MAURITANIA: SIX MONTHS AFTER THE COUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000128 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ECON EAID MR SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: SIX MONTHS AFTER THE COUP REF: A. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 777 ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 31 ¶C. NOUAKCHOTT 93 ¶D. ADDIS ABABA 332 ¶E. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 709 ¶F. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 599 ¶G. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 480 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Six months after the coup, the Country Team, senior LES, and external contacts are virtually unanimous in their opinion that Mauritania is in the midst of an unprecedented crisis. Political uncertainty and deadlock continue and the economy steadily worsens. The economic and social prospects for the short-term future over the next six months look grim; however, this adds to the emerging (but not yet dominant),political trendline against the coup. A negative European Union decision against the coup would have a galvanizing effect in building pressure against General Aziz as would the imposition of our own targeted financial sanctions. Coordinated diplomatic action is needed to ensure that the electoral plan announced by the military does not receive international support and recognition. Mission believes it appropriate to consider seeking Congressional waivers to allow us to re-engage on substantially restructures TSCTP anti-extremism programs as well as new democratization programs to support Mauritania's tenacious anti-coup forces. End summary. -------------- The Current Situation -------------- ¶2. (C) Political: General Aziz continues to display the trademarks of an evolving dictator. Arbitrary arrests, suppression of public demonstrations, political witch hunts (the arrest of Prime Minister Yahya Ould Ahmed El Waghef on corruption charges being a prime example),indiscriminate use of public funds to support the coup and buy off supporters, and a campaign of tribal score-settling (particularly against the Idawaali tribe, which was close to President Abdallahi) have all served to centralize power while generating enemies. The recent promotion of two new generals has further enabled Aziz to close ranks at the top echelons of the military and security services, though discord in the lower ranks may be on the rise (Ref A). The regime's much-hyped "National Dialogue on Democracy," to no one's surprise, was largely a rubber-stamp affair (Ref B),but it did lead to two major developments. First, the ever-prevaricating Ahmed Ould Daddah and his RFD party withdrew from the "dialogue" and took a stronger anti-junta stance (though stopping short of aligning with the anti-coup FNDD). Second, the "dialogue" led to an announcement of presidential elections to be held June 6. However, it seems unlikely that the regime has enough time or money to organize them into any credible process. (Note: Given Qatar's continued assistance since the coup, it may be a potential donor to election funding. Iran, also, has hinted it may fund elections. End note.) ¶3. (C) President Abdallahi's thwarted return to Nouakchott January 22 by the junta (Ref C) was further proof that he is still restricted, despite the junta's claim that he has been released "unconditionally." This was, in effect, a political gift to the President who told Charge February 10 that the incident substantially strengthened his diplomatic case abroad. The FNDD appears to have a wait-and-see policy, preferring to let Aziz dig his own grave. The African Union imposed targeted sanctions February 6 on members of the High State Council and their civilian supporters (Ref D). Meanwhile, the Francophonie Organization, AU, EU, UN, Islamic Conference, and Arab League are scheduled to hold a consultative meeting in Paris February 20. These negative international actions have previous coup-supporters questioning whether Aziz can "deliver" and have sparked a spate of discussion on possible counter-coup scenarios. ¶4. (C) Economic: The economic situation is precarious. The regime has overspent in an attempt to generate popular NOUAKCHOTT 00000128 002 OF 004 support (Ref E). This, combined with donor cuts and the worldwide price drops in iron, copper, and other exports, has led to a sharp decrease in the state reserves. Likewise, the fishing industry in Mauritania, a pillar of the economy, is in dire straits because of appalling decisions by the junta (Ref F). There are shortages of hard currency, and the ouguiya has lost value. Prices that the junta had artificially lowered on fuel, food, and other items shortly after the coup have begun to creep back up while the supply of these artificially discounted products has dwindled (since the regime placed the cost of price cuts on suppliers). Foreign direct investment has plummeted. Additionally, a senior LES reports that governmental salaries were not paid to some employees in at least two ministries in January. The regime still has the support of wealthy businessmen and financial backers who may be able to forestall major funding shortfalls in the near-term. However, the continuing economic crisis and threat of expanded sanctions are raising anxieties within the business community, and there are signs that some financial backers of the junta may be wavering. -------------- Predictions for the Next Six Months -------------- ¶5. (C) Political: Assuming there is no counter-coup nor assassination of Aziz (both regarded as possible, but only medium probability outcomes),Country Team believes Aziz will resign from the army, stand as a presidential candidate, and most likely, win the elections. (Note: Aziz supposedly declared to his ministers after a meeting February 5 that he will run, but there has been no official announcement yet. End note.) The regime will attempt to legitimize the elections by encouraging additional candidates (who have no real hope of winning) to run. For example, Ibrahim Sarr, president of the AJD-MR party and coup supporter, has already announced that he will run for president. Among the big players, RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah has not yet stated his intentions regarding elections. Opinion at Post is split -- some say Daddah will run, because this is his last realistic chance of becoming president, something he desperately craves. Others say Daddah will not run, because he knows any election with candidates from the military will be flawed. APP President and fierce coup opponent Messaoud Ould Boulkheir will not run, barring a completely unexpected turnaround by the FNDD. Former President (and current Colonel) Ely Mohamed Vall remains the wildcard -- he has been very quiet, though he has not excluded the possibility of running for president (Ref G). However, many think that he will not run if the elections are viewed by the international community as illegitimate, and that he will never run as long as Aziz stands as a candidate. ¶6. (C) The repercussions of an Aziz "presidency" would be far-reaching. Sanctions could drive Aziz to turn his back on the West and look eastward. Qatar, Iran, Libya, and China are frequently mentioned as countries that would have few qualms dealing with an authoritarian regime. Libya and Iran, in particular, may dangle desperately needed economic assistance in front of Aziz in return