HEDGING THEIR BETS: PRO-COUP PARLIAMENTARIANS TAKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000188 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR SUBJECT: HEDGING THEIR BETS: PRO-COUP PARLIAMENTARIANS TAKE OPPORTUNISTIC STANCE REF: NOUAKCHOTT 0083 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Consensus is not the word of the day among pro-coup parliamentarians. General Aziz's decision to rally his supporters under one party has found detractors. While stating their support to the High State Council (HSC), independent parliamentarians are distancing themselves from Aziz by forming their own party. The party's name, structure, and platform are still unknown but one thing is clear -- its support to General Aziz is far from unconditional. This group's allegiance depends on whether the electoral commission's membership and the formation of a transitional government stem from a consensual multi-party agreement. According to parliamentarians Baba Ould Sidi and Louleid Ould Weddad, a solution to the Mauritanian crisis is unlikely given the rigidity of positions and the junta's unilateral actions. Claiming "the West is all Mauritania knows," both expressed their desire for U.S. mediation before the regime turns to other support sources. Ould Baba and Ould Weddad's position indicates doubt among the pro-coup camp that General Aziz will be able to consolidate his power. It may also hide a discontent with the junta's foreign policy. End summary. -------------- TWO NEW PRO-COUP PARTIES -------------- ¶2. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met March 5 with Mederdra deputy (and former Minister under President Taya) Baba Ould Sidi to inquire about new pro-coup parties. Ould Sidi explained the first party assembles High State Council supporters in a monolithic structure similar to dictator Ould Taya's PRDS. The second, composed mostly of independent parliamentarians, still supports the HSC but desires more independence of action and thought. ¶3. (C) When asked about the reasons for forming a second pro-coup party, Ould Sidi explained that independent parliamentarians were resentful they had little representation in the ministries. He also stated that, in the past, many of the group's members had been part of state parties -- PRDS (Taya's party) and ADIL (President Abdallahi's party) -- that disappeared when the governments they supported were no longer in power. He stressed that these "independent" parliamentarians, numbering 49, wished to form a party of like-minded individuals that would transcend the strong man in power. They also wished to take a less rigid approach and encourage consensus among political actors. Comment: This desire to distance themselves from the state may signal they have doubts Aziz will be able to consolidate his coup. While still supporting him, they are taking a less rigid stand to preserve their political careers should he fail. End comment. -------------- BONES OF CONTENTION -------------- ¶4. (C) Ould Sidi hinted that the group's support for General Aziz depends on the consensual resolution of two issues: CENI membership and the transitional government. The group calls for political party participation in designating CENI membership. Ould Sidi also stated his rejection of elections organized under the current government and called for the formation of a broad-based transitional government. Comment: Many political actors believe that the transparency of the elections will depend on who is appointed to CENI membership. A consensual appointment of CENI members would likely convince many to support the election. End comment. -------------- ELY VALL -------------- NOUAKCHOTT 00000188 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Ould Sidi stated that General Aziz should be allowed to run for president as long as he retires from the military. He also said Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall should be able to run. He deplored that Vall's request to be released from the military was denied. PolOff asked Ould Sidi whether he thought Vall would run against his cousin and he responded that, even though they were from the same tribe, Vall and Aziz had been at odds for some time; therefore, Vall might run. Comment: Ould Sidi seemed to imply that his group could decide to stand behind Vall if it did not consider General Aziz a viable candidate. End comment. -------------- TOO SOON FOR ELECTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) According to Ould Sidi, June 6 is not a realistic timeframe for elections. In June, the southern part of the country is incommunicado due to the rainy season and the resultant flooding and washed out roads. He mentioned there had been discussions in the National Assembly about pushing the election date back to October or November, when the rainy season is over and the daytime temperatures much cooler. He also stated offhand that pushing the election back would give more time to "find financing" sources for the elections. Note: Presumably Ould Sidi meant Qatar and Libya, who have been mentioned by others numerous times as possible election financiers. End note. -------------- A PACT WITH THE DEVIL? -------------- ¶7. (C) Ould Sidi stressed several times that the U.S. "does not understand" Mauritania's socio-political context -- by this he meant that democracy as the U.S. understands it does not exist in Mauritania. In a criticism of the USG principled position, he stated the U.S. does not know how to "take the baby's toy without making her cry." ¶8. (C) When asked by PolAsst if he thought the Libyan mediation would yield results, he declared himself skeptical and "not optimistic" about Qadhafi's efforts. He stated that the solution to the crisis lies in strong cooperation between France and the United States. "Mauritanians are like children," he said, "and the international community needs to take this matter into its own hands." He suggested the intervention of a group of Western "elders" who could bring the different parties to reason. He believes the way the situation is going, Mauritania is headed towards unilateral elections organized by Aziz. ¶9. (C) Ould Sidi stressed that the West and the United States are "all Mauritania knows." The USG principled attitude is pushing the regime "to make a pact with the devil" and ally with governments that are not Mauritania's historical partners (specifically citing Iran and China). He stated Aziz is "convinced his presidency is a done deal" and won't budge. -------------- FULL FLEDGED DISAGREEMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) PolOff met the same day with Ouadane deputy Louleid Ould Weddad. Unlike Ould Sidi, Weddad was explicit about his disagreements with General Aziz. "I'm opening my heart to you," he said, "last night, we spent hours trying to convince the General he needs to soften his position, but he would not listen." -------------- CONSENSUS IS IMPOSSIBLE -------------- ¶11. (C) Ould Weddad said the country is headed towards NOUAKCHOTT 00000188 003 OF 003 chaos. He regretted the different actors' rigid positions and responded "I frankly don't see a way out of this crisis; they will not budge." Like Ould Sidi, he dismissed the Qadhafi mediation as a joke. When PolOff pointed out that President Abdallahi's position had shifted from an adamant desire to finish his mandate to an agreement that he would return to organize early elections, Ould Weddad responded that "accepting to step down two months before the election and transitioning the country to the President of the Senate are all the compromises General Aziz is willing to make." -------------- A WASTE OF TIME AND MONEY -------------- ¶12. (C) Ould Weddad stated that under the current circumstances, the June 6 elections are a waste of time and money. "They may as well not take place," he said. Comment: Ould Weddad's comments about the election highlight that many perceive the election as unilateral. End comment. -------------- WAITING FOR THE ULTIMATE DEADLINE -------------- ¶13. (C) Ould Weddad was interested in finding out whether U.S. policy towards Mauritania would change now that the Democrats are in power. He seemed disappointed to find out that it would not. He also asked PolOff if she knew when the international community's "ultimate deadline" would be. "Do you think the April one will be the last one?," he asked. Comment: Ould Weddad sounded like someone trying to assess the right moment to jump off a sinking ship. End comment. ¶14. (C) Ould Weddad said he was a supporter of a strong Mauritania-U.S. relationship. He stated he was at the Embassy's disposition if there was anything he could do for the U.S. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Although still supporting General Aziz, Ould Weddad and Ould Sidi have started -- like rats off a sinking ship -- positioning themselves for a post-Aziz world. According to political LES, Ould Weddad, Ould Sidi and other members of the new party are former Ould Taya strongmen who favor close ties with the United States and maintaining relations with Israel. There is cause to wonder whether these men are also reacting to the junta's decision to force the Israelis out of Nouakchott (Reftel) and the regime's newfound closeness to Iran. Given previous denunciations from pro-coup partisans of foreign "interference" and "internationalization" of the crisis, Ould Sidi's appeal for the U.S. and France to come in and mediate the situation shows the growing desperation among the political class to find a way out of the crisis as soon as possible. HANKINS