CYPRUS: TURKISH "AMBASSADOR" ON LIMNITIS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000344 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TU CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH "AMBASSADOR" ON LIMNITIS, VAROSHA, ERCAN, AND UNFICYP REF: A. MACRIS-EUR/SE MAY 22 E-MAIL ¶B. NICOSIA 333 ¶C. NICOSIA 327 ¶D. NICOSIA 300 Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( d) ¶1. (C) At a May 22 working lunch with the Ambassador, Sakir Fakili, the Turkish "Ambassador" to the "TRNC," did not respond substantively to the Ambassador's call for a compromise to allow the eventual opening of the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point in northwest Cyprus. Fakili instead voiced full support for the May 21 demand of Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat to include large-scale T/C troop movements (albeit in civilian clothes) as part of "free passage" to the T/C enclave of Kokkina. The requirement that troops could also use Limnitis was long-standing and the UN had long been aware, he said. On the Cyprus issue in general, Fakili called for iron-clad bizonality and only grudgingly accepted that members of the two communities might live side-by-side in the same constituent state. He pressed the Ambassador on the need for a "Plan B" (read, an upgrading of the status of the "TRNC") if the present UN-brokered process were to collapse. Fakili also sought the withdrawal of UNFICYP or, barring that, an overhaul of its mandate. Domestically, he waxed favorably about the nationalist, solution-skeptical National Unity Party (UBP) "government" and pointedly noted that Turkey would not "play the role of the IMF" to the notoriously profligate Turkish Cypriots. Fakili redirected a request for Embassy consular access to the walled-off city of Varosha to inspect abandoned AmCit properties, claiming that T/Cs were responsible for that decision and the city, not Turkey. Responding to the Ambassador's query over a now-stalled proposal to allow communication between T/C and G/C air traffic controllers to prevent in-air collisions, Fakili's economic adviser said a formal "letter of agreement" between the sides would be required. End Summary. -------------- Crossing of Troops Still a Red Line -------------- ¶2. (C) Fakili, accompanied by First Counselor Bekir Usyal and Second Counselor Levent Eler, discussed with the Ambassador recent efforts to reach a compromise on opening the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point, a stalled confidence-building measure (CBM) and lately the source of great discord between the sides. The Ambassador said that he had been surprised by Talat on May 20 insisting on the need to transport small amounts of fuel to Kokkina, especially after the Greek Cypriots apparently had agreed to most of a UN-devised bargain that involved the G/Cs supplying electricity to the pocket in lieu of fuel, allowing the passage of commodities (save fuel and lethal items),and permitting the transit of the relatives of T/C soldiers (regardless of whether or not they would otherwise be considered RoC citizens). ¶3. (C) Fakili claimed that the G/C offer on electricity had not been "confirmed," a line Talat himself had used with the Ambassador (Ref B). He then said that the Turkish Cypriots' latest position on Limnitis -- to allow the movement of large numbers of T/C soldiers in civilian dress to Kokkina -- was actually long-standing, despite UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer and the Greek Cypriots' surprise when Talat tabled it at the contentious May 21 leaders' meeting (Ref B). Fakili insisted that "free passage" meant just that, and only ammunition, armaments and large amounts of fuel were excluded. Adviser Eler claimed the proposal hailed from October 2007. Fakili argued that there was "no difference between troop rotation (the concept that had led RoC President Demetris Christofias to blow up at Talat on May 21) and soldiers crossing in civilian dress." The Ambassador urged Fakili to have Talat transmit to Downer his exact proposal regarding the movement of troops to Kokkina. -------------- "No mixing" of Turkish and Greek Cypriots -------------- ¶4. (C) Fakili told the Ambassador that it was difficult to be "overly optimistic" about the overall negotiations, especially given the turbulence over Limnitis/Yesilirmak, but he was pleased with the efforts of Talat. On bizonality, a key T/C demand, he thought there would be "no residential NICOSIA 00000344 002.3 OF 003 mixing" of Turkish and Greek Cypriots post-solution. He quickly clarified his comments, however, stating that there would be "ceilings" that limited G/C settlement in a future T/C constituent state. (Note: Our pro-solution T/C contacts, both in Talat's office and the "TRNC MFA", claim that Turkey wants as ethnically pure a T/C constituent state as possible, even if this means giving up more territory in return.) -------------- Demand for a "Plan B" -------------- ¶5. (C) Fakili emphasized the need for a "Plan B" (read, an upgrading of "TRNC's" status) in case the G/Cs rejected a new peace plan, as they had done in 2004. He complained about "unfilled promises made to the Turkish Cypriots" during the Annan period, and noted that constant G/C demands for the abolishment of Turkey's guarantor rights meant that those rights needed to be enumerated clearly in any new plan. Regarding the possibility of a second G/C NO vote, the Ambassador reckoned that, if a plan were to reach a referendum, it would be supported by the political leadership on