for severing relations with Israel (and more broadly, for distancing Mauritania from the West). The junta has already signaled a willingness to cozy up to Iran, having recently held meetings with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Vice President Mohamed Ridha Rahimiand Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. As for Aziz, given his rumored lack of intelligence and reputed cruelty, many external contacts and LES state that an Aziz "presidency" would be worse than President Taya's dictatorship. With some in the political class now openly warning of a counter-coup or civil war if Aziz succeeds in clinging to power, Mauritania's long-term prospects are anything but bright. Political desperation may open the door even further to narcotics traffickers who already are reported to have increased operations transiting Mauritania with the involvement of certain regime authorities. ¶7. (C) Economic: The economic situation will continue to deteriorate. With foreign assistance cut off and foreign direct investment sharply reduced, the junta's budgetary problems will increase. If the regime continues to have NOUAKCHOTT 00000128 003 OF 004 problems paying civil servants' salaries, popular discontent will spread, perhaps leading to increased repression by Aziz in a bid to maintain order. The junta may try to forestall this by raiding SNIM's coffers and other government holdings, but that would only provide a temporary respite. Likewise, if the public becomes aware of the full scope of the regime's budgetary problems, the situation may become very volatile. Country Team believes that with current government spending levels, and barring a fresh infusion of outside financial assistance, the regime will run out of money sometime within the next six months. This will spark significant public discontent and may spark a major urban food crisis as there will be no hard currency available to purchase food and other essential imports. -------------- What to do? -------------- ¶8. (C) In light of the current situation in Mauritania, Country Team recommends the following courses of action: -- Make it widely known that elections as currently proposed by the junta are not acceptable to the international community and work with partners (EU, AU, UN, Arab League) to ensure no support is given to this fatally flawed process.. The junta hopes that elections will solve everything: create a clean slate, and make everything good with the international community. The regime, political class, and public need to be made aware that this is not the democratic transition of 2005-2007 all over again. -- Highlighting the regime's budgetary woes may be another way to apply pressure. Appealing to the patriotic national interests of the regime's financial backers (i.e., "do what's good for Mauritania") would probably have little effect. However, appealing to their personal economic interests may convince junta supporters that continued support for the regime is not in their own best interests. Particularly if they face personal financial, travel, and trade sanctions. -- Expand targeted sanctions. Focused sanctions on the regime and its supporters (both civilian and military) should be applied as soon as possible. These sanctions may have enough psychological effect push Aziz's supporters past the tipping point and force his ouster. The AU has done its part by imposing sanctions and transferring Mauritania's dossier to the UN for deliberation. For sanctions to be maximally effective however, the Europeans must follow the AU's lead. Sanctions on the part of the USG, while having little practical effect due to the limited economic ties between the two countries, carry significant psychological and political effect. Effective sanctions on the part of the AU and EU would have much greater bite -- hitting the junta where it hurts. -- Re-engage where needed: While Mauritania passes through this most difficult of political times, it is also set by a real and increasing terrorist and radical threat. We should continue to engage in information exchange and provide practical support to the regime when it can have an immediate effect against credible and actionable threats. Anti-extremism remains the larger long term security threat and we should would recommend Washington consider seeking Congressional waivers to allow USAID and State PD to re-engage in TSCTP anti-extremism activities that would work with civil society and local communities rather than with central-government authorities. In the same vein, we would seek funding and waivers for democratization funding that would allow us to provide practical assistance to political parties, local governments, media and civil society entities that continue to struggle against the military regime. -------------- CHARGE COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Six months ago, we assumed the coup would be resolved by now -- either the putsch would have fizzled or it would have undisputed control that might have forced a "pragmatic" NOUAKCHOTT 00000128 004 OF 004 acceptance on our part. Neither has happened. The General has yet to legitimize his position in the face of concerted international condemnation and dogged internal resistance. Having a viable democratic alternative to the regime requires a continuation of much of our same policies to date. The six months since the coup have been like tracking the stock market with some weeks seeming to show encouraging signs followed by sudden dips. Our senior staff and many Mauritanian contacts (pro-coup, anti-coup, and indifferent) are signaling major discomfort within the regime and giving 30 to 40% odds that Aziz will not be around in six months. Mauritanians speak of three ouster scenarios; (a) a typical "palace coup" wherein Aziz's closest military, political, financial and tribal supporters will show him the door for exile abroad; (b) a "good" counter-coup led by the likes of General Ghazwani that will force Aziz out with the risk of limited and contained violence; and, (c) a "bad" counter-coup led by the likes of General Hady that would involve bloodshed and establish a straight-forward military dictatorship. Nobody sees the likelihood that Aziz will step down if not coerced. FNDD types cite the odds of a "bad" counter-coup as remote but show a willingness to run the risk of a "good" counter-coup even if it involves a bit of bloodshed. We, of course, should be working towards steering events towards Option A for an arrangement that does not involve arms. While we are not there yet, we need to be prepared for Mauritania's tipping point when things will happen quickly. We are by far the best placed external actor to influence the President and the FNDD if a truly democratic opportunity presents itself whereas we have very limited influence on the regime (that remains the domain of the French). ¶10. (C) Despite all the talk of possible counter-coups, the 60 - 70% odds remain on more of the same. Nothing in Aziz' performance to date offers hope his regime might evolve into something good. While our European brethren often fall back on the argument that we have to be "pragmatic" and look at stability over elusive democracy, an Aziz government over a five year or longer period would almost certainly result in increased narcotics penetration, greater corruption, increased hunger, worsening human rights, greater radicalization and a population more open to terrorist advances. HANKINS