AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON JUNTA "FOREIGN MINISTER"

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000333 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV ODIP MR SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON JUNTA "FOREIGN MINISTER" REF: A. NOUACKCHOTT 512 B. NOUAKCHOTT 330 NOUAKCHOTT 00000333 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CLASSIFICATION CHANGE) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador called on the junta "Foreign Minister" on May 12 amid a wave of negative press featuring accusations of improper interference by the Embassy in internal affairs, an apparent GIRM suspension of visa issuances for official Americans, and attempts to limit in-country USG diplomatic travel. Ambassador advised that USG policy opposing the coup and attempts to legitimize it through unilateral elections remained constant although the USG hoped for progress in ongoing mediation. He urged that efforts be made to maintain as normal a relationship as possible given respective positions, protested attempts to limited mission travel and advised that inaction of visas threatened remaining USG programs of mutual interest. The "Minister" warned against "inappropriate activities" and blamed slow visa issuance on newly tightened controls such those the USG has, but said that he would look into the matter. ¶2. (C) Ambassador called on junta "Foreign Minister" Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou on May 12 and within days of his return to post against a backdrop of an organized campaign against the Embassy by the junta government and pro-coup forces. A wave of negative press in the days before the Ambassador's return featured calls that DCM Hankins (then Charge) be declared persona non grata and accused the Embassy and our democracy partner NDI of improper interference in the internal affairs of Mauritania implying USG financing of pro-democracy parties (ref A). At the same time, the GIRM, already painfully slow to respond to our visa requests, seemed virtually to stop the process altogether while the Foreign Ministry pronounced "inopportune" a planned trip by the Embassy's POLITICAL officer to a southern town to meet with police and local election commission officials (ref B). ¶3. (C) The Ambassador noted that he had requested the meeting in order to share his perspective on US policy toward Mauritania following his stay in Washington as well as to raise some administrative concerns. Regarding the former, he said that notwithstanding the change in administration, the USG continued to oppose the coup d'tat and the junta's unilateral decision to organize early elections. He went on to say that we were nonetheless hopeful that a consensual solution for a return to constitutional order acceptable to the international community could still be found and that we were closely following Senegalese mediation efforts. ¶4. (C) "Foreign Minister" Mohamedou replied that in spite of preparations for elections the GIRM remained open to such mediation but that if it were not successful, the GIRM would carry out the decision of the Estates General on Democracy to hold those elections. He said that it was time for the USG to review its policy and insisted that there was no longer a military regime as General Aziz had stepped down to become a "simple citizen" while the High Council of State's role was now limited to security matters. He argued that Mauritania was on its way back to constitutionality and that the US should support that and realize that the measures such as the targeted travel sanctions in the wake of the coup should be removed. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Boulware noted that absent consensual agreement, it was unlikely that the elections as currently planned would produce any significant change in USG policy. He urged that, nonetheless both the Ministry and the Embassy work to preserve as much harmony in the relationship as possible consistent with the positions of our respective governments. To that end, the Ambassador expressed concern that the Ministry appeared to have virtually stopped visa issuances for official Americans and that these delays were beginning to impact longstanding programs like the Peace Corps that were clearly in our mutual interest. Mohamedou denied any detailed knowledge about pending visa requests but said that when he had taken charge of the ministry he found the visa approval process chaotic and introduced procedures NOUAKCHOTT 00000333 002.2 OF 002 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CLASSIFICATION CHANGE) to properly screen and vet applications"just as you do"and that this was necessarily somewhat time consuming. He promised, though, to look into the matter. ¶6. (C) Similarly, the Ambassador noted our surprise that a routine diplomatic note advising it of a planned mission to the southern town of Rosso to meet with local police and election commission officials had resulted in a responding note advising that the trip was "inopportune." Mohamedou said that he thought the point of the trip was strange and said that "the President" agreed (presumably interim "President" Ba M'Bare). He also noted that the security situation was delicate and had to be taken into account. Ambassador Boulware stated that the Embassy does not request permission to travel within Mauritania nor is that required under conventions. He observed that notifications of planned travel were a simple courtesy enabling the GIRM to take any advisable security measures but said further that we will continue to seek meetings with local officials whenever we thought it useful. Mohamedou responded that Mauritania had to remain vigilant against inappropriate behavior such as in the "recent affair of the Iranians in Morocco." ¶7. (S) Comment: It is not yet clear whether, as some sensitive reporting suggests, that the visa slow down and attempts to limit movements by Embassy staff are the individual initiatives of "Minister" Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou or rather are part of a broader effort by pro-junta elements to put the Embassy on the defensive, limit its effectiveness or extract a higher price for USG opposition to the coup. While unwilling to compromise on fundamental issues neither do we intend to be drawn into an escalating diplomatic row at this moment that can only distract from the current mediation attempts. If there is no sign of improvement following the Ambassador's intervention, we will insure that our concerns and possible consequences are made known to a wider circle of authorities in the hope that the "Minister" will be corrected. BOULWARE