CYPRUS: HARD-LINE HOUSE SPEAKER UNBOWED,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000332

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: HARD-LINE HOUSE SPEAKER UNBOWED,
PESSIMISTIC

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Cypriot House Speaker and DIKO party leader
Marios Karoyian voiced his desire for closer relations
between the U.S. and Cypriot legislatures during a May 19
meeting with the Ambassador. As such, he felt great
disappointment when two high-profile Members of Congress
visited Cyprus earlier this year and did not call on him.
Changing subjects, Karoyian offered that Cyprus Problem
settlement talks were not proceeding to his liking, owing
mainly to Turkish intransigence and unrealistic Turkish
Cypriot negotiating positions that favored confederation over
federation. Greek Cypriots would willingly compromise, he
added, but not on issues of principle such as the
functionality of the unified government and the
inadmissibility of negotiating timetables. In avoiding
mention of continuing DIKO support for Christofias, Karoyian
lent weight to rumors of growing discord within the
coalition. He ended the conversation by predicting a
better-than-most-assume result for his party in the upcoming
European Parliament elections. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Speaker's Feelings Hurt Over Alleged Congressional Snub
-------------- --------------


2. (C) House Speaker Marios Karoyian in mid-April sent a
letter to the Ambassador in which he criticized the Embassy
for not scheduling meetings between him and visiting U.S.
legislators, such as Senator Richard Durbin (who came in
February) and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard
Berman (March). Rather than replying in kind and risk
Karoyian leaking our message and framing it negatively, the
Ambassador on May 19 called on him for a discussion of this
and other matters. The Ambassador expressed his continued
intention to foster dialogue between the Embassy and the
Cypriot House, as well as his desire to increase contacts
between the Cypriot legislature and the U.S. House of
Representatives and Senate. Such efforts already seemed to
be succeeding, evidenced by the greater frequency of U.S.
Congressional visits to the island as compared to prior
years. The Cypriot House Foreign Affairs Committee's
last-second decision to cancel an Embassy-organized
late-April visit to Washington and New York represented an
unfortunate development in the effort to build legislative
bridges, however.


3. (C) Karoyian, who Embassy contacts claim had worked to
kill the House FAC trip for personal reasons, did not take
the bait and ignored mention of the canceled trip. Rather,
he voiced great disappointment and even hurt that U.S.
legislators had made Cyprus stops without engaging him
formally. Whether deliberate or not, the "snubs" had caused
him image problems, with local media questioning why the two
Americans had called on opposition figures but not on the
second-ranking official in the Cypriot government. The
Ambassador reminded Karoyian that the Congress is a separate
and co-equal branch of government. The Members of Congress
have tremendous demands on their time, and they had made
known the agenda they wished to pursue on the island. It was
simply impossible to schedule calls on every high-level RoC
official.

--------------
Little Convergence on Issues of Substance
--------------


4. (C) Karoyian turned next to the Cyprus Problem,
presenting a predictably pessimistic view on progress
achieved in the settlement negotiations. Based on regular
briefings from President Christofias and chief negotiator
George Iacovou -- Karoyian emphasized he played no direct
role in the talks and had no firsthand information, appearing
troubled by that fact -- the sides had reached convergence
only on issues of secondary importance. True, Christofias
and Turkish Cypriot leaders had completed the first read
through the governance and power sharing, property, EU
matters, and most of the economy chapters, but they had left
the toughest issues unresolved. The going would get even
tougher once the talks turned to territory and
security/guarantees.

--------------
As Usual, Problem is Turkey, Turkey, Turkey
--------------


5. (C) In those chapters, Turkey's red lines would grow even
darker, Karoyian predicted. Ankara already was negatively

NICOSIA 00000332 002 OF 003


influencing the discussions on topics unrelated to its
interests on the island; in those areas where its equities
would be directly affected -- withdrawal of its "occupation"
army, for example, or repatriation of "settlers," Turkey
would dig in deeper. "Ankara must determine that it is time
to settle Cyprus once and for all," Karoyian argued.
Currently its leaders spouted empty promises of support for a
bizonal, bicommunal federation on the island, yet tabled
proposals -- via their Turkish Cypriot proxies -- that aimed
to create a confederation at best. Even Talat had admitted
to Christofias that he was under severe pressure from Ankara
not to cross Turkish red lines, Karoyian alleged.

