CYPRUS: TALAT IN FOUL MOOD ON LIMNITIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000333 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TALAT IN FOUL MOOD ON LIMNITIS REF: A. NICOSIA 327 ¶B. NICOSIA 306 Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat continues to demand the right to transport vehicle fuel to the T/C military enclave in Kokkina as quid pro quo for the opening of a Buffer Zone (BZ) crossing at Limnitis. During a May 20 meeting with the Ambassador, Talat explained he could not domestically sell a "concession" like opening Limnitis -- which in his view benefited only Greek Cypriots living in isolated Pyrgos village -- without obtaining something in return; the UN-brokered compromise which entailed G/Cs providing electricity to Kokkina was insufficient. He criticized G/C leader Demetris Christofias for publicizing elements of the UN plan, which had made further fine-tuning problematic on both sides of the Green Line. News regarding other CBMs was better: hindrance-free ambulance crossings should begin soon, the communities were already staffing a communications cell to share information on criminal activity, and cultural heritage experts were engaging on a bicommunal work plan. He and Christofias would meet on May 21 in one of the final meetings on economic matters; convergences existed, but significant gaps remained. Talat still clung to hopes that the first and second reads of all core negotiating topics would complete by summer's end, allowing give-and-take to begin in September. One day after this meeting, however, Talat and Christofias's tete-a-tete on Limnitis ended disastrously, leaving the UN and the international community brainstorming ways of keeping the process on track. END SUMMARY. -------------- Ambassador Makes Urgent Pitch on Crossing -------------- ¶2. (C) After obtaining a telephonic readout from UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer on his May 18-20 visits to Ankara and Athens, the Ambassador on May 20 requested an urgent meeting with the Turkish Cypriot leader, primarily to discuss progress on opening Limnitis. The two immediately began a discussion of the Limnitis crossing -- lately the source of discord between the leaders and a worsening negotiating environment between the sides. The Ambassador recounted his very first substantive engagement with Talat, which focused on Limnitis; Talat had explained that the crossing would only 
benefit Greek Cypriots living near Pyrgos, and to open it and not receive a black eye in the process, he needed payback. The UN-brokered compromise that involved the G/Cs providing electricity to Kokkina, drastically reducing the frequency and cost of shipping fuel to the enclave, seemed just the political cover that Talat needed, the Ambassador thought. On the other hand, delaying the deal by demanding a minimal quantity of vehicle fuel (which Talat estimated at 50 gallons per week) seemed counter-productive. Since some form of seaborne resupply would continue regardless, mainly for arms and ammunition, the fuel could be transported on those vessels and easily stored at Kokkina, obviating the need for the unacceptable-to-G/Cs ground shipment. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador also highlighted the positive role on Limnitis being played by certain elements of the Church. The Bishop of Kykkos and his allies had been preaching calm to the aggravated residents of Pyrgos, for example who were threatening actions to close other BZ crossings if their demands on Limnitis went unmet. Continued T/C refusal to establish the crossing risked marginalizaling the pro-solution Kykkos on the Holy Synod, further buttressing rejectionist hard-liners like Archbishop Chrysostomos. The Ambassador emphasized that reaching agreement on Limnitis would show decision makers in Washington and the broader international community -- many of whom question the sides' political will -- that the Cypriot leaders were capable of compromise on politically difficult matters. Last, a deal would truly constitute a confidence-building step between the sides, sorely needed at this time. He urged Talat to find a way to get to "yes" on Limnitis. -------------- Unsure What Future Will Bring -------------- ¶4. (C) Talat expressed disappointment that Christofias had leaked news of the Limnitis compromise and was now publicly rejecting fuel delivery for Kokkina. Such announcements not only boxed in Christofias, but himself as well -- "how can I walk back my demand now?" he reasoned. Talat was unsure what results the May 21 leaders meeting would bring on the NICOSIA 00000333 002 OF 003 crossing question. Both he and Christofias would be talking to villagers on opposite sides of the crossing route in coming days; Talat dismissed strong signs of support from the T/C mukhtar (village elder),saying he only cared about a repaved road that came as an eventual by-product to the crossing's opening. ¶5. (C) Perceiving a need to clarify the genesis of the Limnitis issue, the Turkish Cypriot leader walked through recent developments. He rebutted a point voiced often by Greek Cypriot negotiator George Iacovou: that T/Cs had agreed unconditionally to open Limnitis in exchange for a G/C green-light to open Ledra Street. Rather, Turkish Cypriots needed payback for Limnitis, either unfettered access to Kokkina or a new road into the bi-communal village of Pyla. They had decided on Kokkina after uncovering a reference by a former UNSYG that the Pyla road would confer military advantage to Turkish Cypriots and thus should be opposed under UNFICYP's mandate. ¶6. (C) Talat next recounted the T/Cs' original demands to open