THE FNDD'S EVER-CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000327

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL USAU SG MR
SUBJECT: THE FNDD'S EVER-CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE
SENEGALESE MEDIATION

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 323

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: The FNDD, while suspicious of Senegalese
President Wade's intentions, is again looking at the
Senegalese mediation as a method to derail the regime's
election agenda. The FNDD has multiple conditions, but sees
the Senegalese proposal as the basis to start talking about
talking -- with the emphasis being on setting up face-to-face
discussions between the FNDD, RFD, and Aziz' political
coalition. The FNDD is concerned the RFD's Ahmed Ould Daddah
may be seduced back towards Aziz through guarantees of
electoral transparency. SEPTEL will cover President
Abdallahi's discussions with Ambassador concerning the
mediation. End Summary

The Senegalese Proposal
--------------


2. (C) DCM met May 11 with FND "Foreign Minister" Mohamed
Ould Maouloud to gethis impressions of the most recent
mediation attmpt by Senegalese Foreign Minister Gadio.
Althouh Ould Maouloud and other FNDD leaders had been
egatively dismissive of Senegalese actions on the ee of
Gadio's visit (REFTEL),Ould Maouloud was mre open to the
initiative following their meetins with Gadio. Ould
Maouloud said the Senegaleseproposal included:

-- An unspecified "special ole" for President Abdallahi in
h( r"n*i(i(n* prcess (Gadio told Ould Maouooddhh oold
e p a n*how Dakar envisioned that role when he met with
Abdallahi),

-- An agreement to reach a consensual date for new elections
to be supervised and monitored by the international community,

-- A new revision of the electoral list and the Electoral
Commission,

-- A consnsual establishment of a new Government of
Nationl Unity,

-- The naming by anti-coup forces of he Minister of
Interior (responsible for the impementation of any
electiions),

-- A general anesty to provide HCE members freedom from
prosection for actions leading to and subsequent to the cup
as well as the release of FNDD political leadrs and dropping
of criminal charges.


3. (C) uld Maouloud told Gadio, ssomewhat to his surprise,
that the FNDD saw the plan as a basis for discusion. Ould
Maouloud stressed that the FNDD did no want the Senegalese
to work on shuttle diplomac to reach an agreed text, but to
facilitate a fae-to-face political dialoggue between the
three goups identified by the International Contact Group
for Mauritania -- those supporting President Abdalahi, Ahmed
ould Daddah's RFD, and General Aziz. Gadio said he could
work with that and suggeste he could be back to start
facilitating that diaoogue within a week. Subsequently,
Gadio phoned u ld Maouloud indicating General Aziz was now
putting up obstacles so he was not sure how soon a dialggue
could begin.


4. (C) Ould Maouloud said h did not get heavily into the
substance of the Senegalese points but had said that the FNDD
obviously could not sign off on a "special status" for
Abdallahi without knowing what that status was. He had also
told Gadio that, in addition to defining the role for the
elected president, there would also have to be agreement on
the role of the military since, if not defined, the security
forces would be free to manipulate the system. He suggestedt hat the dissolutio
n of the BASEP Presidential Protection
Battalion would be a condition the FNDD wolld demand in any
future dialogue.


5. (C) Oul Maouloud told DCM he had greater confidence in

NOUAKCHOTT 00000327 002 OF 003


Gadio who had profusely apologized for the Senegalese
credentialling of the new, Aziz-appointed, Mauritanian
Ambassador to Senegal (Gadio claimed it was an error made by
the Presidency protocol that had not been cleared through
him). Ould Maouloud added that the FNDD still has little
confidence in President Wade who he saw as having "a personal
relationship with the General." That distrust was the main
reason the FNDD wanted to limit the Senegalese role to that
of a facilitator for face-to-face Mauritanian talks rather
than that of a mediator.


