Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NICOSIA49
2009-01-26 12:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRUS: ARCHBISHOP DECRIES TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0049/01 0261217
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261217Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9531
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1327
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000049 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: ARCHBISHOP DECRIES TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE
IN TALKS

REF: A. NICOSIA 48

B. NICOSIA 47

C. NICOSIA 46

D. NICOSIA 36

E. NICOSIA 28

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000049 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: CYPRUS: ARCHBISHOP DECRIES TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE IN TALKS REF: A. NICOSIA 48 ¶B. NICOSIA 47 ¶C. NICOSIA 46 ¶D. NICOSIA 36 ¶E. NICOSIA 28 Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Continued intransigence from mainland Turkish leaders has slowed the Cyprus negotiations, argues hard-line Archbishop Chrysostomos II. In a January 14 dinner with visiting EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza, Chrysostomos described current Greek Cypriot imperatives for any settlement plan: an immediate removal of all Turkish troops and an end to Ankara's intervention rights on the island; deportation of all mainland "settlers" except those married to Turkish Cypriots; and no "virgin birth" ) the unified Cyprus republic must be a transformation of the existing Republic of Cyprus, not a new entity formed by the merger of the RoC and "TRNC." Britain continued to exert negative influence in island politics, the Primate accused, and as such should have no role in the negotiations. END SUMMARY. -------------- More a Political than a Religious Figure -------------- ¶2. (C) The concluding call of his whirlwind 36-hour stay, DAS Bryza on January 14 dined with controversial Church of Cyprus Archbishop Chrysostomos II. The primate launched straight into CyProb politics as he poured 23 year-old Chivas Regal as an aperitif ("most foreigners don,t like our stronger Zivania brandy," he quipped.) "I'm not a politician and I lack their political vocabularly...so I will speak only the truth," Chrystomos avowed. While leaders Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat had tallied some progress in secondary issues, the sides remained far apart on core matters like federal versus state competencies and the nature of the central government. He was not optimistic the pace would pick up soon. ¶3. (C) Ethnic Greeks had inhabited the island for 3,300 years and survived countless waves of invaders bent on eradicating their culture, Chrysostomos boasted. The first wave of Turkish-origin inhabitants had landed only 450 years ago, and their numbers were small. "Most Turkish Cypriots are actually Islamicized Greeks," he argued, alleging as proof that the two communities suffered equivalent rates of thalassemia, an anemia-like disease not seen amongst the Anatolian newcomers.
During most of their years on Cyprus, G/Cs and T/Cs got along well, attending each others' religious, cultural, and social events. -------------- Breaking up our Happy Family -------------- ¶4. (C) Turkish Cypriot nationalists like Rauf Denktash had ruined the happy coexistence in their drive to make the T/C minority a separate community, the Archbishop contended. And the 1974 Turkish "invasion and occupation" made good their separatist dreams. Great demographic alterations had followed, with half the indigenous T/C population emigrating and their places taken by Turkish "settlers" and occupation troops, their numbers now 300,000 and 45,000, respectively. ¶5. (C) The numbers explained why T/C leader was not his own man, and why his positions in the negotiations were actually Turkey's. Chrysostomos could not understand why Ankara needed a presence on the island. "I understand geopolitics," he continued, "but in this age of supersonic bombers and cruise missiles, they don,t need an occupation force on Cyprus." Settlement talks could never prosper as long as the Turkish troops remained. -------------- How Can We Get a Deal? -------------- ¶6. (C) Greek Cypriots had clear red lines for the negotiations and no G/C politician, regardless of popularity, dared cross them. Security was reddest of all: the Turkish military must withdraw from the island, with Turkey,s guarantor status and interventionist rights abolished. As to settlers, only those mainlanders married to Turkish Cypriots could remain on the island after a deal ) "for humanitarian reasons," the not-always-altruistic Chrysostomos explained. Last, the reunified Cyprus must be the existing Republic of Cyprus transformed into a federal entity. "We can never accept 'virgin birth' -- a fusing of the RoC and the illegal 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'" Were Turkey to accept these parameters, the Archbishop thought a final settlement possible. ¶7. (C) He concluded with disparaging remarks toward the British, Cyprus's former colonial masters, who were not to be trusted. "For their own reasons, the British fostered divide-and-conquer tactics that pitted Turkish Cypriots against Greek Cypriots. Now they want a loose federation or confederation that is bound to fail eventually. All to protect their bases," the Archbishop insisted. For this and other reasons, the settlement talks must remain Cypriot-driven, free of foreign impositions. -------------- Ankara's Views, From Our Perspective -------------- ¶8. (C) Turkey was not a monolithic entity bent on Cypriot domination, Bryza clarified. True, there were hard-liners both within the Turkish General Staff and the Foreign Ministry who continued to see great geopolitical value in holding the island, a la former Turkish PM Ecevit. Yet there were plenty of progressive voices too, he noted. The Turkish military under General Ozkok had supported the Annan Plan and had marginalized Denktash in the run-up to the April 2004 referendum, for example. Successor General Buyukanit tread familiar hard lines, but current TGS commander Basbug seemed more moderate. Further, the continuing Ergenekon scandal had the military on the defensive, Bryza reasoned. ¶9. (C) Bryza doubted the TGS would call the plays on the Governance, Property, or EU/Economy settlement chapters. Turkish interlocutors had told him Talat had plenty of room to negotiate, and he had seen nothing so far to refute their assertion. Undoubtedly, the Turks would become serious players once the talks turned to security, however, owing to the troop presence and their status as guarantors under the 1960 treaties. ¶10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. Urbancic

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