THE FNDD'S EVER-CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000327 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL USAU SG MR SUBJECT: THE FNDD'S EVER-CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SENEGALESE MEDIATION REF: NOUAKCHOTT 323 Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The FNDD, while suspicious of Senegalese President Wade's intentions, is again looking at the Senegalese mediation as a method to derail the regime's election agenda. The FNDD has multiple conditions, but sees the Senegalese proposal as the basis to start talking about talking -- with the emphasis being on setting up face-to-face discussions between the FNDD, RFD, and Aziz' political coalition. The FNDD is concerned the RFD's Ahmed Ould Daddah may be seduced back towards Aziz through guarantees of electoral transparency. SEPTEL will cover President Abdallahi's discussions with Ambassador concerning the mediation. End Summary The Senegalese Proposal -------------- ¶2. (C) DCM met May 11 with FND "Foreign Minister" Mohamed Ould Maouloud to gethis impressions of the most recent mediation attmpt by Senegalese Foreign Minister Gadio. Althouh Ould Maouloud and other FNDD leaders had been egatively dismissive of Senegalese actions on the ee of Gadio's visit (REFTEL),Ould Maouloud was mre open to the initiative following their meetins with Gadio. Ould Maouloud said the Senegaleseproposal included: -- An unspecified "special ole" for President Abdallahi in h( r"n*i(i(n* prcess (Gadio told Ould Maouooddhh oold e p a n*how Dakar envisioned that role when he met with Abdallahi), -- An agreement to reach a consensual date for new elections to be supervised and monitored by the international community, -- A new revision of the electoral list and the Electoral Commission, -- A consnsual establishment of a new Government of Nationl Unity, -- The naming by anti-coup forces of he Minister of Interior (responsible for the impementation of any electiions), -- A general anesty to provide HCE members freedom from prosection for actions leading to and subsequent to the cup as well as the release of FNDD political leadrs and dropping of criminal charges. ¶3. (C) uld Maouloud told Gadio, ssomewhat to his surprise, that the FNDD saw the plan as a basis for discusion. Ould Maouloud stressed that the FNDD did no want the Senegalese to work on shuttle diplomac to reach an agreed text, but to facilitate a fae-to-face political dialoggue between the three goups identified by the International Contact Group for Mauritania -- those supporting President Abdalahi, Ahmed ould Daddah's RFD, and General Aziz. Gadio said he could work with that and suggeste he could be back to start facilitating that diaoogue within a week. Subsequently, Gadio phoned u ld Maouloud indicating General Aziz was now putting up obstacles so he was not sure how soon a dialggue could begin. ¶4. (C) Ould Maouloud said h did not get heavily into the substance of the Senegalese points but had said that the FNDD obviously could not sign off on a "special status" for Abdallahi without knowing what that status was. He had also told Gadio that, in addition to defining the role for the elected president, there would also have to be agreement on the role of the military since, if not defined, the security forces would be free to manipulate the system. He suggestedt hat the dissolutio n of the BASEP Presidential Protection Battalion would be a condition the FNDD wolld demand in any future dialogue. ¶5. (C) Oul Maouloud told DCM he had greater confidence in NOUAKCHOTT 00000327 002 OF 003 Gadio who had profusely apologized for the Senegalese credentialling of the new, Aziz-appointed, Mauritanian Ambassador to Senegal (Gadio claimed it was an error made by the Presidency protocol that had not been cleared through him). Ould Maouloud added that the FNDD still has little confidence in President Wade who he saw as having "a personal relationship with the General." That distrust was the main reason the FNDD wanted to limit the Senegalese role to that of a facilitator for face-to-face Mauritanian talks rather than that of a mediator. ¶6. (C) Getting down to mechanics, Ould Maouloud suggested he would prefer that any dialogue be held in Mauritania although either Dakar or Addis Ababa would be acceptable. He saw a role for Wade, the AU's Ping, and the UN SRSG for West Africa Djinnit in opening the dialogue and, if successful, co-signing the agreement as guarantors. He wanted other Contact Group members as well as the U.S. involved, but was unsure in what way. Now that Aziz has been elected President of the political party with the parliamentary majority, he said he had no objection to him being directly involved in the dialogue. In fact, he noted that Gadio had not suggested "Interim President" Ba M'Bare or military junta interim leader General Ghazwany as partners in the dialogue. When asked why, Gadio reportedly replied, "they will agree to anything Aziz agrees to." Ould Maouloud again said he saw Prime Minister Waghaf as presenting the President but, when asked how Waghef was faring in prison, said they would have to see if he was mentally and physically up to that task since prison conditions are getting tougher with the advent of summer. Significantly, Ould Maouloud said that Waghef's release was not a "precondition" for talks but rather "an action that would improve the chances of a successful dialogue." Keeping Ould Daddah In The Fold -------------- ¶7. (C) Ould Maouloud said Aziz is still doing everything he can to pull RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah away from his tenuous alliance with the FNDD -- with some effect. Ould Daddah has started arguing with the FNDD that perhaps it would be better to participate in delayed elections if there were enough guarantees of transparency. Ould Maouloud and the others had argued back that, unless the political influence of the military is removed, there can be no chance of credible elections. Ould Maouloud said, "The last time there had also been guaranties of transparency within the system, but Aziz -- as head of the BASEP -- just told everyone 'I'm the real power and this is how you will vote.'" (Comment: In this comment, Ould Maouloud supports the argument that Abdallahi was "installed" by the military -- as well as most of the Parliament. This may reflect his thinking as well as that of most of the FNDD leadership who, nonetheless, defend the principle of the elected president more than the personality. End Comment). Ould Maouloud saw Ould Daddah as susceptible to being seduced into thinking the regime's electoral agenda could actually offer him a chance to be elected. Ould Maouloud cited this uncertainty about Ould Daddah as yet another reason he wanted face-to-face discussions instead of a shuttle mediation. Ould Maouloud thought Ould Daddah would be constrained from making side deals if all the parties were sitting around the table. Even if there is deception on Ould Daddah's part, the FNDD would insist on a deal acceptable to all three parties. ¶8. (C) Ould Maouloud also noted the FNDD and the RFD have different views about the importance of the June 6 elections. For the FNDD, Maouloud said, "Our main goal is to get the elections canceled but, if we fail in that, we just have to be sure they aren't generally recognized. If Aziz' elections take place June 6, it won't be the end of the world for us since, if they aren't seen as credible, they won't change Aziz status." Ould Maouloud saw the RFD as seeing the elections as far more critical and said Ould Daddah is prepared to shift towards a more violent opposition strategy to stop them. Ould Daddah, according to the FNDD leader, sees the June 6 elections as potentially locking in Aziz' long-term reign. NOUAKCHOTT 00000327 003 OF 003 Keeping the Coalition Together -------------- 9 (C) Ould Maouloud bemoaned the poor judgment of some of his allies at a period where coalition unity is vital. While Ould Daddah's criticism of the FNDD for accepting "illegal" U.S. assistance though NDI has been denied by Ould Daddah, the "Foreign Minister" noted, "he said what he said" which gave the regime ample ammunition to highlight divisions among the anti-coup front. Similarly, recent criticism by Jemil Mansour of the Islamic Tawasoul party concerning an FNDD statement that had spoken well of the United States had been smoothed over but had offered another messaging opportunity for pro-coup forces. Ould Maouloud said that Mansour had been unable to attend the meeting where the statement had been discussed but had sent a deputy. He suggested Mansour was uncomfortable praising the United States even though Ould Maouloud told him, "All we said was that the U.S. has been strong and consistent in its message and we wish other countries would follow suit." BOULWARE