both sides, unlike 2004. -------------- "No need for UNFICYP" -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked Fakili for the Turkish side's general impressions of the UN presence on Cyprus. "There is no need for UNFICYP," he assessed flatly, stating it was the Turkish military in 1974 that had brought relative security to the island. He was displeased by recent complaints that Turkish forces increasingly were limiting UNFICYP movement and access in the north, and bothered by the criticism his side had received in the Secretary General's most recent report (May) to the Security Council. Fakili leveled a number of minor grievances toward the UN contingent: use of official vehicles by UNFICYP personnel in civilian clothes for unofficial purposes (Note: long a UN practice, a considered well within the mandate),the continued UN transport of humanitarian goods to "wealthy" G/C and Maronite enclaved villages, and its "slanted" reporting of buffer zone violations. His real criticism was directed at UNSCR 186 (1964),which had recognized the Republic of Cyprus -- by that point bereft of Turkish Cypriot representation -- as the "legitimate" government on the island. UNFICYP needed to operate on the principle of the sides' "political equality" on Cyprus, he continued, suggesting that UNSCR 186 might have to be "amended" to reflect this reality. Fakili claimed that UNFICYP forces were at best "guests" in the north, since they had no status of forces agreement with the Turks. The Ambassador replied that, if Fakili wanted, he would pass on to UNFICYP any issues the Turks might have with their operation, in an effort to resolve problems speedily. -------------- "Eroglu Cooperating" -------------- ¶7. (C) Fakili said that new UBP "Prime Minister" Dervish Eroglu was "cooperating" and was fully aware of Turkey's continuing strong support for Talat in the ongoing peace process. He praised the make-up of the new "government," including the presence of businessmen as "Ministers" of Finance and Public Works, claiming that the markets had positively responded to their appointment (Note: While our more candid UBP contacts complain that the present "government" consists exclusively of party loyalists, not technocrats or experts, we believe they are at least as qualified as the poor-performing "ministers" in the previous CTP "government." Ersin Tatar, the "Minister" of Finance, is wanted in the UK for his alleged link to the "Polly Peck" scandal, however.) ¶8. (C) After economic expert Bekir Usyal had said the Turkish Cypriots needed to control expenditures and reform the bloated public sector, Fakili sharply clarified that Turkey would not "act like the IMF" by setting conditions for its aid to the "TRNC." (Note: if true, the "no conditionality" pledge represents a change in policy. The previous, not-AKP-friendly Republic Turkish Party (CTP)-led "government" was forced to call early elections after Turkey closed the money spigot in the absence of implementation of significant "public sector" cuts and other fiscal reform.) NICOSIA 00000344 003 OF 003 -------------- Claims T/Cs control Access to Varosha -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador urged Fakili to approve Embassy consular access, blocked by Turkey since 2005, to a number of abandoned, AmCit-owned properties in the fenced off city of Varosha. Fakili claimed unconvincingly that Turkish Cypriots controlled access to Varosha, and said that we should appeal directly to Talat, since the T/C Security Forces, under General Recep, were responsible for ingress and egress. (Note: General Recep is a Turkish general. Under the "TRNC Constitution, he and all T/C police and military forces report to the Turkish General Staff, not Talat. Sympathetic Turkish Cypriots in the "MFA" have told us they have absolutely no control over Varosha, and that decisions over access rest with the TGS. The zone is plastered with standard red Turkish militar "KEEP OUT" signs as seen across the Turkish mainland.) The Ambassador responded that we would continue to pursue the issue. He warned that our inability to inspect AmCit properties in Varosha might draw negative attention from Members of the U.S. Congress who were increasingly visiting Cyprus, especially if they had property-owning constituents. -------------- -------------- Need Letter of Agreement to fix air traffic control problem -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question regarding the fate of a scheme to allow direct communication between Ercan and Larnaca air traffic control via EuroControl in Brussels and Ankara, Uysal said there would be no problem if the G/Cs agreed to "direct contact" with Ercan (a G/C red-line that had been obviated by the scheme's proposed technical routing through Brussels and Ankara.) Moreover, he added that letters of agreement between Ankara, Ercan, and Larnaca would have to be signed in Brussels with EuroControl to get the project off the ground -- seemingly another non-starter for the Greek Cypriot side. Fakili noted that Turkey had fully financed a "Smart Project" at Ercan that, when completed in the near future, would not only be more advanced than the G/C air traffic control system, but would also serve as an emergency back-up for all of Turkish air traffic control. (Note: Turkish sensitivities on control of air space post-solution have already been felt during the present negotiations. A contact in Talat's office told us that T/C demands for two flight control regions (FIRs) had in fact come from Ankara and were non-negotiable.) Urbancic