RENEWED AU-LIBYAN MEDIATION EFFORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000268

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU MR
SUBJECT: RENEWED AU-LIBYAN MEDIATION EFFORTS

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 266

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: The African Union and Libya have started a
renewed mediation effort aimed at avoiding the need to apply
sanctions. The African Union questions whether the three
main Mauritanian protagonists can ever come up with a
consensual plan if left to their own devices, and suggests
the international community needs to put something concrete
on the table. Discussions seem to lean towards the military
agenda, but President Abdallahi said he is open to hearing
what they might propose. Absent General Aziz abandoning his
electoral strategy, the FNDD sees no basis for mediation.
End


2. (C) AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra
and Libyan Secretary for African Affairs Ali Abdel Salam
Triki completed three-day visit to Mauritania on April 13
during which they met with the full range of political
players including President Abdallahi, President of the
National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir and General Aziz.
The emissaries did not meet with diplomats, but Lamamra spoke
with Charge by phone the morning of April 13. Lamamra
indicated the AU was trying once again to find a consensual
resolution to the Mauritanian crisis that could allow the
return to constitutional order and avoid the applications of
sanctions on the regime. He said the AU's desire was to
unlock the current deadlock between the hard positions taken
by Abdallahi and Aziz. He noted that, despite its recognized
failings, Aziz' commitment to resign and to pass power back
to civilian authority was at least something positive to work
on. Charge responded that we saw nothing promising in what
we had seen to date in the process -- the ability to see
where government funds were being directed was now nearly
impossible, Aziz has spent months putting his people in place
in all the positions that might ensure free and fair
elections, and he continues to repress dissent and manipulate
the political and judicial systems to bring down his enemies.
The U.S. can support early elections -- as also offered by
President Abdallahi -- but not under the framework being put
forward by Aziz.


3. (C) Lamara worried that the inflexibility of positions
made it impossible to help the Mauritanians work out their
own problems. He recognized that the election process as
currently spelled out was not credible and was subject to
manipulation by General Aziz. That said, he suggested it was
time for the international community to put something
concrete on the table that would at least meet international
concerns -- suggesting this included a mechanism where
Abdallahi accepts an interim presidency under the President
of the Senate but with a consensus government that would in
fact be independent of Aziz' manipulation and that would have
enough time put together a credible electoral process. He
said that when he has met April 12 with President Abdallahi
in Lemden he did not float any specific recommendations but
the President had said he would be open to studying any
proposal put forward. Lamamra pocketed this, "at least he
didn't say 'no'" response as something to work on. Lamamra
said he would be giving some thought to a specific proposal
and might be back in Mauritania in a week to ten days. He
added he thought the AU might call another Contact Group
meeting to discuss such a proposal before coming back.
Charge told Lamamra that it was unlikely the U.S. would back
any proposal that could not gain the consent of President
Abdallahi and the FNDD.


4. (C) Charge spoke late April 13 with FNDD "Foreign
Minister" Mohamed Ould Maouloud who had received readouts of
the two AU/Libyan meetings with President Abdallahi and Ould
Boulkheir. Ould Maouloud saw the initiative as "exploratory"
and an effort to restart after the debacle of Qadhafi's
mediation effort. He said the Libyan Triki had served as
"head of delegation" to "save face" but found the message far
more conciliatory than Qadhafi's. The delegation had probed
-- but not pushed -- to see whether the President and FNDD
could be brought to accept the transition plan put forward by
Aziz. The Mauritanians had responded that they would be open

NOUAKCHOTT 00000268 002 OF 002


to renewed dialogue but that the General would have to cancel
his electoral initiative first -- otherwise the FNDD would
only be discussing participation in a process they see as
critically flawed and not credible.


5. (C) Ould Maouloud said the FNDD in fact sees little
utility in diplomatic activity at this time and is focusing
most of its efforts on internal opposition. Highly upset by
the turn in French policy and still reeling from the Qadhafi
whirlwind, the FNDD leadership is suspicious of the
neutrality of the multiple negotiating efforts. While
speaking with the Charge, Ould Maouloud received a call
saying Senegalese Foreign Minister Gadio was coming April 14
to continue Senegalese mediation efforts (apparently
uncoordinated with the AU). Ould Maouloud could only smile.
In a conversation later with the FNDD's Abdel Koudouuss Ould
Abeidna (calling from Paris),Charge was told the FNDD sees
the Senegalese as trying to keep them distracted so they
can't focus on their own anti-Aziz strategy. Ould Abeidna
saw the heavy hand of France behind everything, adding that
when they had pushed back at Qadhafi for his anti-democratic
mediation efforts, Qadhafi responded, "but you understand its
the French who sent me to do their dirty work."
HANKINS