AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI IN LEMDEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000328 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI IN LEMDEN REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 315 ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 306 Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Abdallahi, still determined to fight the coup and very much active in the opposition, declared himself open to concessions as long as proposed solutions respected the constitution. The president thinks the Senegalese, rather than coming to the negotiation table with a ready-made plan, should play the role of facilitators and let political parties find a solution. Nevertheless, he explained it was unlikely the Senegalese mediation would lead anywhere as General Aziz and his supporters -- who originally claimed they were open to negotiations -- were not willing to reschedule the election. According to Abdallahi, pro-coup supporters declared themselves amenable to finding a solution only because they expected President Abdallahi to obstruct the negotiations but were very much taken aback when they found out he was willing to participate. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Boulware traveled to Lemden May 11 to meet with deposed President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi for the first time since the Ambassador's return to Mauritania. The people of Lemden came out in full force to greet the Ambassador, who was accompanied by Mrs. Boulware, PolOff and EconOff. Members of President Abdallahi's entourage included Diplomatic Advisor Sidney Sokhona, Spokesman Ahmed Samba Ould Abdallahi Ould Samba and Tawassoul Member in Charge of External Relations Mohamed Lemine Ould Mohamed Moussa. President Abdallahi's wife Khatou Mint Boukary, their daughter Amal, and Mohamed, one of their three sons, were also present. ¶3. (C) President Abdallahi, who was in good spirits, was thrilled to see the Ambassador. He thanked Ambassador Boulware for U.S. support and its strong stance against the coup. He highlighted that, against all expectations, opposition to the coup had strengthened over the past nine months and that this was the first time in Mauritanian history that the population had opposed the military. According to Abdallahi, General Aziz's supporters, who sided with him only because he was the man in power, are starting to realize Aziz will not succeed in consolidating the coup or delivering on all his promises. ¶4. (C) President Abdallahi then provided an overview of the political crisis since Ambassador Boulware's departure. He summarized the positions of neighboring Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Senegal, and Tunisia, and said his neighbors were influenced by their interests in Mauritania. The president also commented on the Qadhafi mediation as well as French, German, AU and Arab League positions. During the President's summary, a member of his entourage entered the room and whispered something to his ear. The President looked amused and told the Ambassador that pro-coup parliamentarians had prevented anti-coup ones from entering the National Assembly. Comment: Later on, EmbOffs were informed by the entourage that what had really happened was that pro-coup majority parliamentarians and ministers started making noise when their opposition colleagues suggested the session should focus on the political crisis in Mauritania. Since opposition parliamentarians would not back down, the pro-coup majority decided to leave the session. Opposition parliamentarians then decided to hold the session without them and to occupy parliament for 24 hours. President Abdallahi and his entourage were elated at the news. Local media outlets reported a different story, where anti-coup parliamentarians drowned out pro-coup parliamentarians (see Septel). End comment. -------------- THE SENEGALESE MEDIATION -------------- ¶5. (C) The President stated his displeasure at the NOUAKCHOTT 00000328 002 OF 003 Senegalese as both he and the FNDD felt the Senegalese had sent negative signs after the coup. President Abdallahi criticized Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade for wanting to solve the crisis in what he described as the "African way" or under the "arbre a palabres." Note: The "arbre a palabres" is a tree where traditional community leaders and elders meet to discuss problems and reach agreements. End note. President Abdallahi explained Wade wanted to bring him together with Aziz in the same room, join their hands in a handshake and tell them they could not leave until they sorted out their differences. ¶6. (C) President Abdallahi explained that Wade had invited him to Senegal as he wanted to gather elements to draft a mediation initiative. At the beginning, Abdallahi was skeptical but after General Aziz's resignation he told himself he would give Wade a chance. Abdallahi proposed a date for the visit but things did not work out as expected. According to Abdallahi, the Senegalese waited three days before the visit to start planning. Abdallahi was also disappointed the Senegalese decided to accept the junta's Ambassador credentials the night before his visit. Abdallahi was also told he could not meet with Mauritanian students nor with the Senegalese opposition. Wade, said the president, wanted him to meet exclusively with religious leaders. Abdallahi felt Wade wanted his visit to be a personal visit rather than a political one. As a result, Abdallahi decided to postpone his visit (See Refs A and B). ¶7. (C) According to Abdallahi, the Senegalese proposed a solution in which the president would return to create a government of national unity and then would resign. This would open the way for President of the Senate (and current interim president of the republic) Ba M'Bare to be appointed as legitimate interim president. A new CENI would be formed and amnesty would be given to political prisoners and the military. Abdallahi stated this solution did not make much sense to him. He advised Senegalese Foreign Minister Gadio that instead of bringing a pre-drafted plan, Wade should play the role of a facilitator and create the necessary conditions for dialogue. President Abdallahi suggested political parties should meet to find a solution. He said that, as constitutional guarantor, he would consider any constitutional solution. ¶8. (C) President Abdallahi thinks that General Aziz declared himself open to negotiations because he thought the FNDD would refuse to participate in the Senegalese mediation. As soon as the General found out that Abdallahi was amenable to negotiations and willing to make concessions, he backed down. Pro-coup parliamentarians then appeared on Al-Jazeera saying they would not accept a delay in the election. According to Abdallahi, at a meeting with Gadio, General Aziz did not agree with rescheduling the election. ¶9. (C) In a subsequent one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador, President Abdallahi reiterated his warm appreciation for both for the U.S. position as well as the assistance given to his emissaries by U.S. missions in Europe and Africa. While he discouraged direct expressions of U.S. support for the Senegalese plan but noted that support for a consensual solution would be welcome. He said that he planned to send his close advisor Sidi Mohamed Ould Amajar as his representative to the U.S. to speak for him in dealing with both the U.S. and the U.N., noting that resources precluded having representatives in both New York and Washington. The Ambassador indicated that we would provide appropriate assistance in facilitating Ould Amajar,s mission. Abdallahi further noted that he was considering sending a delegation to visit the U.S. and was even thinking of traveling there himself but wanted our input before deciding. Ambassador Boulware noted that we would need to engage Washington colleagues to assess the best course of action and promised that we would get back to him. Finally, Abdallahi noted that supporters in the U.S. had explored the possibility of booking satellite broadcast time to enable the NOUAKCHOTT 00000328 003 OF 003 President and his supporters to reach a Mauritanian audience given that local broadcast media under control of the junta was not open to them. Although admitting that he was skeptical that USG support for this initiative could be found, the Ambassador promised to inquire. ¶10. (C) Comment: President Abdallahi was relaxed, in good spirits and was closely following events in Nouakchott. He seems convinced that time is on the side of pro-democracy forces and that disillusionment with the junta and its unilateral agenda is growing and efforts to legitimize the coup will ultimately fail. End comment. BOULWARE