REGIME'S "NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY' HARDENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000016 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: REGIME'S "NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY' HARDENS DIVISIONS REF: A. 2008 NOUAKCHOTT 740 ¶B. 2008 NOUAKCHOTT 775 ¶C. NOUAKCHOTT 0002 ¶D. NOUAKCHOTT 11 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary -- The two week "National Dialogue on Democracy" developed more a menu of options than a political roadmap out of Mauritania's political crisis. Detractors see what they expected from the process, a charade designed to legitimize General Aziz' coup. Insiders hope Aziz will not use the discussion document as a ticket to get himself elected through elections that would, by definition, be flawed if held under current political circumstances. Some Europeans were quick to embrace the Dialogue though others see little progress on the underlying political dilemma. ¶2. (SBU) The National Dialogue on Democracy (Etats Generaux de la Democratie) closed January 6 -- a day later than previously planned -- in a ceremony in which junta leader General Aziz committed to abide by the decisions of the majority. While including seven separate working groups, the most important points raised in the final declaration concerned the timing of new elections (with the majority calling for May 30 presidential elections),amendments to the constitution to weaken the office of the president, and the role of the military. By intent, the final declaration did not attempt to lay out a "roadmap" out of the political crisis but to describe the issues discussed with some effort to cite the most frequently heard argument as well as any strong minority opinions. A Dialogue Insider -------------- ¶3. (C) Charge met January 7 with Dialogue Moderator Cheikh Saad Bouh Camara to see whether the event had panned out as he had previously described (REFTEL C). Camara offered that the Dialogue had created a useful document for dialogue but regretted the event had been marred "by a misunderstanding" leading to the eventual disassociation of opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah. Camara said Daddah had gotten too upset "about one word" concerning the recommendations of the working-group on the constitution as to whether there was a "majority" or a "minority" view on the need to modify the constitution prior to new elections. Camara allowed that the original committee report said "minority" which the chairperson later tried to change to "majority" claiming a statistical error. The final report used "majority." ¶4. (C) While defending the Dialogue's end product, Camara worried that General Aziz was using it in the wrong way. Camara boasted, "the final language is very diplomatic -- you can construct any finding you want, and its opposite, from the text." For Camara that was the goal -- to spell out the different views on the various political and constitutional challenges facing the country for future discussions between the FNDD and the Regime. He emphasized it was not a real debate -- the group was too large for anything other than a series of interventions -- and should not be used as a decision paper. He noted that many of the most frequently voiced positions were either impractical or unconstitutional. He saw the majority view for elections by May 30 as impossible "if we want free and transparent elections" since there will not be enough time to put the election machinery in place. He added that, "Mauritania is not yet able to hold free and fair elections unless there is international support and monitoring." He noted also that he personally was against any change of the constitution prior to new elections saying such changes needed to be done carefully and deliberately -- not under a deadline. He thought the changes wouldn't go through anyhow since Aziz would be unable to complete either of the two methods for constitutional revision (a) a referendum, (b) a two-thirds majority of the combined parliamentary chambers (Camara calculated there are NOUAKCHOTT 00000016 002 OF 003 not enough votes if Ould Daddah and his RFD members resist). ¶5. (C) Camara said he saw no way to have credible elections unless they include Ould Daddah, an FNDD candidate and, possibly, Col. Vall. If Aziz runs without these significant opponents (and Camara is still not sure Aziz will run),the elections will not constitute a real competition between the main power blocks. Camara saw the various players now looking at re-assessing alliances. There continues to be an Aziz -- Ould Daddah dialogue going with the civilian still looking to be designated the military's next candidate. There are talks between the FNDD and Vall to see if they can unite against a common enemy. There are talks between elements of the FNDD and Ould Daddah for an alliance. And there are talks between elements of the FNDD (Ould Boulkheir) and Aziz to find a compromise. Camara's assessment was that Aziz will not run if he can't get anyone of stature to run against him -- needing a "real" opponent to have his victory legitimized. Under the current circumstances, the FNDD (Abdallahi, Ould Maouloud or Ould Boulkheir) will not run nor will Ould Daddah or Vall. In the impasse, Aziz will continue to opt for a longer transition time to try to get a real opponent -- but not Vall who might beat him. Camara thought that in the end, perhaps six months out or longer, all the deadlocked parties will look for a compromise candidate acceptable to all -- "someone like (Abdallahi's first Prime Minister) Zein Zeidane but with more experience under his belt." Camara saw UN SRSG for Somalia Amadou Ould Abdallah as someone who might fit the bill. Ahmed Ould Daddah -------------- ¶6. (C) Charge met with opposition leader and RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah January 7 noting things had played out pretty much the way Ould Daddah had predicted in mid-December (REFTEL A). Ould Daddah confirmed that his ultimate