CYPRUS: HARD-LINE HOUSE SPEAKER UNBOWED,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000332 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: CYPRUS: HARD-LINE HOUSE SPEAKER UNBOWED, PESSIMISTIC Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Cypriot House Speaker and DIKO party leader Marios Karoyian voiced his desire for closer relations between the U.S. and Cypriot legislatures during a May 19 meeting with the Ambassador. As such, he felt great disappointment when two high-profile Members of Congress visited Cyprus earlier this year and did not call on him. Changing subjects, Karoyian offered that Cyprus Problem settlement talks were not proceeding to his liking, owing mainly to Turkish intransigence and unrealistic Turkish Cypriot negotiating positions that favored confederation over federation. Greek Cypriots would willingly compromise, he added, but not on issues of principle such as the functionality of the unified government and the inadmissibility of negotiating timetables. In avoiding mention of continuing DIKO support for Christofias, Karoyian lent weight to rumors of growing discord within the coalition. He ended the conversation by predicting a better-than-most-assume result for his party in the upcoming European Parliament elections. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- Speaker's Feelings Hurt Over Alleged Congressional Snub -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) House Speaker Marios Karoyian in mid-April sent a letter to the Ambassador in which he criticized the Embassy for not scheduling meetings between him and visiting U.S. legislators, such as Senator Richard Durbin (who came in February) and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman (March). Rather than replying in kind and risk Karoyian leaking our message and framing it negatively, the Ambassador on May 19 called on him for a discussion of this and other matters. The Ambassador expressed his continued intention to foster dialogue between the Embassy and the Cypriot House, as well as his desire to increase contacts between the Cypriot legislature and the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. Such efforts already seemed to be succeeding, evidenced by the greater frequency of U.S. Congressional visits to the island as compared to prior years. The Cypriot House Foreign Affairs Committee's last-second decision to cancel an Embassy-organized late-April visit to Washington and New York represented an unfortunate development in the effort to build legislative bridges, however. ¶3. (C) Karoyian, who Embassy contacts claim had worked to kill the House FAC trip for personal reasons, did not take the bait and ignored mention of the canceled trip. Rather, he voiced great disappointment and even hurt that U.S. legislators had made Cyprus stops without engaging him formally. Whether deliberate or not, the "snubs" had caused him image problems, with local media questioning why the two Americans had called on opposition figures but not on the second-ranking official in the Cypriot government. The Ambassador reminded Karoyian that the Congress is a separate and co-equal branch of government. The Members of Congress have tremendous demands on their time, and they had made known the agenda they wished to pursue on the island. It was simply impossible to schedule calls on every high-level RoC official. -------------- Little Convergence on Issues of Substance -------------- ¶4. (C) Karoyian turned next to the Cyprus Problem, presenting a predictably pessimistic view on progress achieved in the settlement negotiations. Based on regular briefings from President Christofias and chief negotiator George Iacovou -- Karoyian emphasized he played no direct role in the talks and had no firsthand information, appearing troubled by that fact -- the sides had reached convergence only on issues of secondary importance. True, Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leaders had completed the first read through the governance and power sharing, property, EU matters, and most of the economy chapters, but they had left the toughest issues unresolved. The going would get even tougher once the talks turned to territory and security/guarantees. -------------- As Usual, Problem is Turkey, Turkey, Turkey -------------- ¶5. (C) In those chapters, Turkey's red lines would grow even darker, Karoyian predicted. Ankara already was negatively NICOSIA 00000332 002 OF 003 influencing the discussions on topics unrelated to its interests on the island; in those areas where its equities would be directly affected -- withdrawal of its "occupation" army, for example, or repatriation of "settlers," Turkey would dig in deeper. "Ankara must determine that it is time to settle Cyprus once and for all," Karoyian argued. Currently its leaders spouted empty promises of support for a bizonal, bicommunal federation on the island, yet tabled proposals -- via their Turkish Cypriot proxies -- that