REFINING THE FNDD POLITICAL STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000011 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: REFINING THE FNDD POLITICAL STRATEGY Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The FNDD will hold back until February or March to launch a political counter-offensive believing General Aziz will see himself further isolated both internationally and domestically. The "National Dialogue on Democracy" brought nothing substantive to the negotiation table and was manipulated but did succeed in creating a final breach between the military and opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah -- who may now work more closely with the FNDD if not directly with President Abdallahi. The FNDD believes President Abdallahi can be more useful for the cause outside of Mauritania than inside. End Summary ¶2. (C) The Gaza Effect: Charge met January 6 with President Abdallahi's effective Foreign Minister and FNDD leader Mohamed Ould Maouloud to discuss current FNDD political strategy. Ould Maouloud noted that the Gaza crisis had had a direct impact on the Front. Plans for a highly public return of President Abdallahi from Lemden on December 31 had been canceled because national attention was diverted on Gaza and since a celebration of the President's return would be the wrong message with the country in protest over Gaza. Maouloud offered that General Aziz had gained from the crisis in Gaza by being able to condemn the Israelis to strong public acclaim. Maouloud noted the junta had made an early miscalculation by organizing early protests against the Israelis only to find them getting out of hand as returning university students took over and escalated the level of violence. The decision to recall the Mauritanian Ambassador for consultations had appeased the crowd. Maouloud (who does not support the relationship) did not believe Aziz would move quickly to severe relations outright but hold that as a future bargaining tool -- either to entice political support at the right moment or to get money out of Libya. ¶3. (C) Let things stew some more: Maouloud assured the Charge that the FNDD has a political strategy to get President Abdallahi back in power but said it was not useful to make a political counter-offensive until Aziz had been weakened. The anticipated decision of the African Union in early February and of the European Union in late January -- as well as the possible referral of Mauritania to the Security Council -- will further isolate General Aziz. "It doesn't matter how effective the sanctions are, the mere fact of international sanctions will have a political and psychological effect" that Maouloud believes will convince Aziz' supporters that he will never be able to overcome international opposition and; therefore, not be able to deliver anything for his supporters. As that effect sets in, Maouloud said the FNDD will be ready to launch a political counter-offensive (although, by way of detail, he offered only getting some political party defections to the FNDD). ¶4. (C) The National Dialogue Plays in Our Favor: Maouloud said the National Dialogue on Democracy had played out as expected and would bolster the FNDD more than Aziz. He saw the structure of the Dialogue stacked by the regime by hand-picked "representatives" from the interior and abroad who "repeated whatever they were told." The skewed membership had upset all political parties who had seen themselves pushed aside. Maouloud alleged that the Dialogue itself was openly manipulated. By example, he noted that the first reading of the committee report looking at constitutional issues had correctly noted that the majority of the delegates had recommended that no changes be made to the constitution until a new president is elected and there is greater political calm. On the first reading of the report, the Vice President of the Senate Mohamed ElHacen Ould Elhaj had interjected that the REAL consensus was that changes had to be done now that would support Aziz' campaign. ElHacen crowded the room with his supporters forcing the conclusion to be changed. For Maouloud, the Dialogue showed Aziz for what he is and will alienate those who might have been hoping for some option between Aziz and Abdallahi. ¶5. (C) We can work with Ould Daddah now: Maouloud saw the NOUAKCHOTT 00000011 002 OF 002 best result of the Dialogue being Ahmed Ould Daddah's new (and hopefully permanent) rupture with the military. Maouloud said he had met several times with Ould Daddah prior to the Dialogue with Ould Daddah making clear he was willing to test the General's good faith. Ould Daddah said he would go along with the Dialogue if the military agreed not to present themselves in early presidential elections but condemn the Dialogue without that commitment. In the end, Ould Daddah told Maouloud that Aziz had said unequivocally that he would run for President leading Ould Daddah to denounce the process. Maouloud noted that President Abdallahi "has something personal" against Ould Daddah and that the dislike seemed mutual. That said, he saw Ould Daddah as "a common enemy against the military" that he thought the FNDD would now be able to work with. He expected that Ould Daddah's RFD party would come apart in coming weeks but added "we just need him, not his party members." Maouloud did not believe Ould Daddah would present himself for the elections being organized by the junta which would leave Aziz as the only real candidate. The lack of and real opposition will, Maouloud believes, force the international community to dismiss the elections as a farce leaving Aziz no better off after the elections than before. ¶6. (C) The President Is More Useful Outside Of Mauritania: Maouloud said the FNDD had proposed to President Abdallahi that he leave Mauritania for the next several months and is awaiting his decision. Maouloud noted that under the current circumstances "every day he stays in Lemden or, later, in Nouakchott just underlines that he is not in power and makes him irrelevant." The FNDD believes that outside of Mauritania, Abdallahi can "act presidential" by meeting with heads of state and bolstering his image and international support. Maouloud also added that having Abdallahi back in Nouakchott will pose insurmountable security issues since the only security available are forces provided by the regime. HANKINS