6. (C) Getting down to mechanics, Ould Maouloud suggested he
would prefer that any dialogue be held in Mauritania although
either Dakar or Addis Ababa would be acceptable. He saw a
role for Wade, the AU's Ping, and the UN SRSG for West Africa
Djinnit in opening the dialogue and, if successful,
co-signing the agreement as guarantors. He wanted other
Contact Group members as well as the U.S. involved, but was
unsure in what way. Now that Aziz has been elected President
of the political party with the parliamentary majority, he
said he had no objection to him being directly involved in
the dialogue. In fact, he noted that Gadio had not suggested
"Interim President" Ba M'Bare or military junta interim
leader General Ghazwany as partners in the dialogue. When
asked why, Gadio reportedly replied, "they will agree to
anything Aziz agrees to." Ould Maouloud again said he saw
Prime Minister Waghaf as presenting the President but, when
asked how Waghef was faring in prison, said they would have
to see if he was mentally and physically up to that task
since prison conditions are getting tougher with the advent
of summer. Significantly, Ould Maouloud said that Waghef's
release was not a "precondition" for talks but rather "an
action that would improve the chances of a successful
dialogue."

Keeping Ould Daddah In The Fold
--------------


7. (C) Ould Maouloud said Aziz is still doing everything he
can to pull RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah away from his
tenuous alliance with the FNDD -- with some effect. Ould
Daddah has started arguing with the FNDD that perhaps it
would be better to participate in delayed elections if there
were enough guarantees of transparency. Ould Maouloud and
the others had argued back that, unless the political
influence of the military is removed, there can be no chance
of credible elections. Ould Maouloud said, "The last time
there had also been guaranties of transparency within the
system, but Aziz -- as head of the BASEP -- just told
everyone 'I'm the real power and this is how you will vote.'"
(Comment: In this comment, Ould Maouloud supports the
argument that Abdallahi was "installed" by the military -- as
well as most of the Parliament. This may reflect his
thinking as well as that of most of the FNDD leadership who,
nonetheless, defend the principle of the elected president
more than the personality. End Comment). Ould Maouloud saw
Ould Daddah as susceptible to being seduced into thinking the
regime's electoral agenda could actually offer him a chance
to be elected. Ould Maouloud cited this uncertainty about
Ould Daddah as yet another reason he wanted face-to-face
discussions instead of a shuttle mediation. Ould Maouloud
thought Ould Daddah would be constrained from making side
deals if all the parties were sitting around the table. Even
if there is deception on Ould Daddah's part, the FNDD would
insist on a deal acceptable to all three parties.


8. (C) Ould Maouloud also noted the FNDD and the RFD have
different views about the importance of the June 6 elections.
For the FNDD, Maouloud said, "Our main goal is to get the
elections canceled but, if we fail in that, we just have to
be sure they aren't generally recognized. If Aziz' elections
take place June 6, it won't be the end of the world for us
since, if they aren't seen as credible, they won't change
Aziz status." Ould Maouloud saw the RFD as seeing the
elections as far more critical and said Ould Daddah is
prepared to shift towards a more violent opposition strategy
to stop them. Ould Daddah, according to the FNDD leader,
sees the June 6 elections as potentially locking in Aziz'
long-term reign.

NOUAKCHOTT 00000327 003 OF 003



Keeping the Coalition Together
--------------

9 (C) Ould Maouloud bemoaned the poor judgment of some of
his allies at a period where coalition unity is vital. While
Ould Daddah's criticism of the FNDD for accepting "illegal"
U.S. assistance though NDI has been denied by Ould Daddah,
the "Foreign Minister" noted, "he said what he said" which
gave the regime ample ammunition to highlight divisions among
the anti-coup front. Similarly, recent criticism by Jemil
Mansour of the Islamic Tawasoul party concerning an FNDD
statement that had spoken well of the United States had been
smoothed over but had offered another messaging opportunity
for pro-coup forces. Ould Maouloud said that Mansour had been
unable to attend the meeting where the statement had been
discussed but had sent a deputy. He suggested Mansour was
uncomfortable praising the United States even though Ould
Maouloud told him, "All we said was that the U.S. has been
strong and consistent in its message and we wish other
countries would follow suit."
BOULWARE