TARGETED SANCTIONS: THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000108 SIPDIS SECSTATE FOR AF/W - BOULWARE/HEFLIN; PARIS FOR KANEDA; USAU FOR MAYBURY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL MR SUBJECT: TARGETED SANCTIONS: THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON REF: NOUAKCHOTT 73 Classified By: Classified by Charge d'Affaires Cornelius Walsh for reas ons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) National Front for the Defense of Democracy director, Mohammed Ould Maouloud, tells us the very thought of targeted sanctions is taking a toll on the Junta. Anxiety is growing among businessmen and Junta financiers. As the February 5 AU/PSC and the February 20 EU/AU consultative meetings near, tensions have risen and faith in Aziz has dropped. As reported reftel, senior Junta financier, Mohamed Ould Bouamatou, visited President Abdahllahi on a reconnaissance mission. The FNDD has received similar visits. The FNDD believes Aziz supporters will defect if targeted sanctions are applied. They realize the state is nearly broke, major investments stalled, donors are pulling back, and the regime has made appalling economic decisions. Maouloud believes that the Aziz tribal "mafia", the Ouled Bisbaa, may force Aziz to defer to Colonel Vall to keep their quarter century hold on the national economy. Targeted sanctions, particularly from the EU, frighten them. Keep pressuring them is the FNDD message. On the political side, the FNDD reaffirmed its support for the constitutional return of President Abdallahi. After that, all is negotiable. The FNDD has not abandoned hope of finding common ground with RFD leader Ahmed Ould Daddah to transition the country into civilian dominated elections. End Summary. -------------- Nobody Will Take a Hit for Aziz -------------- ¶2. (C) In a February 3 meeting at UFP headquaters, FNDD leader Ould Maouloud and former Abdahllahi Minister of the Economy Abderrahmane Ould Hama Vezaz unexpectedly focused on Mauritania's deteriorating economy, the role of the tribal Ouled Bisbaa "mafia" in supporting the Junta (and before that, transition leader Vall, and two decade strongman Taya) and their worries as money dries up and targeted sanctions by the AU, EU, and possibly, the UN move closer. According to Ould Maouloud, Aziz has asked supporters to downplay his potential candidacy in the Junta's planned June elections to allay Western and domestic concerns about his remaining in power. Moreover, influential pro-coup Ouled Bisbaa businessmen Mohamed Ould Bouamatou and Azizi el Mamay have contacted President Abdallahi and the FNDD to express their anxieties about sanctions and probe for some give in the Presidential and/or FNDD positions. ¶3. (C) Maouloud discounts European diplomats who have cautioned him on sanctions. For him and the FNDD, targeted sanctions and the threat thereof have had and will continue to have serious psychological, symbolic, and political impact. Given the opportunistic nature of Mauritanian politics, Aziz will be progressively isolated if he fails to establish legitimacy and credibility with the West and the AU. In his view, Aziz's supporters themselves will "restrain" the general if sanctions are imposed. The Bouamatou visit to Abdallahi and the Senate Vice President Mohcen El Hajj's visit to imprisoned former Prime Minister Waghef were made against a backdrop of tribal concern that Aziz was endangering not only their decades long access to the state trough but the trough itself. If Aziz can't deliver, and the elite finds its access to travel, trade, and financial resources cut or limited, something will have to be done. -------------- The Ouled Bisbaa Mafia -------------- NOUAKCHOTT 00000108 002 OF 003 ¶4. (C) Ould Maouloud and Ould Hama Vezaz think the coup was fueled by Ouled Bisbaa's greed. The Ouled Bisbaa has amassed considerable economic/political influence due to support to Ould Taya, their role in the 2005 coup d'etat and military transition, and their influence on recent events through Aziz. Ould Maouloud and Ould Hama Vezaz outlined Ouled Bisbaa density in the current administration. Comment: Indeed, Aziz has peopled the government with cousins and clients. Post will report on winners and losers in septel. End Comment. ¶5. (C) Former Economy Minister Ould Hama Vezaz enumerated various corruption schemes devised by the Ouled Bisbaa to monopolize state resources and scoffed at the junta's clumsy fiscal/monetary policies. He also noted that the transparency of the regime's anti-corruption campaign, targeted as it is at coup opponents, is engendering an atmosphere of fear and contempt. -------------- Vall and Aziz: One and the Same -------------- ¶6. (C) Ould Maouloud mentioned a recent Ouled Bisbaa meeting in which the coterie discussed Aziz's replacement by Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall. They would hope to use Vall to keep their grip on power and the money. Vall, who has Western support and is viewed as the "father of democracy," would make a viable presidential candidate. Ould Maouloud, himself a former presidential candidate, warned "make no mistakes! Aziz and Vall are one and the same, they serve the same mafia." ¶7. (C) Ould Maouloud believes the rivalry between General Aziz and his cousin Vall is real. General Aziz and Vall are competing to lead their tribe. According to Ould Maouloud, Vall has stayed aloof to prosper from Aziz's clumsiness and maintain an unsullied reputation. -------------- Toward an End State -------------- ¶8. (C) Ould Maouloud: - Reaffirmed the FNDD's absolute dedication to a constitutionally viable resolution to the impasse with no role whatsoever for the military. Once the legality of the elected government is confirmed and the Junta deposed, everything else is negotiable. (Comment: There's fuzziness here. Abdallahi is the symbol and personification of the democratic movement. His return to office is paramount to a final solution. However, there are constitutional variations that would/could limit his time and actions once returned to office. End Comment.) - Confirmed that RFD leader Ahmed Ould Daddah and the FNDD are negotiating. They are in agreement that the military have no role in any political settlement and no role in the planned elections, particularly not in the current regime- sponsored voter census and registration program. - Confirmed that the estrangement between president Abdallahi and RFD leader Ould Daddah is a real and significant obstacle to a constitutional settlement but it might be worked out. (Comment: In an earlier meeting with Ould Daddah, he told CDA and PolOff that Abdallahi should have no role whatsoever inasmuch he was not the legal president due to his 2007 pre-election support from the military. There is a chasm to be negotiated here. End Comment.) NOUAKCHOTT 00000108 003 OF 003 - Projected post-Addis Ababa FNDD outreach to all political actors excluding the military. - Stated that both parties (FNDD and RFD) agree on sanctions. Indeed, sanctions would frighten many prominent RFD members who have been co-opted with positions and financial access back to the democratic fold. Furthermore, both parties believe that if the AU applies sanctions, the EU and the international community will follow. -------------- The United States -------------- ¶9. (C) As we left, former Minister Vezaz thanked the Embassy once again for its support and noted the recent letter from President Obama to President Abdallahi. In the end, he said, what we are doing here, with your help, transcends our concerns in Mauritania. What is Maritania? Three million people and limited economy? If we were to disappear tomorrow, it'd be hardly noticeable. What we are doing for Africa with your help (he emphasized) is much larger than us or our issues here. He seems a rare straightforward person and perhaps meant this as sincerely as he said it. WALSH