THE FNDD'S INTERIM STRATEGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000269 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: THE FNDD'S INTERIM STRATEGY Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reason 1.4 (b and d ) ¶1. (S - N/F) Summary: The FNDD sees opportunity in General Aziz's upcoming resignation to work on internal divisions in his support base -- hopefully leaving him out in the cold. Diplomatic activities (including travel by President Abdallahi) will continue as will open resistance. The FNDD fears France as a spoiler. Sanctions, as always, are seen as critical. End Summary ¶2. (S - N/F) Dragging Out Aziz' Limbo: Charge met April 13 at the embassy with FNDD "Foreign Minister" Mohamed Ould Maouloud to discuss the Front's strategy in coming weeks. Ould Maouloud said, "we are avoiding anything that might cause Aziz to change his mind about resigning," saying they see opportunity to reverse the coup once he relinquishes his formal ties to power. While never accepting the electoral plan put forward by Aziz, the FNDD will do whatever it can to get a postponement of the date (if they can't get the election canceled all together). Ould Maouloud said that as soon as Aziz resigns, President Abdallahi will send a letter to the President of the Constitutional Council trying to pre-empt any statement that there is a "presidential vacancy" that would allow President of the Senate Ba M'Bare to assume the interim presidency. Charge shared the highlights of his previous conversation with the President of the Constitutional Council and suggested the FNDD may also want to have President of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir challenge M'Bare's succession since it would be difficult to dodge a complain from the President of the National Assembly whose legitimacy is not subject to debate. Charge also noted the possibility of finding a candidate to challenge Aziz' ability to run for president under the provisions of the Africa Charter, ratified by MauriQnia, which bars coup leaders from running for office. Ould Maouloud said he was not confident the Constitutional Council would "do the right thing" if put on the spot noting they had a mixed record to date -- knocking down Aziz' efforts to expel Ould Boulkheir from the National Assembly presidency but also giving its blessing to the CENI electoral commission appointed by the regime. That said, Ould Maouloud said they would put challenges in front of the Constitutional Council as a delaying tactic. Should they win, the FNDD will be thrilled. If they lose, they will denounce the process as further evidence of Aziz' manipulation of the system. ¶3. (S - N/F) Looking for betrayals: Ould Maouloud said they saw the possibility that some of those whom Aziz is putting in place to watch out for his interests in the interim between his resignation and the elections could turn against him. The FNDD is focused particularly on General Ghazwany as someone who might "get up the courage" to abandon General Aziz -- with the chance of that happening increasing the longer Aziz is technically a civilian. Ould Maouloud understood that General Aziz will try to maintain behind-the-scenes control of the BASEP Presidential Security Battalion even after he sheds his uniform. He believes Ghazwany is bristling at that interference -- which makes the BASEP more a personal militia than ever. Were Ghazwany to abandon Aziz politically, Ould Maouloud believes Aziz would try to come back by force by using the BASEP as well as Tuareg fighters provided by Malian Tuareg leader Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. Were the occasion to arise, Ould Maouloud suggested that, "beyond four or five BASEP officers who are personally loyal to Aziz," the BASEP itself would not necessarily come out in force against other military units. As for the Tuareg, Ould Maouloud sees them as too far away for what, if it ever happens, he would expect to be a rapid change. When asked whether the President and FNDD leadership had discussed what they would offer Ghazwany if he were to turn on Aziz, Ould Maouloud discussed the possibility of naming Ghazwany as a greatly empowered Minister of Defense (abolishing the long-held "real military power" held by the Presidential Personal Military Chief of Staff previously held by Aziz and shifting that power to civilian control). Ould Maouloud emphasized that these types of scenarios are being discussed but added, "the problem with being a Front is that WE ARE A Front," meaning that this type of sensitive discussion has to be held at the level of a far smaller group of which he is a member. ¶4. (S - N/F) Ould Maouloud believed President of the Senate M'Bare could also renege on his understanding with Aziz. He sees M'Bare as a very weak person, however, so he assumes M'Bare would be at best a "follower" of a wave against Aziz. Ould Maouloud also did not discount the possibility of a double-cross by intelligence chief General Hady, but he was not as sure the result of a Hady-led action against Aziz would be as positive as one led by Ghazwany. ¶5. (S - N/F) Ould Maouloud emphasized that targeted sanctions and a clear international denunciation of the electoral process would be essential in getting Aziz' putative allies to turn on him. Ould Maouloud hoped Uganda would move forward on a Security Council PRST denouncing coups in Africa although he was worried the Ugandans were being dissuaded by Libya. Ould Maouloud worried that previously strong political support from Algeria was fading in favor of a "security agenda" being pushed by Algerian military and intelligence services. ¶6. (S - N/F) French Spoilers: Ould Maouloud said the greatest FNDD concern was that, while they might be able get Ghazwany and others to abandon Aziz politically, the French intelligence services might intervene to get Ghazwany to stick with Aziz' game plan. ¶7. (S - N/F) Comment: The FNDD is not unrealistic enough to believe that Aziz' allies are likely to turn on him, but they do believe it could happen. Lacking their own forces, the FNDD cannot mount a counter-coup but must hope for a continually deteriorating economy and internal rivalries to spark a revolt (they don't see Aziz ever backing away through a political settlement). Aziz' desire to seek the veneer of legitimacy by going to elections through a short-lived civilian transition government is seen by the FNDD as a moment of vulnerability they can exploit. At the same time, Aziz got to where he is today through a mastery of palace intrigue. Overtly or behind-the-curtain, Aziz has been running security for some time now and knows how to stage and how to counter coups. He will now be at his point of maximum awareness. The FNDD is, unfortunately, poorly placed to influence the military inner circle. Most of the FNDD leaders consider themselves intellectuals who have never developed relations with the coarser military -- who generally come from warrior tribes. We know there is personal resentment against Aziz within the military, but we do not know its depth or whether any of the military would run the risk of turning on Aziz. HANKINS