PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI'S CAMP INCREASINGLY WORRIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000175 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI'S CAMP INCREASINGLY WORRIED REF: NOUAKCHOTT 170 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Multiple FNDD contacts are markedly discouraged following the February 20 meeting if in International Consultative Group on Mauritania and Muammar Qadhafi's entry into the political mix. Qadhafi is not trusted to hold the AU's hard line against the coup but the FNDD recognizes rejecting Qadhafi's advances will paint them as the problem. The broad European outreach conducted by the FNDD prior to the February 20 convinces Abdallahi's supporters that French intelligence services poisoned the European well after being duped by Aziz that Abdallahi represented a latent terrorist threat. The see some limited success in turning European views around -- but it is a slow process. FNDD leaders see Aziz continually under pressure and expect him to lash out with further arrests of Abdallahi supporters if not more violent tactics of repression. ¶2. (C) Charge met March 2 with FNDD leader and President of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir. At their request, Charge also met on March 3 with rotating FNDD President Abdel Koudouss Abeidna and ADIL (President Abdallahi's Party) President Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba. All three voiced concern about the international state of play concerning Mauritania. -------------- The Qadhafi Conundrum -------------- ¶3. (C) Ould Boulkheir, who left for Tripoli on Tuesday for what will be his third encounter with Qadhafi, told Charge is was deeply concerned that Qadhafi was incapable of playing an appropriate AU mediation role because he will run with his own agenda -- not that of the African Union. He lamented that the African Union had allowed a military autocrat who had come to power through force to assume the leadership of the Union. "We don't really expect one military coup leader to exert any real pressure on a fellow military coup leader." He added that, "Up until now, we have benefited most from the strong positions taken by the United States and the African Union. We fear that with Qadhafi in control, the African Union position would be eroded leaving us with just you." Abeidna told Charge that both he and Ould Boulkheir had strongly urged Abdallahi not to go to Tripoli for several reasons: (a) they fear Qadhafi will want to take advantage of his unique historical moment as the Presidency of both the African Union and UN Security Council to force through a "solution" inconsistent with the African Union's position and unacceptable for Mauritanian democracy; (b) they fear that, once out of Mauritania, Aziz will copy the template of the 2005 coup against Taya by preventing the president from coming back (likely with Qadhafi's connivance); and, (c) they fear Qadhafi will exclude everyone from his meeting with Abdallahi and then either distort what the president says to claim their is a "deal" or paint the president as the primary obstacle to democracy. Abeidna lamented that Qadhafi's legitimacy as the President of the African Union poses a real dilemma, "If we don't cooperate, we are seen as the problem. But if we do play along, we are almost certain to be faced with an unacceptable proposal." Abeidna said he had declined instructions to go to Tripoli as head of the FNDD delegation saying, "I'm not enough of the diplomat. As soon as Qadhafi said something stupid, I would have mouthed off." Abeidna cited FNDD "intelligence" from within Aziz' staff to say he was greatly concerned that Aziz and Qadhafi had reached a deal on how to deal with Abdallahi. The "Head of State" honors bestowed Aziz on arrival in Tripoli as well as Tripoli's acceptance of a new Mauritanian Ambassador were cited as evidence of Qadhafi's overt support for the regime. He suggested Qadhafi had provided Aziz the cash he needed to meet the Mauritanian federal payroll on the 22nd of February. Aziz, it was said, refused any of his staff to sit in on the meeting with Qadhafi but, afterward told them, "We're good. Continue planning for the election." ¶4. (C) Abeidna told Charge the FNDD was trying to put up as NOUAKCHOTT 00000175 002 OF 003 many conditions as possible to make Abdallahi's Tripoli trip fall through -- demanding a diplomatic passport showing him as "President" instead of "Former President;" demanding that he be received with head of state honors. In discussing with Charge the risk that Qadhafi would go off the African Union's script, he decided to also demand that a senior African Union official -- ideally Lamamra -- join in any Tripoli meetings between Qadhafi and Abdallahi (he asked that the U.S. share FNDD concerns about Qadhafi's motives and recommend Lamamra try to get in the meetings). Abeidna finally said, "I told the President he should only go if the U.S. says it's okay." Charge said that while he doubted the President's physical safety would be at risk under Libyan care and doubted Qadhafi would play along with the President returning to Mauritania, we certainly couldn't exclude the possibility Qadhafi would distort the meeting or try to force an unacceptable agreement. -------------- Them French -------------- ¶5. (C) Sidi Baba lamented, "We are dealing with four French republics: the republics of the Presidency, of the Foreign Ministry, of the Cooperation Ministry, and of the security services" In the European diplomatic contacts leading up to the February 20 Paris meeting, Sidi Baba said, "we were amazed how prevalent the thought had sunk in among the Europeans that Sidi was somehow the next Osama Bin Laden." He said Aziz had effectively laid that seed with the French intelligence services who had, in turn, spread the idea among the other Europeans. Time and again, Sidi Baba said discussions with European diplomats did not focus on any democratic blockage that may have preceded the coup but on whether Abdallahi was soft on terrorism. The FNDD emissaries repeated heard concerns from the serious -- that Abdallahi had released terrorists from custody -- to the banal -- that he had built a mosque on the presidential grounds. On the release of terrorists, Sidi Baba said that when Abdallahi decided to build his parliamentary block, he told the leadership, "The judiciary is releasing terrorists and drug traffickers. I can't stop them because they are an independent branch, so I need a strong parliamentary block that can put in legislation to prevent judiciary laxity." On the mosque, Sidi Baba said, "That was Aziz' idea. He told the President he had to have a mosque on the grounds because it was to difficult to organize security for trips to the central mosque." Sidi Baba added that when the President allowed an Islamic party to be established, "only the United States understood the rationale of allowing a political voice for moderate Islam. The Europeans all saw it as an Islamic takeover." ¶6. (C) Abeidna, who had recently returned from a diplomatic mission to Morocco said he had also found a distorted understanding among European ambassadors who tended to understand that an Abdallahi return somehow equated inroads for Islamic radicalization. He credited previous U.S. briefing efforts with Mauritania-watchers in Rabat as having started to turn opinions -- something he felt he was successfully able to build upon. Abeidna also saw a change in Moroccan views which had previously been relatively overt in their support for Aziz. The head of the Moroccan intelligence service told him Morocco did not support Aziz saying, "Have you seen us send and senior ministers down, have we done anything to support him? No." Abeidna, noting again that the Moroccans had noted previous U.S. interventions, told Charge, "Either they became disillusioned with Aziz, or they backed away from him when they saw the international community wasn't going to roll over on the coup." -------------- The Scorpion Will Strike -------------- ¶7. (C) Abeidna and Sidi Baba both predicted that an increasingly frustrated Aziz will strike back. Abeidna noted, "A cornered scorpion will strike as its last act even as it knows it is dead." Abeidna said they had expected FNDD member Boidel Ould Houmeid to be arrested last week and had NOUAKCHOTT 00000175 003 OF 003 therefore included him on the delegation to Tripoli telling the Libyans no FNDD members would travel if any were restrained. Abeidna and Sidi Baba both believed Aziz was planning to have them arrested along with the leadership of the Tawwasol Islamic party. Again citing FNDD "intelligence," Abeidna said Aziz had told his staff that if the FNDD persistent, he would attack them personally. Abeidna said one staffer asked, "You mean you want them to disappear?" Aziz reportedly declined to respond. HANKINS