IN LEMDEN, ABDALLAHI SEES THE TIDE TURNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000126 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR SUBJECT: IN LEMDEN, ABDALLAHI SEES THE TIDE TURNING Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. Summary: President Abdallahi is more determined than ever to oppose the coup and sees political and economic trends going in his favor. He has been approached by Aziz' own Ouled Bisbaa tribe business leaders about resigning but rejects any negotiations with the military and hopes to return to power, but not necessarily to organize early elections. He does not think the coup was a tribal affair but believes it has now turned into ONE because the Ouled Bisbaa are determined to tighten their grip through General Aziz or, possibly, through Colonel Vall. The president is convinced Ahmed Ould Daddah will side with the military if Aziz decides not to run for President. From his exile in Lemden, the president is coordinating FNDD outreach to the EU in preparation for the February 21 deadline, and the UN Security Council. He is worried about the upcoming Libyan presidency of the Security Council and wants the US to raise awareness about Mauritania among Security Council members. End summary. -------------- Ouled Bisbaa Visitors: The Truth -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting February 10 with Charge d'Affaires and PolOff in Lemden, President Abdallahi denied rumors that Mohamed Ould Bouamatou and Azizi El Mamay -- powerful Ouled Bisbaa businessmen and members of his wife's family -- were visiting to negotiate a solution to the crisis. Instead, the president said, they were probing his willingness to step down "for his country's sake." President Abdallahi knows General Aziz was aware of the visits but is not certain whether their initiative was personal or part of a concerted plan. The president was appalled by their boldness and declared he will do everything in his power to thwart the coup. The president spoke primarily of the visit of junta financier Mohamed Hmayenne Bouamatou who had essentially beaten around the bush until 3:00 in the morning without putting something concrete on the table from either himself or on Aziz' behalf aside from vague references about how all could be resolved if Abdallahi resigned. Abdallahi told Bouamatou, "you (the tribe) launched a coup against me, locked me away for months and denigrated my reputation. It seems far fetched to expect me to stand down to help you." Bouamatou responded, "I would react the same way if I were you, but I'm not you." -------------- The Coup: Not a Tribal Affair -------------- ¶3. (C) Charge asked whether the coup was motivated by Ouled Bisbaa tribal interests as some in the FNDD feel Aziz is actually working on behalf of Aziz or at least as part of a tag-team where whoever has the better position gets to run the country. President Abdallahi insisted the coup was not tribal. He stressed the coup happened because Aziz and the parliamentary majority realized he was not "the man they needed," as he refused to encourage clientelism and remained open to all political actors. ¶4. (C) For President Abdallahi, tribal allegiances started playing after the coup. Before the coup, General Aziz mobilized his cousins to co-opt elected officials and spread rumors against Abdallahi's wife, but full-fledged Ouled Bisbaa involvement came later, when the tribe closed ranks around and strengthened Aziz. To this end, Ouled Bisbaa targeted Ould Taya's Smasside group and the Idaballi. Rivalries between them existed before but have been exacerbated by the coup. Comment: Political LES believe that even though the coup was not a tribal affair, it has now become ONE and current tensions could devolve into actual conflict. Other tribes feel threatened and displaced by Ouled Bisbaa who are reported to have frequent meetings of tribal leaders to determine how to protect/advance their interests. A counter-coup, particularly ONE that would physically harm Aziz, could spark a tribal war. End comment. NOUAKCHOTT 00000126 002 OF 004 -------------- Ouled Bisbaa's Struggle for Unity -------------- ¶5. (C) President Abdallahi underlined that the rift between General Aziz and his cousin Colonel Ely Vall has existed since 2006. The tribe needs to contain it as divisions threaten Ouled Bisbaa political and financial influence. The President stated it would be impossible for both to run for President as that would divide the tribe. If General Aziz realized he had no political future, he would abstain from running and would either support Vall or keep quiet, said President Abdallahi. Nevertheless, according to tribal logic, it would be impossible for the General to support anyone else or to openly oppose his cousin. ¶6. (C) The president thinks Ely Vall is more respected by the international community than by Mauritanians. Nevertheless, he could emerge as a solution because he knows the country well, is respected by the international community and has resources. Abdallahi said Vall won't run if the elections are organized by the military. Charge told the president that Vall overstates the extent of his international support -- while Vall's shepherding of the transition process was appreciated, that did not mean he was seen as an ideal president given his history of corruption and rumored narcotics ties. -------------- Ahmed Ould Daddah -------------- ¶7. (C) In the President's view, unlike Vall, Ahmed Ould Daddah will run for president in elections organized by the military if General Aziz decides not to run. Ould Daddah's problem with President Abdallahi is personal and stems from Abdallahi's 2007 presidential victory. After the election, said the president, Ould Daddah's sole intent was to destabilize Abdallahi's government. As opposed to some FNDD leaders who see some possibility of rapprochement between the president and Ould Daddah, Abdallahi did not appear to offer any hope the two would be able to work together. -------------- What Abdallahi Wants -------------- ¶8. (C) President Abdallahi stated that the political class must force the military to pull back for him to return. The president heavily qualified the language in his recent political plan suggesting he would call for early presidential and legislative elections upon his return to power. For him, early