LIBYAN DELEGATION ACCOMPLISHES LITTLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000137 SIPDIS SECSTATE FOR AF/W - HEFLIN/DENNISON; PARIS FOR KANEDA; ADDIS FOR USAU - MAYBURY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MR SUBJECT: LIBYAN DELEGATION ACCOMPLISHES LITTLE NOUAKCHOTT 00000137 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Cornelius C. Walsh for reasons 1. 4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) A Libyan delegation led by Ravi Al-Madani, a special envoy of Muammar Qadhafi, arrived in Mauritania February 11. The ostensible purpose of the visit was to encourage all sides to find a consensual solution to the crisis and spare the country from further international sanctions and isolation, something Libya has had much experience with. The delegation met with most of the major players on the Mauritanian political scene: General Aziz, President Abdallahi, RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah, National Assembly President Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, and other pro-coup and anti-coup figures. (Note: Local press reports state that former president, and current Colonel, Ely Mohamed Vall was in Cairo while the delegation was in Mauritania. End note.) The delegation was supposed to hold a final press conference February 14 but did not, returning to Libya instead with no official announQent made. ¶2. (U) FNDD and President Abdallahi reactions: The FNDD released a statement after the Libyan delegation visit. Beyond the usual expressions of friendship and brotherhood with Libya, President Abdallahi reiterated that he was open to dialogue for solving the current crisis, buQnly after the coup failed and the military returned to their barracks. "Any discussions held between political parties while under the reign of the military would legitimize the coup," the statement finished. ¶3. (C) President Abdallahi's Chief of Staff: Charge a.i. met with Abdallahi's Chief of Staff Ahmed Kaber Ould Hammoudi. Hammoudi noted that the Libyans did not appear to have done their homework and were unaware of the issues involved and the positions held by various parties. He also mentioned that he thought the Libyans were baffled by the concept of "legitimacy." The foundation of President Abdahllahi's position is that as an elected head of state removed by force, he is the legal head of state of the Islamic Republic, and it rests with the High State Council to remove itself from office and return the country to a constitutional process. This reasoning process appeared, to Hammoudi's view, to be beyond Libyan understanding. While acceding the President's position, they continually probed for some "give" in his claim to legitimacy. ¶4. (C) RFD response: Daddah cut short his own trip around Africa that he was taking and rushed back to Mauritania to meet with the Libyans. (Note: The Libyan visit appears to have taken people completely by surprise. Contacts in both the RFD and FNDD stated that there was no advance notice given of the Libyans' arrival. End note.) PolAsst met with RFD Vice President Dr. Hamedou Baba Kane February 16. Kane did not provide details of what was said directly between Daddah and the Libyans. However, Kane did say that the Libyans arrived with three main points to deliver: share their own bad experiences of sanctions and embargoes, stress the necessity of open dialogue, and offer themselves as mediators to resolve the crisis. Furthermore, Kane said it was probable that the Libyans would launch a formal initiative to solve the crisis in the near future, perhaps on February 20. (Note: This date coincides with the February 20 EU deadline. End note.) PolAsst asked Kane if he was optimistic about the Libyan proposal's chances, given the lengthy trail of "initiatives" already put forth by various actors. Kane paused for several seconds, then offered a tentative "yes." He said the FNDD may come around to the Libyan proposal, given the "divisions" he saw beginning to emerge within the Front, particularly within the APP party. (Note: APP is an amalgam of Haratine and Nasserist political currents. The Nasserist wing in the party is rumored to have pro-Libyan tendencies. Also, the APP is scheduled to take over the rotating FNDD presidency in March. End note.) ¶5. (C) Comment: The real reasons for the sudden Libyan NOUAKCHOTT 00000137 002.2 OF 002 visit are unclear. Given that most of the participants were unaware of the visit until the last moment, it does not appear to have been a well-planned affair. According to some conspiracy theorists (particularly in the FNDD),the whole event may have been cooked up by Qadhafi and Aziz to give the appearance of consultation and dialogue, particularly ahead of the February 20 EU deadline. However, state-run media did not cover the visit at all -- presumably Aziz would have wanted to milk coverage for all it was worth if this were an attempt to show the international community the regime's willingness for dialogue. Likewise, Qadhafi may be eager to notch a diplomatic success as he begins his term as AU president. Whatever the ulterior motives for the visit were, it accomplished little aside from vague statements from participants that they were willing to talk. Given Aziz's and Abdallahi's entrenched positions though, even this seems unlikely to happen anytime soon. Kane's lukewarm endorsement of the Libyans only reinforces an apparent lack of enthusiasm among the interested parties. LES confirm that many Mauritanians do not regard the Libyans as trustworthy mediators, given past history of Libyan "assistance" to Mauritania that came with many strings attached. End comment. HANKINS