CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER TALAT: "THE SIDES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000681 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TR GR CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER TALAT: "THE SIDES CANNOT FINALIZE DEAL WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT" REF: A. NICOSIA 678 ¶B. ALLISON-FITZPATRICK OCTOBER 16 E-MAIL ¶C. URBANCIC-KAIDANOW OCTOBER 21 E-MAIL Classified By: Amb. Frank Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: "The sides cannot finalize a deal without international involvement," Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat warned the Ambassador during an October 21 lunch. Although he admitted that progress was possible, Talat lamented what he dubbed the "acquiescence" of the international community to the Greek Cypriot (G/C) notion of a "Cypriot Solution." He wanted upgraded UN involvement to prevent what he termed G/C "violations" of established UN parameters and get the sides to "yes." Talat urged the USG to "encourage" the UN to increase its footprint and lobbied for the appointment of a US Special Envoy for Cyprus. He said the rhetoric of G/C leader Demetris Christofias "fluctuated between good and bad." He said the leaders planned a joint media strategy to counter increasingly hostile anti-solution voices on both sides (Reftel A). Regarding the talks themselves, Talat said the sides were still making constructive proposals, but that, at present, the "give and take" phase was still "remote." For his part, the Ambassador said that the USG had looked long and hard at the possible appointment of an envoy, but had to consider the possibility that such a step might do more harm than good by triggering a G/C backlash and fueling hard-line opposition. He also said he was in regular contact with UNSYG Special Adviser Downer and would pass on Talat's desire for a more robust UN role. End Summary "The sides cannot finalize a deal without international involvement" ¶2. (C) In an oft-heard refrain, Talat complained that, although progress was possible, "the sides cannot finalize a deal without international involvement." He said that the international community had uncritically adopted the G/C mantra of a "Cypriot Solution", i.e. minimal outside involvement. He said that a purely "Cypriot Solution" as envisioned by the Greek Cypriots was "nonsense" and would, in the end, result in failure. ¶3. (C) In fact, he charged, the present G/C position on property and bi-zonality violated the "established UN framework" and would stymie on-going property talks unless Greek Cypriots walked back their demand that the original property owner had the right of first refusal (Note: G/Cs owned a majority of property in the north pre-1974, i.e in the area that would form a future T/C constituent state. End Note) This position, Talat hinted, would lead to majority G/C property ownership in the future T/C constituent state--a clear redline for him. To strengthen his point, Talat pointed to 1992 UNSCR 750 that defined bi-zonality as majority population/property ownership in the titular constituent state of a given community. Christofias, he claimed, accepted the principle of majority population only, but rejected majority property ownership as evident in his position on property. (Note: A UN Good Offices' staffer told us on October 28 that the UN's goal is to get the sides to focus on creating solutions to the property issue, not debating past issues over which the sides vehemently disagree. End Note) ¶4. (C) Talat urged the USG to use its own good offices to encourage the UN, which until now had behaved "timidly," to play a more "salient" role and call out the G/Cs on their "violation" of bi-zonality. Talat also urged the appointment of a Special US Envoy for Cyprus without clearly defining what he expected such an individual to do, aside from "encouraging" the G/Cs. The Ambassador noted that the USG had considered the appointment of an envoy, but had to weigh the possibility that it might trigger a G/C backlash and harm the common goal of achieving a solution. The Ambassador added that the Embassy enjoyed regular and good contact with the UN Good Offices Mission and would raise Talat's concerns with UNSYG SA Alexander Downer. "Difficult to understand Christofias' repeating controversial topics" ¶5. (C) Talat voiced consternation over what he said were Christofias' often unhelpful press statements, though Talat admitted that sometimes Christofias' rhetoric was "good." He said that is was "difficult to understand Christofias' repeatedly raising controversial topics", such as his insistence on the post-solution continuation of the RoC and NICOSIA 00000681 002 OF 002 the need to put pressure on Turkey. Talat said he avoided raising hot-button issues in public, like "virgin birth." Unfortunately, however, this sensitivity was not reciprocated. Talat said that Christofias had even voiced public support for Talat against his probable challenger in 2010 "presidential elections", hard-liner Dr. Dervish Eroglu. Such a tack, he said, was sure to "backfire" given deep-seated Turkish Cypriot suspicion. Talat shared with the Ambassador a conspiracy theory in circulation in the north, with which he did not agree but dubbed "logical." According to the theory, Christofias is secretly working to undermine Talat and secure Eroglu's election on the assumption that Eroglu's hard-line will allow Christofias a blameless exit strategy. (Note We have heard this sentiment voiced with conviction by two of Talat's high-ranking supporters and advisers. End Note). To counter this, Talat said that he would propose a "common media strategy" to Christofias, but did not go into further detail. "Christofias frightened by criticism" ¶6. (C) Talat said Christofias was "frightened by criticism," especially from his coalition partners EDEK and DIKO. He added that Christofias still believed that Turkey "would surrender" in the face of EU pressure as advocated by his partners. Talat hoped, however, that the October 19-20 visit of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou might have a positive effect on Christofias since "Greece was back in the game" after the defeat of New Democracy, which he felt was more willing to follow Nicosia's lead (Note: Talat's Republican Turkish Party (CTP) has excellent relations with PASOK, which helped CTP obtain observer status in the Socialist International. End Note). The Ambassador noted that former RoC President George Vassiliou told him in a recent meeting that Papandreou had delivered a strong pro-solution message to Christofias. "Give and Take Phase still remote" ¶7. (C) Talat said that the sides were still "making proposals" and trying to take each other's concerns into consideration. That said, he warned that the "give and take phase" was still remote. He said that property and governance, the present focus of the on-going second round, were different issues and did not lend themselves to trade-offs; that would come later when they started to tackle issues such as territory, which could be coupled with property. ¶8. (C) Talat said that they had, for the time being, put the various proposals on electing the executive made during the second round "on the shelf." The final G/C proposal (Ref B),which envisioned weighted, single-ticket cross-voting, was "rejected in principle" by the T/Cs, but not "categorically." He said that the G/C proposal met the requirements of "political equality," but fell short on "bi-communality" since it allowed Greek Cypriots to have a say in whom the T/Cs elected. He said that nationalism would grow on the T/C side post-solution since the Turkish Cypriots would, at least short-term, suffer property and territorial displacement. Right-wing parties would then manipulate this unease to increase their votes. If Greek Cypriots voting in Turkish Cypriot elections stymied this will by allying with left-wing T/C parties, he argued, there would be an ugly backlash. URBANCIC