elections are not a given. He would only accept early elections if Mauritanians request them after the military's departure with the base assumption that, without military manipulation, there is no political crisis requiring new elections. Abdallahi's position contrasts somewhat with that of other FNDD leaders who view his return as a bridge to constitutional order and a short transition to new elections. Even though support for President Abdallahi has increased slightly following the military's refusal to let him enter Nouakchott, most of that support is for him as the INSTITUTION of the elected president and not for him personally. Many believe the president's return, resignation, and early elections are necessary to end the crisis. ¶9. (C) President Abdallahi supports sanctions. He believes targeted sanctions against the military and pro-coup civilians will erode Aziz's support. He sees the African Union decision as highly important since the regime thought they would be able to avoid a negative AU decision. In a society where many Mauritanians will simply follow power, Abdallahi sees Aziz' defeat in Addis as undermining the confidence of those around him that he can deliver the goods. A negative decision by the European Union would be even more effective since European sanctions would have more bite than African or American measures. Abdallahi also reviewed his NOUAKCHOTT 00000126 003 OF 004 understanding of the increasingly desperate financial situation that will likely turn public opinion strongly away from Aziz in coming months. Charge asked whether the president was worried that Arab states like Libya and Qatar as well as Iran might fill the gap in exchange for a rupture of relations with Israel. Concerning Iran, Abdallahi noted that in a meeting he had held with Ahmedinajad, the Iranian leader had pushed for stronger bilateral relations but had not once raised the issue of Mauritanian relations with Israel. He said, "I don't know about the Iranian practice in regards to paying for what they want," but discounted the idea Iran would come in with significant money. As for Libya, he confirmed that the Leader always raises the relationship with Israel coupled with offers of money but discounted the Libyan and all bluster and not much substance. He assumed Tripoli might advance some money if Aziz cuts ties, but not enough to offset the cost of losing western support. Abdallahi was deeply disappointed with the Emir of Qatar who he had previously seen as a strong supporter of Mauritanian democracy. Following the divisive Doha Summit of Gaza, Abdallahi said he had seen increased support for his position from the Arab League's Amr Musa and recognized the possible utility of bolstering contacts with Cairo and Riyadh to toughen up the Arab position on the coup. ¶10. (C) When asked by Charge whether he sees mediation as a solution to the crisis, Abdallahi responded he is the rightful president and will not negotiate with the military unless to set the terms of their departure. Abdallahi accepted the Charge's suggestion that if the political situation reaches a tipping point leading to Aziz' ouster, fast and effective mediation might be needed to steer the outcome in the right direction. He confirmed that neither he nor Aziz are looking for a mediator right now. Comment: Requests for US mediation by both pro-coup and anti-coup supporters have increased. Many believe the current blockage is dangerous and some would like to see the US, viewed as a disinterested, credible actor, bring opposing parties to the negotiating table. Another possible mediator would, of course, be France. -------------- Abdallahi Requests US Help with EU and UN -------------- ¶11. (C) The President asked Charge to help the FNDD engage with EU and Security Council members. The FNDD has increased contacts with the Czech Republic in preparation for the February 21 EU deadline. An FNDD emissary went to Morocco, met with the Czech Ambassador and had the opportunity to let the Czech talk directly to President Abdallahi. The FNDD European representative will hold discussions with the Czech Foreign Minister on February 18. The group feels the US could help by maintaining pressure on Spain, France and Germany. Comment: FNDD rotating president Ould Abeidna said he has been picking up positive signs from the Czech presidency. He noted the Czechs indicated displeasure with continued French input on the issue after their presidency had concluded. End comment. ¶12. (C) The President expressed concern about the upcoming Libyan Security Council presidency. He believes the Libyan's are inconsistent and unpredictable and is worried that many countries in the Security Council do not understand the Mauritanian context. Charge suggested that it would be a good strategy to ask African members like Burkina Faso and Uganda to organize an informal Security Council briefing when his representatives go to New York as members like China and Russia could react negatively at US involvement. Abdallahi said he was confident Uganda and Burkina Faso would be supportive. He hoped that the Security Council would discuss Mauritania in February under the Japanese presidency than in March when Libya will be in the chair since anything involving Tripoli is always hard to predict. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) This was the Charge's third trip to Lemden (previous NOUAKCHOTT 00000126 004 OF 004 visits on November 13 and December 9) and saw President Abdallahi perhaps more confident than ever before. He appeared in good HEALTH and did not suffer from the somewhat detached nostalgia noted in the December visit. Like a tug-of-war, he sees the flag moving towards his side although with no illusions he is running away with a victory. There is no significant change in his position. Indeed, he has pulled away from what seemed a concession of accepting early elections should he return. For a government in external exile, the little village of Lemden shows signs of new construction. Each visit sees Abdallahi's staff growing. The first meeting in November was with Abdallahi alone. In December, he had gained a Chief of Staff. On this trip he had a Diplomatic Advisor and Spokesperson. He still receives visitors in the equivalent of a two-room school house, but the operation is becoming more professionally staffed. HANKINS