CYPRUS: COMPROMISE POSSIBLE ON LIMNITIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000342 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: CYPRUS: COMPROMISE POSSIBLE ON LIMNITIS REF: A. NICOSIA 333 ¶B. NICOSIA 327 Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer on May 25 secured buy-in from Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators George Iacovou and Ozdil Nami on a compromise plan to allow the Limnitis/Yesilirmak Buffer Zone crossing to open. Iacovou and Nami must now "sell" the plan to Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, with Downer hoping to announce the measure after the leaders' May 28 meeting. Constructive ambiguity dominates the four-point agreement, aiming to bridge the sides' opposing positions on use of Limnitis by Turkish Cypriot military and their family members. For it to work, Talat and Christofias must coordinate their messages to respective media and hard-liners. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Downer on Memorial Day (May 25) urgently sought a meeting with the Ambassador and UK High Commissioner Peter Millett. He told the envoys that Iacovou and Nami, meeting (with their teams) that morning ostensibly to discuss economic issues, instead had peeled off to tackle Limnitis, a contentious confidence-building measure which a week ago had caused public acrimony between the leaders (reftels). Downer opened the Iacovou-Nami meeting with an admonition: the sides' positions were divergent and well-known, and unless one or both reconsidered, the matter had reached a dead-end that would damage perceptions that a wider Cyprus settlement could be reached. He suggested they move on to substantive issues. ¶3. (C) Instead, Iacovou and Nami began to discuss the crossing -- though only after the always-pendantic G/C negotiator lectured 30 minutes on the genesis of the Limnitis impasse. Downer believed that Talat may have felt pressure to act not from the Turkish Army, but rather from T/C municipal leaders in the Limnitis area who contend that the crossing would economically revitalize their region. Regardless of the reasons, Nami engaged seriously in 90 minutes of give-and-take, after which the sides agreed on an ad referndum four-point agreement to present to their respective leaders. According to the compromise (verbatim, and please protect), -- Limnitis crossing will be opened under normal rules. -- The G/Cs will connect the enclave of Kokkina to the Cyprus Electrical Authority grid. -- A bus will be authorized to travel several times a week from the T/C checkpoint at Limnitis to the Kokkina enclave and back at predetermined times. The bus will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of UNFICYP from the T/C checkpoint to the enclave at Kokkina and back. -- UNFICYP will inspect and supervise the transport of foodstuffs and other civilian supplies from Limnitis to Kokkina. ¶4. (C) Downer acknowledged that the framework agreement depended on constructive ambiguity. Passing line-by-line through the text, he interpreted "Limnitis crossing will be opened under normal rules" to mean all Turkish Cypriots, including T/C military in civilian clothes and their "settler" family members, could transit. Point 2 was straightforward and technically feasible and should be accepted by both sides. Point 3 had received significant attention from Iacovou and Nami, primarily over who would enjoy ridership privileges and how they might be accounted; Nami was adamant, for example, that the "TRNC" could not discriminate between its T/C- and mainland Turkish-origin "citizens." With Downer's mediation, they eventually agreed not to stipulate formally any ridership criteria and to perform a simple passenger count (to ensure the same number disembarked who embarked). Point 4 had been attached to meet G/C concerns that shipment of agricultural products and foodstuffs through Limnitis to Kokkina not range far from EU Green Line Regulation norms in force at the other crossings. ¶5. (C) Turning to the source of the latest Limnitis hiccup -- Talat's position that Turkish Cypriots be allowed to transport small quantities of vehicle fuel to Kokkina even after the electrical hook-up is complete -- Downer winked that the Turkish Cypriot vehicles using the crossing might carry "a jerry can or two of gas... for the tractor of the shepherd still living in Kokkina." He thought Christofias likely could accept the ambiguity of the agreement, but was less sure of Talat's reactions. The ball was now with Nami and Iacovou to convince their leaders to accept it; Downer hoped Christofias and Talat would announce the measure after their upcoming meeting on May 28. UKHC Millett mentioned that Foreign Secretary David Miliband would be arriving in Ankara shortly for consultations and asked Downer if his boss should raise the compromise. The UN envoy responded positively but suggested an indirect approach, saying only that Limnitis was delaying progress on key substantive issues and the parties should make great efforts to resolve it. ¶6. (C) Comment: Downer emphasized rightly that this deal is tentative at best and asked that we ensure that details remain strictly within U.S. and UK channels. Successfully bridging the sides' divergent positions on Limnitis requires both to accept a broadly-written, ambiguous compromise text, and even with Downer's interpretation, this represents real compromise by both sides. In the UN envoy's short briefing, however, he did not give the impression that he or his staff had considered fully the reactions to the deal of the media and hard-line camps in both the G/C and T/C communities. For example, Greek Cypriot nationalists last week protested loudly against Talat's latest "demands" that fuel and "Turkish settlers" be allowed to cross Limnitis to Kokkina. When they ping Christofias again, will the not-always-courageous President deploy his constructively ambiguous points, or will he counter that he would never accept such demands -- likely spurring an equally firm response from Talat and possibly scuttling the deal? Serious efforts by the Good Offices mission to convince G/Cs and T/Cs to coordinate their responses will be imperative. The Embassy will work with Downer and his team toward that end. Urbancic