MEETINGS WITH NEW PRO-COUP POLITICAL PARTIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000332

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM MR
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH NEW PRO-COUP POLITICAL PARTIES

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 188

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: PolOff and PolAsst met with two different
breeds of new pro-coup political parties. Union Pour la
Republique (UPR),intimately connected with coup leader and
now presidential candidate Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, sees the
June 6 election as an opportunity to return to constitutional
order and dismisses coup detractors as a minority that is
attempting to tyrannize the majority. Rassemblement du
Peuple Mauritanien (RDPM),headed by former Taya strong-man
Louleid Ould Weddad, supports the coup but has refused to
unconditionally back Aziz and is increasingly taking its
distance from him. Its leaders say they want to help broker
a consensual agreement and have publicly called for delaying
elections. End summary.

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UPR: THE PARTY OF THE PARLIAMENTARIAN MAJORITY
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2. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met May 13 with Mohamed Aly
Cherif, parliamentarian and vice-president of the newly
created UPR political party, of which coup leader and now
presidential candidate Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz is "interim"
president. (Comment: It is widely known that UPR is Aziz's
party but Aziz is running as an independent candidate and UPR
has named him "interim" president with the intention of
confirming him as president after the election. Many believe
UPR will become a monolithic state party in Ould Taya's PRDS
fashion once Aziz becomes president. End comment.) Cherif
was accompanied by National Assembly Deputy and President of
the Assembly's External Relations Commission Taleb Ould Sidi
Ould Khalifa. Almost thirty minutes into the meeting, the
men were joined by Abdallah Hormatallah , UPR's
communications officer. Note: In addition, Hormatallah
works as communications officer for Aziz's presidential
campaign. End note.


3. (C) Cherif and Khalifa seemed all too pleased to welcome
EmbOffs. Cherif opened the meeting by stating that he only
regretted EmbOffs had not come to see him sooner. He went on
to explain that UPR was created on May 5 by a group of
independent majority parliamentarians who, for the most part,
were former members of President Abdallahi's defunct
PNDD-ADIL party. According to Cherif, 41 out of 95 deputies
are UPR members and only five former PNDD-ADIL members
refused to join UPR. Comment: Former PNDD-ADIL members who
refused to join UPR formed RDPM under Ould Weddad's
presidency. End comment.


4. (C) Cherif and Khalifa insisted on providing EmbOffs
with a comprehensive history of President Sidi Ould Cheikh
Abdallahi's political mistakes, aimed at justifying their
support for the coup. They accused Abdallahi of betraying
his own party, PNDD-ADIL, by not granting ministerial
positions to party members, "even though we supported him in
everything." They further accused him of alienating his
parliamentarian majority by including Mohamed Ould Maouloud's
UFP and Jemil Ould Mansour's Tawassoul parties in Prime
Minister Waghef's government. Cherif stated these two
parties were given "too much importance." Cherif reminded
EmbOffs that UFP and Tawassoul, now "the backbone of the
FNDD," were, respectively, a Marxist and Islamic party.
According to Cherif, UFP and Tawassoul "had not been elected
by the people but wanted to control the government." Cherif
declared they did not mind UFP's entrance in the government
as much as Tawassoul's. He stressed that Mansour had been in
contact with "Islamist leaders" without naming names. He
alleged that Mansour's party had spent over 3 million dollars
campaigning during the 2006 National Assembly elections and
hinted that this was laundered money coming from outside
sources. Cherif said that the inclusion of Islamists in the
government, something Abdallahi had promoted in the name of
democratic representation, had made the parliamentarian

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majority very uneasy. Comment: By condemning UFP and
Tawassoul, Cherif was playing the now-familiar "extremist"
card so often used by coup supporters. He seemed to imply
the U.S. and Jemil Ould Mansour made for strange bedfellows.
End comment.


5. (C) Cherif also highlighted Abdallahi's mismanagement of
the military. He explained that after being "on good terms
with the Generals," Abdallahi brought the coup upon himself
by firing all of them at once and replacing them with lower
ranking colonels. In Cherif's view, if Abdallahi suspected
General Aziz of plotting against him, he should have fired
General Aziz and not the others. Instead, Abdallahi's
decision "unleashed chaos" within the military and created
the conditions for a very dangerous imbalance in the country.


6. (C) Cherif was keen to dispel rumors that UPR party
members were the military's supporters. "We can't be accused
of being pawns" for the military, he asserted. He stressed
that it was the military that supported President Abdallahi
until May 2008 and not the "independents."


7. (C) Cherif stated that Waghef was a "disastrous" Prime
Minister with no legitimacy as he was not a politician and
had not been elected by the people. Waghef is in jail for
corruption rather than for political reasons, stressed
Cherif. Other FNDD leaders like Boidiel Ould Houmeid and
Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba were individuals who had been defeated
in the elections and had no popular legitimacy. He said he
could not understand how Abdallahi could have chosen these
people to be part of his government and head his party.


8. (C) Regarding accusations that majority parliamentarians
were "extremists" who wanted to severe relations with Israel,
Cherif declared himself a supporter of ties with Israel but
said he opposed "Israeli extremism." According to him,
Israel had crossed the line by attacking Gaza, leaving
Mauritania no option but to "freeze" relations. Cherif was
quick to point out that those relations had not been "cut"
but suspended. Comment: Cherif's comments suggest that
Mauritanians intend to continue using relations with Israel
as a bargaining chip with the U.S. End comment.


