SENEGALESE MEDIATION: FNDD AND RFD STILL COMMITTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000336

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM MR
SUBJECT: SENEGALESE MEDIATION: FNDD AND RFD STILL COMMITTED
DESPITE DISCOURAGING SIGNS

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 253

B. NOUAKCHOTT 323

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: FNDD and RFD emissaries told Ambassador
that they remain committed to the Senegalese mediation, which
they described as the "last opportunity" to reach a
consensual agreement. Nevertheless, Aziz has sent
discouraging signs by not responding to their calls to
suspend the elections and liberate political prisoners by the
May 17 deadline. The FNDD and RFD want the Senegalese
mediation to continue under international community auspices
and asked the US to request that France, the African Union
and international partners put pressure on Aziz to negotiate.
They would also like the International Contact Group and
France to declare publicly that they will not recognize the
elections. End summary.

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THE FRIDAY MEETING
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2. (C) In a meeting May 17 with the Ambassador, FNDD
co-leader and UFP President Mohamed Ould Maouloud and RFD
Vice-President Mohamed Abderrahmane Ould Moine stated that
the FNDD and RFD had accepted to go into the May 15 meeting
without any pre-conditions. Maouloud explained that this
concession was aimed at creating favorable conditions for a
first contact between contending factions. Nevertheless,
beyond this trust-building encounter, Ould Maouloud said that
the FNDD and RFD had imposed two pre-conditions necessary for
a second meeting. The first would be the suspension of
General Aziz's unilateral electoral agenda and the second the
liberation of political prisoners. They requested that
Aziz's camp give them a response by May 17 before noon to
allow the FNDD and RFD to prepare for the second meeting and
cancel, as a sign of good faith, a massive demonstration
scheduled for May 18.


3. (C) Ould Maouloud was concerned that as of the afternoon
of May 17, the AU and Senegalese mediators had not heard back
from Aziz. They had heard discouraging rumors that pointed
at Aziz's unwillingness to negotiate. Alarmed by Aziz's
silence, the FNDD and RFD had continued planning their march
but decided to request the US's assistance in pressuring the
international community to make an urgent call "against the
mediation's failure." They would also like the mediation to
move forward under the international community's wing, as the
International Contact Group's decision called for a
consensual solution as the only way out of the crisis. Ould
Moine echoed Ould Maouloud's concerns. He asked the
Ambassador to act quickly to pressure the international
community into stressing to Aziz that failure to negotiate
was unacceptable.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked Ould Maouloud and Ould Moine
whether they had contacted AU Commission President Jean Ping.
They responded they had not and said their Ambassador in
Addis Ababa had said AU Peace and Security Commissioner
Ramtane Lamamra would come to Nouakchott next week. They
both agreed that the African Union had kept a low profile
during the mediation, which was mostly run by the Senegalese.
At the May 15 meeting, the international community had been
represented by UN SRSG for West Africa Said Djinnit but he
played a minor role.


5. (C) Ould Maouloud asked the Ambassador to suggest that
the International Contact Group release a communique tomorrow
stating that they will not recognize the elections. He also
wants the Ambassador to intervene with France to convince
them to reject the election. Comment: A French change of
heart seems highly unlikely in light of a French Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statements on May 14 saying France
"thinks it is important that these elections take place and

NOUAKCHOTT 00000336 002 OF 002


that they be inclusive. France and the overwhelming majority
of the international community believe that holding these
elections is crucial for Mauritania." End comment. The FNDD
and the RFD would also want the AU's Peace and Security
Council to announce that sanctions will be applied starting
June 6 if Aziz moves forward with his agenda.


6. (C) Ould Maouloud and Ould Moine concurred that if the
General starts his campaign as planned on May 21, "things
will get very complicated for everybody." They highlighted
that "unilateral actions would be strongly rejected" by the
opposition. Ould Moine, as if to warn the Ambassador about
possible violence, stated that an authorized march had been
violently repressed last week and that they did not know how
the authorities would react to the planned May 18 march.
Note: That march, according to Ould Moine and several media
outlets, has been authorized. End note.


7. (C) The men stated they were meeting May 18 with the
Embassy of France. The Ambassador reassured them he would see
what he could do on their behalf but cautioned that
coordinated international action normally took time. He
stressed a joint US, AU and international community action
would be necessary as he did not think the US alone could
have much of an impact. He stated that maybe members of the
AU Peace and Security Council that had shown a certain
independence could be contacted. The men suggested that the
Ambassador contact Senegal, Qatar and Libya. They stressed
that Libya would respond positively to a US request.


8. (C) Comment: Some local media outlets reported May 17
that the Air Mauritanie case involving Prime Minister Waghef
and three other anti-coup activists (Ref A) will be
transferred to the Supreme Court on May 18. Reportedly the
Supreme Court will hear the detainees' appeal, order their
immediate temporary release, and remove the bail requirement
(currently set at 100 million ouguiyas, or approximately
$380,000 US). Such a move would fulfill one of the
opposition's main prerequisites for beginning any serious
dialogue and would signal Aziz is "throwing them a bone."


9. (C) Comment continued: If Aziz is unwilling to
negotiate, it will be extremely difficult for the US to
assist the FNDD in extending the Senegalese mediation's life.
It is regrettable, and shows a certain lack of vision on
their part, that two weeks ago the FNDD and RFD declined the
Ambassador's offer to intervene with the Senegalese towards a
productive negotiation. At the time, FNDD and RFD declared
themselves skeptical of Senegalese efforts (Ref B).
Nonetheless, as the Senegalese mediation represents the last
best chance for a consensual solution to the Mauritanian
crisis before the junta organized elections, it is important
that the US make every effort to keep these talks alive.
End comment.
BOULWARE