-------------- --------------
Talks Commenced Without Ground Sufficiently Prepared
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Karoyian tread familiar DIKO ground in arguing,
without using former President Tassos Papadopoulos's exact
words, that the ground had not been sufficiently prepared to
commence formal negotiations. The "Turkish side" did not
speak the same language as Greek Cypriots, he surmised, nor
did it share the G/Cs' vision for a unified Cyprus.
Political equality, for example, meant to the T/Cs equal
numerical representation in federal structures, an outcome no
G/C could accept. Karoyian related that one week earlier, he
had traveled to Bratislava to commemorate the 20th
anniversary of bi-communal Cypriot political party
gatherings, an initiative of the then-Czechoslovakian
government (and now carried out by the local Slovak mission).
There, Turkish Cypriot leaders such as Ferdi Soyer (CTP) and
Serdar Denktash (DP) espoused their goal of crafting a weak
federal government and strong constituent states --
"essentially a confederation," Karoyian reckoned. Cyprus was
too small to be divided in that way.

-------------- --------------
Ready to Compromise, but Not on Issues of Principle
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Greek Cypriots recognized they would not achieve all
they sought in the negotiations, Karoyian assured.
Compromises could be made, but not on issues of principle.
Any solution must be functional, for example, and not lead to
deadlocks (Note: "functional" is G/C code for governance
free from special majorities and other, ethnic-based decision
models). Timetables over negotiations must be avoided at all
costs, Karoyian continued, with the pace of negotiations
being dictated by the "quality" of Turkish Cypriot proposals
and their acceptance of "common language" as defined by
Security Council resolutions and international law.

-------------- --------------
Ambassador: Some Positions Turkey's, Most Turkish Cypriot
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The Ambassador rebutted Karoyian's hard-line,
anti-Turkey message and put forward a more optimistic picture
of CyProb developments. Ankara did not appear to be
dictating positions to Talat on issues such as
governance/power sharing and property that primarily
concerned Turkish Cypriots' relations with Greek Cypriots.
Clearly the T/Cs approached governance from a different angle
than G/Cs, still harboring fears of Greek domination. Were
they to obtain stronger powers for the constituent states,
they likely would back off on their demands for near-equal
representation in the federal government. These appeared to
be uniquel T/C concerns, the Ambassador observed, not Turkish
ones.


9. (C) When the talks turned to territory and security,
Ankara would play a greater role, owing to its status as a
guarantor power. At that point, the U.S. would be willing to
utilize its contacts and influence in Turkey in furtherance
of a settlement, he assured. The task at hand, however, was
for the Cypriot leaders first to find convergence on the
"domestic" CyProb issues. Here again, the U.S. would be
willing to lend its good offices to help bridge gaps, were
the sides to seek our support. The progress the leaders had
achieved so far, and their still-excellent personal rapport
-- should not be discounted, the Ambassador noted.

--------------
EP Elections: Expects 2004 Redux
--------------


10. (C) Karoyian last mentioned his DIKO party's prospects
in the June 6 European Parliamentary (EP) elections.

NICOSIA 00000332 003 OF 003


Cyprus's six seats likely would fall to Communist AKEL (two),
right-wing DISY (two),DIKO and EDEK. Recent polling that
would be published imminently showed DIKO garnering 16-17
percent, a repeat of its performance in 2004 (Note: most
Embassy contacts predict a much lower DIKO haul, although
still enough to win an EP seat). Such a performance
satisfied party leadership, Karoyian added, especially
considering the internal bickering and power struggles lately
plaguing the party.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) On CyProb substance, Karoyian emitted a familiar G/C
complaint: were only the Turks to loosen Talat's leash,
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots -- "one people," after
all -- could quickly do a deal. His Turkey bashing and
insistence the G/C side make no more "concessions" likely
will spike further in the two weeks before EP elections in
hopes of energizing the nationalist DIKO base. Of greater
interest was what Karoyian did not say in the meeting. With
rumors flying over growing discord amongst DIKO factions and
the coalition parties, not once did he assure the Ambassador
that DIKO would remain with Christofias. Further, his
clarification that the party did not take active part in the
talks and instead submitted proposals in a formal fashion
hinted at growing distance from Christofias and his inner
circle.
Urbancic