9. (C) PolOff asked Cherif how UPR interpreted the fact
that none of the major parties wanted to participate in the
election and how UPR intended to move the country forward
after June 6. Cherif responded that for UPR, the opposition
is a minority that does not represent the true voice of
Mauritanians. Cherif dismissed Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD as a
party "in the process of disintegrating." He stated RFD had
already lost four deputies and would most likely lose two or
three more in the next weeks. He declared himself surprised
that RFD was now opposing the June 6 election because they
had originally called for elections to be held as soon as
possible. As for the FNDD, Cherif said they had rejected all
opportunities for dialogue and now were accusing the majority
of acting unilaterally. He stated the FNDD had refused to
participate in the Etats Generaux ("National Dialogue on
Democracy"),in the Qadhafi mediation, and in the Senegalese
mediation. They were a typical example of the "minority that
rejects the law of the majority" and all they wanted was to
perpetuate the crisis.


10. (C) Cherif proceeded to sing the praises of the United
States. He drew frequent parallels between President Obama
and President Kennedy. He declared himself open to dialogue
and to U.S. advice in these difficult times as the U.S. is an
important Mauritanian partner. He invited PolOff to keep in
touch and called the meeting "an ice-breaker" that should
lead to further exchanges. Nevertheless, he pointed out that
our policy in Mauritania had come to further "upset" the
situation in a context that was already "rotten."


11. (C) At PolAsst's request Cherif explained the party's
platform would center on "restoring Mauritanian democracy"
after the June 6 elections and increasing security and

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stability in order to fight corruption and poverty. When
PolOff asked about Aziz's plans to dissolve the National
Assembly and eliminate the Senate, Cherif stepped back from
Aziz by responding that Aziz was an independent candidate and
had his own platform.


12. (C) In response to PolAsst's observation that
Mauritania seemed to be moving closer to Iran and Libya, he
responded that the U.S. was also getting closer to those
countries. He stated he did not see a problem with
Mauritania's newfound friendship with these countries as
Mauritania is a sovereign country and practices a moderate
Islam.


13. (C) Khalifa ended the meeting by calling on the U.S. to
understand that democracy meant respecting the wishes of the
majority and that the majority of parliamentarians were
pro-coup. He also stated that mayors, as elected officials,
are the people's representatives. Most mayors, according to
him, are pro-coup. Finally, he reminded the U.S. that
disorder and crisis could not breed development and security.
Cherif said he would like to come to the U.S. if visa
sanctions were not applied against him.

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RDPM: FURTHER DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM AZIZ
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14. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met with RDPM party president
and parliamentarian Louleid Ould Weddad and parliamentarian
Baba Ould Sidi at the new and affluent RDPM headquarters.
PolOff and PolAsst had previously met with these men in
March, when they announced they wanted to create a party
that, while supporting Aziz, would maintain its distance from
the state party the General was planning to create (see
Reftel). Comment: Many Mauritanians in political circles
believe that Ould Weddad's unwillingness to back Aziz is a
sign that the General is weak. Ould Weddad, Ould Taya's
gate-keeper, has a reputation for being a sly politician who
is always on the right side of power. Furthermore, he is
rumored to be extremely rich, a result of his many years with
Taya. LES state that he owns a large villa in Nouakchott,
and an equally luxurious villa in his hometown of Ouadane.
End comment.


15. (C) Ould Weddad declared his party was actively
approaching political actors to convince them to find a
solution. His party felt it would be wise to hold off on the
elections until a consensus had been reached, and agreed that
elections as currently planned wouldn't magically solve
everything. Note: The party recently published a press
release openly calling for a delay in elections. End note.
He said he still had hopes the election date would be changed
and that he would work towards that goal "until the last
minute." When PolOff asked him if they planned to boycott
the election if it took place on June 6, he refused to
expound on the party's strategy and stated they would think
about it once it became obvious that no agreement could be
reached.


16. (C) Ould Weddad's questions revealed more about what
preocupies him than his actual statements. He wanted to know
if PolOff knew anything about the FNDD's willingness to
participate in the Senegalese mediation, if a change in the
election date would satisfy the FNDD, and what the
international community position in the post-election period
would be. Ould Sidi and Ould Weddad seemed surprised when
PolOff said that the main bone of contention was not the
actual election date but the General's unilateral agenda.


17. (C) Comment: It is interesting that UPR leaders were
so keen about maintaining a semblance of distance from Aziz
and the military when everybody knows they are one and the
same. Ironically, their accusations of Abdallahi spreading
the wealth among various political parties at the expense of
his own party appears to be Aziz's emerging strategy. By

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running as an independent candidate, Aziz can have a freer
hand to distribute the spoils of government to whomever he
likes. As for Ould Weddad and RDPM members, it seems that
the rats are poised to jump off the Aziz ship, which is
surprising as he is headed towards a virtually assured
electoral victory on June 6. In fact, when Aziz met with
"his" parliamentary majority May 13, Weddad and the RDPM
boycotted the meeting, in another sign of their tepid support
for him. End comment.
BOULWARE