disavowal of the Dialogue came from the result he had expected all along -- a fairly transparent charade to legitimize the coup and Aziz' efforts for a "democratic coup" via a new fake election. Ould Daddah said he had left the door open for a sincere exercise and added he saw some of the others working with the Dialogue were equally interested in forging a real solution to the crisis. In the end, Aziz stacked the deck in his favor and forced changes when the results weren't what he wanted. As for the "single word" issue cited in Para. 3, Ould Daddah said getting a "majority view" that the constitution needed revision prior to the elections as essential for Aziz' plan to put himself in power permanently. Ould Daddah noted he agrees that constitutional reform is needed but not now in the midst of a political crisis and not with the current corrupted parliament. Ould Daddah also dismissed the utility of the process saying that, even if sincere, it was so bloated to exclude any real debate -- just a "Hyde Park" of interventions with no way of qualitatively measuring one from another with most coming from "illiterates from Bassikanou" who couldn't understand the concepts being discussed. ¶7. (C) Ould Daddah will not run in elections as being spelled out by the Dialogue. He saw some room for closer cooperation with the FNDD "if they can get past this Sidi, Sidi, Sidi mantra." In that vein, he voiced the same warming towards the FNDD's Mohamed Ould Maouloud that Ould Maouloud had voiced for Ould Daddah in REFTEL D. Ould Daddah saw the FNDD growing frustrated with President Abdallahi and willing to look at other arrangements that did not involve the President -- he said he had heard essentially that from Ould Maouloud, Ould Boulkheir, and even from Abdallahi's representative abroad Sidi Mohamed Ould Amajare. Ould Daddah said, "there is a basis for cooperation between those who want to see the end of over 20 years of military rule," adding that "I include the 'parenthesis' of Sidi's time since he was just a front for the military." ¶8. (C) Ould Daddah became upset when asked how he saw the Gaza crisis playing on the domestic political scene. "I'm NOUAKCHOTT 00000016 003 OF 003 not going to play that card. Yes, Aziz is playing populist politics on the issue and gaining some support, but this is something every Mauritanian is united on." Ould Daddah warned that the U.S. was going to lose years of hard work over its silence on Gaza. He noted and praised the U.S. strategy on counter-terrorism in Mauritania that equally addresses the Al Qaeda threat and the root causes of extremism, but warned there was little the U.S. could do internally to stem radicalization in Mauritania is the Palestinian issue got out of hand. He added, "I'm no fan of Hamas and I know they provoked the attack, but the response plays into their hands. They are now the heroes of the Middle East and nobody is even listening to Abbas." Role of the Military -------------- ¶9. (C) One issue of concern raised by Camara, Ould Daddah and Ould Maouloud was the effort to define a role for the military in the Dialogue document. Ould Daddah was adamant that the military can have no special constitutional role. Camara noted that while the document spoke about the military as an "institution" as a gesture the military had pushed for, the text of the declaration emphasized the need for an apolitical republican army. Ould Maouloud told Charge January 6 he found the military reference the most worrisome in the Dialogue document. Ould Maouloud told Charge the "Kill an Ostrich" story dating back to French colonial times when the French banned ostrich hunting because of dwindling populations. A tribe that made its livelihood off ostrich hunting was up in arms so the village chief went to the French provincial administrator saying he needed permission to hunt "just one" ostrich for a religious ceremony. The Frenchman relented and gave the village chief a permit for one ostrich. Returning to his village, the village council berated the chief saying "what can we do with just one ostrich?" The chief told them, "with this piece of paper, we can kill all the ostriches -- just one at a time." So Ould Maouloud worried that any reference to a special status for the military -- no matter how democratically worried -- will give them the crack they need for an endless series of coups. European Reactions -------------- ¶10. (C) Following the closing of the Dialogue, the government media was quick to publish comments attributed to the German Ambassador to Mauritania Eberhard Schanze calling the Dialogue "a serious discussion that had been very open, very frank and very serious," and adding, "my impression is that what took place was not fabricated." Charge checked with the German Embassy the morning of the 7th finding that the Ambassador had departed the night before for consultations with the EU Presidency in Prague that German will represent in Mauritania through June. The German Charge Nicole Steckmann (protect) said she had not been present when the Ambassador spoke to the press but, if accurately quoted, said what was attributed to her Ambassador, "does not reflect the position of either Germany or of the European Union." Steckmann noted that after the closing ceremony, her Ambassador, the Spanish Ambassador, the French Charge and she had discussed how to report the process to capitals. Within the context of the EU negotiations with the regime, Steckmann noted there had been tangible progress on two points: the President had been released and there had been some form of national dialogue that the President had chosen not to participate in. She noted, however, that the product of the dialogue was not an exit strategy but a compilation of opinions that served no real purpose. She also noted that "the assumption was that Abdallahi's release implies some return of his functions. Abdallahi doesn't really seem to have tried since being released, but clearly he is not exercising any presidential powers." HANKINS