QADHAFI WILL SETTLE FOR A JOINT DECLARATION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000195 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR SUBJECT: QADHAFI WILL SETTLE FOR A JOINT DECLARATION ON MAURITANIA MEDIATION REF: NOUAKCHOTT 191 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Negative review of Libya meeting: Charge met evening of March 9 with President Abdallahi's Chief of Staff Ahmed Kaber Ould Hammoudi at Hammoudi's request. Hammoudi provided much the same readout on the Libya visit as provided by FNDD rotating President Abeidna in REFTEL (Hammoudi seemed unaware Abeidna had already briefed the Charge). Hammoudi confirmed that in two personal meetings with President Abdallahi, Qadhafi had pushed hard to get the President to resign -- at one point giving Abdallahi a pre-written resignation letter for him to sign. Qadhafi's theme was that democracy and political parties were inappropriate for the African context and that progress and security demanded strong long-term leaders. While no written plan was offered, Qadhafi wanted essentially what Aziz wants -- both Abdallahi and Aziz resign with the President of the Senate managing a short-term "government of consensus" leading to elections in which Aziz could be a candidate. Abdallahi told Qadhafi "no deal" adding that he was determined that any solution to the crisis has to end with the coup "failing" if there is any hope to get Mauritania out of the cycle of recurrent military takeovers. Hammoudi said the President left Tripoli with confirmation of what he feared -- he can expect nothing useful from Qadhafi because "he doesn't care about democracy and he doesn't care about legitimacy." ¶2. (C) Still Playing Nice With Qadhafi: Hammoudi told Charge that as long as Qadhafi does not openly come out with a formal plan along the lines they heard in Libya, the President and FNDD will not openly criticize him. He related that the African Union's Jean Ping had voiced his frustration with Qadhafi during his meeting with Abdallahi. Ping -- who saw a tough year ahead working with Qadhafi -- said Qadhafi was clearly not sticking to the policy line set by the African Union as a whole. Ping reportedly told Abdallahi he was prepared to publicly distance himself from Qadhafi if the Guide tries to force a deal that is unacceptable. ¶3. (C) Qadhafi doesn't want to leave Nouakchott empty handed: Hammoudi said the FNDD and President's staff have remained in close contact with Qadhafi's staff since Qadhafi's colorful arrival in Nouakchott March 9. Abdallahi had declined a request that he come from Lemden to Nouakchott to meet Qadhafi at the airport saying, "I won't stand next to Aziz like we are two equals." Abdallahi invited Qadhafi instead to Lemden -- with the Libyans saying "we'll consider it." The FNDD has also decided to boycott Qadhafi's scheduled speech to the joint houses of parliament since FNDD co-leader and President of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir -- who had met just days earlier with Qadhafi -- was not advised of Qadhafi's desire to meet parliament. Hammoudi said Qadhafi sees he will not be able to wrap up a deal while in Nouakchott so is trying to put together a face-saving "joint declaration" about his initiative. The informal draft received by the FNDD includes: (a) A recognition that the three parties to the crisis -- the FNDD, the High State Council, and "opposition forces" (note -- meaning Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD but not saying so implicitly) engage to reach a solution to the political crisis. (b) A statement by the three parties welcoming the mediation efforts of Qadhafi who "has been asked by the international community to find a solution." (c) A commitment to find a solution "that restores constitutional order and constitutional institutions." (d) A commitment to end media campaigns that attack or denigrate the other parties. (e) A commitment to release the FNDD detainees Hammoudi noted the formal commitment to release FNDD detainees (notably Prime Minister Waghef) is obviously attractive but indicated the FNDD would insist on at least three changes: (a) adding President Abdallahi as a 4th party independent of the FNDD, (b) a commitment to allow all NOUAKCHOTT 00000195 002 OF 002 parties access to public media, and (c) having the military abandon its plans leading to new elections in June. In discussing with Charge Qadhafi's apparent view that he has a personal mandate to mediate a deal, Hammoudi thought they would also want to stipulate that they welcome Qadhafi's mediation "with Jean Ping on behalf of and consistent with the decisions of the African Union." Hammoudi does not expect Qadhafi to accept these changes and assumes Qadhafi will leave without a declaration. ¶4. (C) Expecting More Problems: Hammoudi said they had learned from an un-named Libyan that, seeing he would not be able to get an easy concession from President Abdallahi, Qadhafi had told his staff to "come up with a solution that doesn't include Abdallahi." While Hammoudi did not say so directly, it appears that Abdallahi's insistence to identify himself as a party distinct from the FNDD reflects concern Qadhafi will now look to suborn individual FNDD leaders to try to get them to sign a deal without the President. ¶5. (C) Comment -- What If? Hammoudi was caught off guard when asked what the President would do if they got the main things they have asked for -- Aziz drops the plans for elections June 6 and the FNDD leaders are released from prison. Charge noted the President had previously been adamant that he would never accept Aziz as a party to any negotiations on a political resolution. It did not appear that Hammoudi had seriously considered the possibility Qadhafi might be able to deliver on their demands and; therefore, doesn't really have a strategy for what next. As in most contacts with the FNDD leadership, we have found little thinking about how they might actually accept to be able to close an acceptable deal. They avoid discussions, for instance, of who might be an acceptable Prime Minister for a significantly strengthened and independent transition government. NDI, which has been working closely with the FNDD parties, unions and civil society groups that have been pulled together as the National Coordination for Democracy tends to be dominated by the parties leaving little room for their non-political partners and closing off some important "what next?" discussions. FNDD rotating President Abeidna has told Charge he has been trying to get his colleagues to build a closing and transition strategy (believing, like Charge, that if the opportunity for an acceptable deal comes it will come quickly and may be fleeting). So far, his more politically experienced FNDD colleagues have told Abeidna -- "it's too early for that." The FNDD is a very diverse group. It could be the older politicians know they will have a tough time sticking together and suppressing individual political ambitions if success really seems attainable. HANKINS