the Limnitis crossing. All T/C relatives, not just those whom the G/Cs considered "real" Turkish Cypriots, needed access to Kokkina. Additionally, his side sought the right to transport through the crossing all commodities save armaments and munitions. He never thought the Greek Cypriots would draw the line on fuel, which he had told Christofias he needed because of G/C efforts between 1963 and 1974 to "starve out" the Kokkina enclave by interrupting electrical supplies. During the negotiations, Christofias surprisingly had conceded on the "settlers" point but refused to budge on gas; after the UN tabled the electrical hook-up compromise, the G/C leader responded that he needed additional time to consider it. ¶7. (C) Domestic political concerns were making it difficult to negotiate on Limnitis, Talat assessed. Families of T/C conscripts were demanding immediate access to Kokkina. Hard-liners were insisting on "no concessions to G/Cs" and would equate a retreat on overland fuel shipments to a major defeat. And the military would see little utility in the electrical arrangement if it still had to send fuel by sea to the enclave. In a nutshell, the compromise as prepared was not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side. ¶8. (C) Concluding the call, Talat dismissed the argument that Limnitis represented a valuable CBM that would improve prospects for progress on core CyProb subjects. "Look, we opened Ledra Street. Did it help?" he argued, convinced the answer was "no." Increased focus on CBMs would actually perpetuate the status quo by making the current arrangement more comfortable, "normalizing the non-solution conditions." -------------- More Progress on Other CBMs, Though -------------- ¶9. (C) Talat brightened on discussing positive movement in other confidence-building measures. A bicommunal advisory board tackling cultural heritage preservation was meeting regularly and prioritizing possible projects, and the heritage working group formed during last summer's preparatory phase of negotiations remained active and motivated. On environmental issues, a handful of disagreements -- "but none that serious" -- were temporarily halting progress, but Talat appeared optimistic they would be overcome soon. Perhaps most promising, law enforcement experts from both communities were staffing a crime/criminal matters cell and sharing information. The only hiccup so far was a Greek Cypriot demand for Sundays off for souvla and backyard barbecues, Talat chuckled. -------------- G/Cs' Allegedly Slowing Progress on Economy -------------- ¶10. (C) He and Christofias would again discuss economic matters on May 21, Talat noted. The issue was complex, the working papers thick, and the staffwork to prepare the leaders for meaningful talks voluminous. Convergence existed between the sides' positions, but so did dissonance. Talat was troubled by Greek Cypriot attempts to assign full responsibility to the federal government for economic relations with the EU and other international bodies, even on matters of constituent state competence; the technical teams were attempting to develop a compromise. ¶11. (C) Echoing a complaint voiced earlier by chief T/C NICOSIA 00000333 003 OF 003 negotiator Ozdil Nami, Talat criticized Greek Cypriot under-preparedness for the economic discussion. "They are disorganized," he argued, and had moved from positions they earlier had tabled during the preparatory phase of negotiations (Note: G/Cs make the same accusations toward Turkish Cypriots. UN participants in the economics-related meetings confirm the T/Cs have been able to use G/Cs' lack of coordination to shift the agenda.) Talat claimed the sides had agreed last summer to assign development policy to the constituent states. Now, however, Greek Cypriots sought to make it a federal competency. "Perhaps Christofias is motivated by his love for Soviet-style 5-year plans," the T/C leader laughed. Concluding the meeting, Talat repeated his hope that the first read of the core negotiating topics and a second, gaps-bridging phase would be completed by summer's end, allowing the leaders to begin horsetrading in September. -------------- Limnitis Hits the Fan -------------- ¶12. (C) Greek Cypriot television interrupted regular programming at 1245 hrs local May 21, less than three hours after the leaders meeting commenced, to cut to the Presidential Palace . There, an upset Christofias voiced great disappointment with Talat, "who was tabling new demands for Limnitis's opening every time we meet." (Note: Downer subsequently confirmed to the Ambassador that Talat had insisted that T/C military units be permitted to use the crossing for troop rotation.) Follow-on reports from Pyrgos showed the G/C mukhtar and village leaders promising more dynamic measures, such as the closing of the main BZ crossing at Astromeritis, to publicize their plight. ¶13. (C) Downer telephoned the Ambassador at 1300 hrs with news the Christofias-Talat tete-a-tete had been disastrous. The Greek Cypriot leader had emerged from the leaders' room silent, Downer recounted, but became enraged almost immediately over the private Limnitis discussion. Christofias calmed slightly, but no substantive discussions on the economy chapter took place and the larger meeting broke early. UN staff did manage to schedule another leaders meeting in one week, but all involved worried that the recent dust-up could prove serious. At 1600 hrs, the Ambassador and UK High Commissioner Peter Millett engaged Downer for a more-detailed readout of the day's events meeting and an urgent brainstorming session aiming to avoid a slow-down in the talks (septel). Urbancic