article 96 proceedings. European
ambassadors agree that, absent significant improvements, the
post-National Dialogue process will not meet international
expectations. The EC expects the European Council will stop
all new activities with the GIRM when the 120-day
consultation period ends February 20 followed by a "lost
year" as the EC refocuses its strategy to work with local
governments and civil society rather than central
authorities. The Europeans are debating whether to hold a
final Article 96 consultation with the regime before the
consultation period ends. There is also discussion of a
multi-organization meeting (EU. AU, Arab League, OIC,
Francophonie) in the next two weeks. The EC Representative
(strictly protect) is concerned about the unilateral actions
of the German Ambassador who will represent the European
Union in Mauritania over the next six months. End Summary


2. (C) National Dialogue on Democracy Fails to Impress:
Charge met January 11 with European Commission Delegate Geza
Strammer and again, January 12, with Strammer as well as the
French and Spanish Ambassadors, the German Charge d'Affaires,
the UNDP ResRep and the IMF and World Bank representatives.
On both days, Strammer said he personally did not see that
the regime had gone far enough to avoid a negative result in
the European Union's Article 96 consultations. While
recognizing that the regime had released President Abdallahi,
had held some form of national debate on the political
situations, and had set a timeline for new elections,
Strammer said the absence of President Abdallahi in the
process meant that the results were insufficient. The
Spanish Ambassador, generally quick to defend the regime,
conceded that, "we (the Europeans) posed several questions to
the regime and the answers were generally insufficient." The
Europeans held that the regime's idea of heading to elections
on May 30 could be made acceptable but only under certain
conditions: (a) the new National Independent Electoral
Commission (CENI) would have to be exceedingly credible, (b)
Aziz, when he resigns to campaign for president, would need
to yield presidential authority to the President of the
Senate and not to someone else on the High State Council,
and, (c) the Mauritanians would have to accept and receive
international electoral monitoring. On the last point, the
French Ambassador said he had already recommended to Paris
that the French support EU election monitoring regardless of
how legitimate the process is seen. The UNDP ResRep said she
was seeking guidance from New York whether to offer support
to the CENI suggesting the Secretariat would likely look for
guidance from member states. The European Commission
Delegate cautioned that it was almost beyond the realm of
possibility that the Commission would field a significant
election monitoring team.


3. (C) Aziz No Better Off: Charge noted that the U.S. had
not supported the National Dialogue process in the first
place since it was organized by an illegitimate president and
the government he had put in place. The Dialogue itself had
not been representative, fell well short of being a true
national debate, and was manipulated to produce the desired
results. Charge added that rather than building national
consensus around an exit strategy, the Dialogue seemed only
to have hardened divisions as Aziz' intent became more clear
-- forcing Ahmed Ould Daddah more firmly in the anti-coup
camp. The French and Spanish ambassadors agreed that the
Dialogue process had done little to help bolster Aziz'
legitimacy. The Frenchman noted that an election campaign
without a credible opponent -- either Ahmed Ould Daddah or
someone representing the FNDD -- would leave a "victorious"
Aziz no better off after the election than before. The
Spaniard agreed saying "Aziz recognizes his weakness" but
suggesting that Aziz is then faced with a choice between
continuing with a strategy that leaves everything muddled or
assume a more overt military posture and dispense with the
election process altogether.


4. (C) But What Is The Option?: The Europeans bemoaned the
lack of a clear counter-strategy from President Abdallahi and
saw some growing tensions between Abdallahi and his loose
FNDD political coalition. The French Ambassador dismissed
the President's approach of letting things get worse before
launching a political counter-offensive -- "that's not a
'strategy,' it's a 'posture.'" The Spaniard echoed that a
strategy based on the hope of greater instability was
reckless and risked results worse than the current situation.
When pressed by the World Bank on what he would have
Abdallahi do, French Ambassador Vandepoorter responded, "He
can't just stay with his, 'Put me back in office and then
we'll talk' approach because it's not going to happen. What
he can and should do is insist on a political transition
process that would lead to a true democratic decision and
insist on a process that will get the military out of
politics." Absent something concrete from Abdallahi, the
Europeans assumed Aziz will go forward with elections and win
and that, over time, Abdallahi will become less and less
relevant.


5. (C) Next Steps for Europe: The German Charge and
European Commission Delegate said they had yet to see how
much emphasis the Czech Presidency of the European Union
would give Mauritania. The German noted that her ambassador
is in Prague briefing the Presidency on Mauritania as the
proxy EU spokesperson in Mauritania during the Czech
Presidency. She added that the Czechs had asked him to brief
an EU Africa working group meeting to be held in Brussels on
the 15th. The European Commissioner Delegate said there was
a current debate within the Commission and with the Czechs
whether to give Mauritania "one last chance" via a final
Article 96 consultation. There was also discussion whether
to hold another meeting of all concerned organizations (EU,
AU, UN, OIC, Arab League and Francophonie) before the
February 5 African Union deadline on actions against
Mauritania. Assuming the status quo, Strammer said the
Commission would start drafting a paper on "appropriate
measures" by the end of January to be considered by the
Council after the 120-day period for Article 96 dialogue
expires on or about February 20. In his meeting with Charge
on the 11th, Strammer said he thought the recommendations
would be to cancel any new projects with the central
government -- the most important being the modernization of
the Port of Nouadhibou. Strammer thought there would be a
desire to adjust the EC's workplan to avoid cooperation with
the central government in favor of work with communities and
civil society. Noting that most of the current workplan is
infrastructure based, Strammer said such a significant
rewrite would result in "a lost year" and yield a
significantly more modest assistance package.


6. (C) German Concerns: European Commission Delegate
Strammer (strictly protect) voiced worries about German
Ambassador Schanze. On a bilateral basis, Strammer
questioned whether the Ambassador actually reflected German
national policy. He confided that "While I disagree, I
understand that the French and Spaniards follow a so-called
"pragmatic" approach dictated by specific national interests.
Germany, however, has no real interests here and should be
more in the "principled" camp like the U.S." Strammer saw
German policy, as expressed by Ambassador Schanze, as
inconsistent with more principled positions taken by the
Germans in other countries. Noting Ambassador Schanze's
extremely positive comments following the National Dialogue
on Democracy, Strammer worried that the German would
misrepresent the "European" viewpoint during his six months
representing the Czech Presidency. He cautioned that Schanze
had started his stint by unilaterally deciding to attend the
closing ceremony of the Dialogue. This had forced the EC and
the other European Missions to follow suit "to maintain some
semblance of unity." He added that the ambassador's current
trip to Prague to brief the Presidency was again a unilateral
decision with no consultation with the Commission. He added
he had drafted a Commission position paper to ensure the
German Ambassador did not misrepresent the situation.
However, he remains concerned
HANKINS