MAURITANIA'S NEIGHBORS -- ABDALLAHI LOSING MALIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000257 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU AG ML MO SG MR SUBJECT: MAURITANIA'S NEIGHBORS -- ABDALLAHI LOSING MALIAN SUPPORT REF: 2008 NOUAKCHOTT 688 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Charge did the rounds April 5 of neighboring country embassies to check on evolving views following the failed Qadhafi mediation. Morocco and Algeria remain fixed on two sides of the fence -- Morocco urging acceptance of the status quo based on stability concerns (and discounting as "temporary" Mauritania's dalliance with Iran) while Algeria states itself against Aziz (his recent "technical stop" in Algiers notwithstanding). Mali has signaled a change. Deciding to send a new Ambassador to Mauritania to "lower the level of bilateral tensions" even as it pledges itself to support for the AU PSC position. Mission previously reported on neighbors' views in November's REFTEL. End Summary -------------- Morocco -------------- ¶2. (C) Charge met with Moroccan Charge Chalouatti Abdel Aziz who argued that the electoral plan put forward by Aziz was the best path forward to restore normalcy in Mauritania's relations with the international community. When Charge countered that elections organized on behalf of the leader of the coup by a government put into place by him could not be deemed free and democratic, Abdel Aziz questioned whether democracy really had any relevance in a country like Mauritania -- a country still dominated by tribal chiefs who follow power. Abdel Aziz underlined the need for stability on Morocco's southern border, particularly in the light of an Al Qaeda presence that can only benefit from the current power vacuum. He added that if Aziz was able to get the majority of Mauritanians out to vote, and win a majority of that vote, the international community should rethink withholding recognition. The Moroccan added that Arab League and Maghreb Arab Union election monitoring should be able to certify whether the election was valid or not. Charge noted that the mechanics of the election day itself were not all that determined the legitimacy of the elections. Aziz was already in obvious campaign mode using government funds and open promises to buy votes. The military themselves repeatedly tried to undermine Abdallahi's legitimacy by boasting how they had successfully corrupted the previous elections through behind-the-scenes manipulation. ¶3. (C) Charge asked whether Aziz' apparent shift towards Iran following the Doha Conference on Palestine and the expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador had altered in any way Rabat's calculations on long-term security and stability in Mauritania. Abdel Aziz responded that while the timing was not ideal, following Morocco's severing of relations with Teheran, the move was seen as superficial. He did not believe the Shiite Iranians would find fertile ground in Mauritania and he saw Aziz' moves as born of political necessity, not ideology. -------------- Algeria -------------- ¶4. (C) Algerian Ambassador Kaid Cheikh Rachid was quick to dispel the idea that there had been a warming of Algiers towards General Aziz following a refueling stop Aziz made in Algeria the week before (Comment: Local press suggested that Algeria was willing to work closer with Aziz since it was presumed Morocco was mad at him over Iran. End Comment). Rachid said Algiers had allowed the refueling stop but had received Aziz only at the level of the State Secretary for Maghreb Affairs -- the same individual who had received Aziz' emissaries months earlier as a clear sign of disfavor. Rachid echoed the Charge's comments that Algiers did not see long-term stability through the General whose performance to date as leader of the junta had only shown negative tendencies. Charge asked why, then, Algiers seemed relatively silent in decisions by the Maghreb Arab Union and NOUAKCHOTT 00000257 002 OF 002 Maghrebian - Sahelian CEN-SAD that had all offered to send observers to the June 6 elections. The Algerian claimed not to have heard from his capital on the subject but suggested that Algiers felt obliged to defer to Libya's Qadhafi who holds the presidency of both organizations. ¶5. (C) Rachid tended to downplay the strength of the Al Qaeda threat to Mauritania saying that, although it had gained some regional attraction and credibility by assuming the "Al Qaeda" brand name, AQIM is still at its roots the GSPC with its primary focus on Algiers. -------------- Mali -------------- ¶6. (C) Newly arrived Malian ambassador Souleymane Kone told Charge that Bamako's decision to send him, after 8 months of leaving only a Charge in place, was driven by the need to "reduce bilateral" tensions related to trade disputes (particularly bus traffic rights) and issues related to the Tuaregs. Kone insisted that Mali remains committed to the position put forward by the AU PSC (of which it is a member), but that bilateral priorities demanded the presence of an ambassador. He was interested to learn that other ambassadors arriving since the coup (Russia, South Africa and Israel) had been allowed to function without presenting their credentials to General Aziz as Head of State. That said, he noted that he would present his credentials to Aziz if need be since "we have relations with countries, not governments." When asked whether he planned to meet with President Abdallahi or FNDD leaders, Kone responded that "given my delicate situation," Mali preferred that contacts with the opposition be maintained at the level of Bamako. -------------- Senegal -------------- ¶7. (C) The Senegalese Ambassador was unable to meet with Charge as he was dealing with the attempted mediation visit of Foreign Minister Gadio. HANKINS