CONSOLIDATING POWER: THE JUNTA'S NEW CLIENTELISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000227 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR MR SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATING POWER: THE JUNTA'S NEW CLIENTELISM Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: While Qadhafi's mediation efforts unfolded the week of March 9-13, the High State Council (HSC) continuedQming coup supporters to key government positions -- particularly in ministries involved with elections such as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Communications. These politically motivated appointments aimed to further consolidate General Aziz's power by rewarding allies with key tribal and regional connections. These individuals will in turn use their influence to ensure the General gets elected in June 6. The wave of appointments included a Haratine and an Afro-Mauritanian, catering to the electorate from traditionally under-represented groups. The nominations also brought an increasing number of Nasserists and Baathists to the government, highlighting the junta's desire to get cozy with Qadhafi and bring Mauritania closer to the Arab world (despite its surprising newfound closeness with Iran). International community deadlines have afforded General Aziz enough time to build a clientelistic system designed to ensure his permanence in power. The General is now prepared to move swiftly towards the final kill, securing the presidency in the June 6 elections. End summary. -------------- A CARNIVAL OF PROMOTIONS -------------- ¶2. (U) Local newspaper Le Quotidien highlighted March 8 the fast pace of promotions and appointments, stating that now "every Council of Ministers results in personnel changes." According to the newspaper, promotions "have become prizes that regime leaders brandish in front of civil servants hungry for career advancement. They are also a weapon used against those who are hostile to their cause." Le Quotidien states that those who get promoted are "the mediocre, the social climbers and the boot lickers," and stresses that undeserving regime supporters are promoted at the expense of meritorious civil servants. ¶3. (SBU) According to political LES, the junta has been playing the tribal card by appointing influential members of powerful tribes favorable to the HSC to key government positions. For example, Mohamed Salem Ould Bouka, recently appointed Director General of state controlled Mauritanian TV (TVM),belongs to an important tribe from the Eastern region of Assaba that supports General Ghazouani. His deputy Amar Ould Bouhoubeini is from the powerful Ouled Ahmed Ben Daman tribe from the southern city of Rosso and a staunch supporter of General Aziz. -------------- INFLUENCING ELECTIONS -------------- ¶4. (U) Many of the recent appointments directly concern the Ministry of the Interior (counselors, inspectors, directors, deputies),the Ministry of Communications (secretary general and director of cooperation and exterior relations) or state controlled media such as Radio Mauritanie (director) and Mauritanian TV (new director). These ministries are closely involved with election efforts -- the Ministry of the Interior coordinates elections with walis, deputies and hakems -- and the Ministry of Communications has control over information and the power to influence public opinion. ¶5. (SBU) Interestingly, new Secretary General to the Ministry of Communication Mohamed Lemine Ould Molaye Zeine, who will coordinate and control state and private media, was previously in charge of authorizing demonstrations and public gatherings and is known for repressing FNDD and labor union demonstrations against the coup. -------------- COURTING MINORITIES -------------- NOUAKCHOTT 00000227 002 OF 002 ¶6. (SBU) According to political LES, the appointment of Haratine Sidi Moloud Ould Brahim, the new wali of Nouakchott, exemplifies junta efforts to cater to the traditionally under-represented Haratine population. The nomination also rewards Ould Brahim's allegiance to the junta. (Note: Ould Brahim was the Brakna region's wali before being dismissed by President Abdallahi following the December 2008 assassination of the French tourists near Aleg. End note.) Comment: The Haratine population has also been among the main recipients of General Aziz's aid in the poor districts of Nouakchott in an effort to co-opt their support for General Aziz. End comment. ¶7. (SBU) An Afro-Mauritanian journalist, Dicko Soudani, was named director of cooperation and exterior relations. Soudani's appointment caters to another under-represented group. Comment: General Aziz's recent visits to the poverty triangle (Brakna, Assaba, Gorgol),his promises of poverty reduction programs, and his efforts to settle the "passif humanitaire" question further illustrate his campaigning efforts among the Afro-Mauritanians (see Septel). End comment. -------------- NASSERISTS AND BAATHISTS -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Political LES point out that the junta has named a large number of Nasserists and Baathists to government positions. Appointments of Nasserists in particular seek to court Qadhafi, the movement's current spiritual leader. The movement's credo -- promotion of the Arabic language, belief in the uniqueness of the Arab community and opposition to Israel and Western countries that support it -- is shared by many in government and the armed forces. Baathists are also among the regime's main supporters and General Aziz has rewarded them with government positions. For example, influential members of Mauritania's Baathist central committee such as Mohamed Yehdid Ould Breidleil and Memed Ould Ahmed party were recently appointed presidents to the board of directors of the national water and electricity companies. (Comment: Interestingly, the junta's rapprochement with Iran makes for strange bedfellows as Mauritanian Baathists loathe Iran. End comment.) ¶9. (C) Comment: The junta, which accused President Abdallahi of corruption and nepotism, has not put its money where its mouth is. International community deadlines pushed back numerous times have given the HSC plenty of time to build its clientelistic system. The current government put in place by General Aziz will prove useful to him when he steps down from the presidency in mid-April to run for office. His supporters will not only keep things in order in the government during his "absence" but will also ensure he gets elected by using their regional and tribal connections to gather votes in his support. It is likely that General Aziz will run unopposed in June 6 and there should be no doubt as to the outcome of the election. End comment. HANKINS