POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE RUMINATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000116 SIPDIS AF/W FOR AMBASSADOR BOULWARE/DON HEFLIN, PARIS FOR KANEDA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2018 TAGS: EAID ECON PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE RUMINATIONS FROM THE TOP REF: NOUAKCHOTT 00001 Classified By: A/DCM Cornelius WALSH for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On January 28, AID Rep met with United Nations Systems Mauritania Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative Maria do Valle Ribeiro (protect) to discuss the current political and assistance environment in Mauritania. While Ms. Ribeiro is a sociologist and technical program specialist by training, her perspective on the future of politics and donor funding in Mauritania is interesting. Her role as UN Systems Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative permits her a broad view of donor perceptions on the current situation in addition to the different UN agencies and their partners. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The United Nations has been active since the coup and continues to formally interact with technical-level junta authorities in order to continue designing, implementing and measuring impact of their humanitarian projects. Two examples of UN projects launched since the coup include: a multi-million USD environment and climate change project and a $5 million USD conflict prevention project. While the UN avoids high-level government interaction, Ms. Ribeiro continues to meet with junta leader Abdel Aziz and the Ministry of Finance on urgent, programming and budget-related issues. -------------- The National Budget -------------- ¶3. (C) According to Ms. Ribeiro, the UN, out of all the donors, has been working the closest with the junta's Ministry of Finance in an attempt to advise the military administration on budget issues. The ministry continues to protect budget information from the World Bank, IMF and UN, however Ms. Ribeiro reported that the Minister personally promised her a copy of the current detailed budget, and she believes that she will indeed receive it in coming days. Ms. Ribeiro also noted that UN is working on hiring former Prime Minister Zeine Ould Zeidane as a consultant to do a junta financial budget assessment. Ms. Ribeiro reported that the former Abdallahi PM is reluctant to speak against the junta if there are indeed budget problems, but she thinks that the UN will be able to convince him to step up to the plate. ¶4. (C) She agreed that the junta continues to overspend in an effort to win hearts and minds (Reftel),and that the state coffers are quickly approaching empty. Ms. Ribeiro opines that this egregious spending will come to an abrupt halt after the anticipated presidential elections. Comment: The election &winner8 will have the dubious and unpleasant task of fund-raising in an environment where most donors will proclaim the elections invalid. End comment. With a chuckle, Ms. Ribeiro acknowledged that the junta was taking advantage of the launch of new UN programs to claim and publicize them as their own. She was unaware of the recent press articles and a January 27 radio interview on Radio France International where the junta,s Human Rights Commissioner took credit for a new $5 million USD conflict prevention program that will target assistance to former slaves. -------------- Upcoming Presidential Elections -------------- ¶5. (C) UNDP had originally planned to support elections and the Independent Electoral Commission via this new conflict prevention program, however those election-related plans were since canceled. Ms. Ribeiro mentioned an unconfirmed report that the only donor that has offered to help fund the Mauritanian presidential election is Qatar. Comment: AID Rep had recently discussed the upcoming elections with the Executive Director of Qatar's bilateral assistance program, Abdelkader Ghessab. While he coyly feigned ignorance when asked if Qatar was planning on supporting the election process, he did not deny it. End comment. Ms. Ribeiro said that despite reports that the junta recently revised its budget to liberate seven billion Ougiya ($28 million USD) for elections (Reftel),this was not exactly the realty and NOUAKCHOTT 00000116 002 OF 003 if/when elections are held, the junta will need significant outside funding. ¶6. (C) Ms. Ribeiro thinks the June 6 proposed election date is too early because the junta will not be able to organize and mobilize the necessary funds in time. Comment: The junta launched a voter registration campaign over the past weekend. End comment. She agrees that the likely reasons for the junta,s selection of the June 6 date is due to budget reasons -- when the budget is expected to run out. She does not think that Aziz will be elected, if indeed he chooses to run, simply because he is trying to control too much as it is. With some regret and referring to the junta,s initiatives to win hearts and minds, she said that Aziz's presidential campaign had already begun. -------------- The Future of Donor Funding -------------- ¶7. (C) Ms. Ribeiro remains depressed about Mauritania's current political and economic situation and opines next several months will be &rough8. She stated that several of Aziz's entourage are convinced that the donors will see the light and re-launch funding soon, particularly after the upcoming presidential election. She offered the example that the junta expects that the European Union to renew its fishing contract when it comes up for renewal in August 2009, however, she said, the junta is mistaken. In the long term, she presumes that it is possible that donors, and particularly EU, will "turn around", however definitely not by July as the junta is predicting. She agrees that junta needs to understand the implications of organizing elections in the current environment -- that donors will not accept the election results. She says the best way to do this would be by having a combined high-level delegation, potentially comprised of Spanish, EU and International Organization of Francophonie (OIF) members meet with Aziz to stress that donors will not accept the election outcome of his June 6 election. She agrees that this message must be very strong and direct. ¶8. (C) On bilateral sanctions, Ms. Ribeiro does not think they will be effective if used. She mentioned that the sanctions that EU is currently considering are individual sanctions, and that on-going EU-funded projects will likely be able to continue without interruption regardless of the European Union's anticipated February 20-21 decision on sanctions and relations with Mauritania, although no final decision has been made. -------------- Mauritania's Political Future -------------- ¶9. (C) While Ms. Ribeiro continues to think that Abdallahi has no chance to regain political power, she agreed that the junta made a significant mistake by blocking Abdallahi's recent motorcade into Nouakchott last Thursday. She mentioned that she had complained to junta leader Aziz about this. Ms. Ribeiro believes that the junta will allow Abdallahi to return to Nouakchott, provided it is not in a convoy. Despite this, she says, he will not be able to reestablish power. ¶10. (C) Ms. Ribeiro went on to opine that only three or four people in Mauritania truly practice politics in the real sense of the word, and opposition leader Ould Daddah is one of them. According to her, most so-called politicians are waiting to see where the wind blows before they truly choose side. This, she compared to nomads who go wherever there is water. ¶11. (C) In the past, Ms. Ribeiro went through the motions of joining western donors in publicly condemning the August 6, 2008 coup, however behind closed doors she remained optimistic that the coup leaders would be an improvement over President Abdallahi The fact that she admits to being depressed by the situation is significant. Given that Ms. Ribeiro maintains excellent contact with junta authorities, UN agencies and most donors, she is usually well-informed. Indeed, the next several months will likely be very difficult NOUAKCHOTT 00000116 003 OF 003 months for most: 1) for donors, as they decide if and how to impose sanctions; 2) for the junta as they attempt to &fix8 the budget issue and solicit for outside funding; and 3) for the Mauritanian people who are caught in the middle, beginning to feel the economic and political pinch, and asking themselves if they should register to vote and participate in the junta-organized elections this summer. ¶12. (C) Charge Comment: Ms. Ribeiro meets often with General Aziz carrying both her primary programming hat and UN policy hat on behalf of the SRSG for West Africa. She has stated that her role in keeping UN programs underway does not inhibit her ability to talk tough with Aziz -- in fact, she has argued that the money associated with UN programs leverages her policy clout. In practice, we have found her more allied with the Spanish/German "stability" position than a strong democracy role. She has told Charge that the AU failed in the early days of the coup in not putting any pressure on Abdallahi to negotiate something with Aziz. HANKINS