aimed to create a confederation at best. Even Talat had admitted to Christofias that he was under severe pressure from Ankara not to cross Turkish red lines, Karoyian alleged. -------------- -------------- Talks Commenced Without Ground Sufficiently Prepared -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Karoyian tread familiar DIKO ground in arguing, without using former President Tassos Papadopoulos's exact words, that the ground had not been sufficiently prepared to commence formal negotiations. The "Turkish side" did not speak the same language as Greek Cypriots, he surmised, nor did it share the G/Cs' vision for a unified Cyprus. Political equality, for example, meant to the T/Cs equal numerical representation in federal structures, an outcome no G/C could accept. Karoyian related that one week earlier, he had traveled to Bratislava to commemorate the 20th anniversary of bi-communal Cypriot political party gatherings, an initiative of the then-Czechoslovakian government (and now carried out by the local Slovak mission). There, Turkish Cypriot leaders such as Ferdi Soyer (CTP) and Serdar Denktash (DP) espoused their goal of crafting a weak federal government and strong constituent states -- "essentially a confederation," Karoyian reckoned. Cyprus was too small to be divided in that way. -------------- -------------- Ready to Compromise, but Not on Issues of Principle -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Greek Cypriots recognized they would not achieve all they sought in the negotiations, Karoyian assured. Compromises could be made, but not on issues of principle. Any solution must be functional, for example, and not lead to deadlocks (Note: "functional" is G/C code for governance free from special majorities and other, ethnic-based decision models). Timetables over negotiations must be avoided at all costs, Karoyian continued, with the pace of negotiations being dictated by the "quality" of Turkish Cypriot proposals and their acceptance of "common language" as defined by Security Council resolutions and international law. -------------- -------------- Ambassador: Some Positions Turkey's, Most Turkish Cypriot -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador rebutted Karoyian's hard-line, anti-Turkey message and put forward a more optimistic picture of CyProb developments. Ankara did not appear to be dictating positions to Talat on issues such as governance/power sharing and property that primarily concerned Turkish Cypriots' relations with Greek Cypriots. Clearly the T/Cs approached governance from a different angle than G/Cs, still harboring fears of Greek domination. Were they to obtain stronger powers for the constituent states, they likely would back off on their demands for near-equal representation in the federal government. These appeared to be uniquel T/C concerns, the Ambassador observed, not Turkish ones. ¶9. (C) When the talks turned to territory and security, Ankara would play a greater role, owing to its status as a guarantor power. At that point, the U.S. would be willing to utilize its contacts and influence in Turkey in furtherance of a settlement, he assured. The task at hand, however, was for the Cypriot leaders first to find convergence on the "domestic" CyProb issues. Here again, the U.S. would be willing to lend its good offices to help bridge gaps, were the sides to seek our support. The progress the leaders had achieved so far, and their still-excellent personal rapport -- should not be discounted, the Ambassador noted. -------------- EP Elections: Expects 2004 Redux -------------- ¶10. (C) Karoyian last mentioned his DIKO party's prospects in the June 6 European Parliamentary (EP) elections. NICOSIA 00000332 003 OF 003 Cyprus's six seats likely would fall to Communist AKEL (two), right-wing DISY (two),DIKO and EDEK. Recent polling that would be published imminently showed DIKO garnering 16-17 percent, a repeat of its performance in 2004 (Note: most Embassy contacts predict a much lower DIKO haul, although still enough to win an EP seat). Such a performance satisfied party leadership, Karoyian added, especially considering the internal bickering and power struggles lately plaguing the party. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) On CyProb substance, Karoyian emitted a familiar G/C complaint: were only the Turks to loosen Talat's leash, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots -- "one people," after all -- could quickly do a deal. His Turkey bashing and insistence the G/C side make no more "concessions" likely will spike further in the two weeks before EP elections in hopes of energizing the nationalist DIKO base. Of greater interest was what Karoyian did not say in the meeting. With rumors flying over growing discord amongst DIKO factions and the coalition parties, not once did he assure the Ambassador that DIKO would remain with Christofias. Further, his clarification that the party did not take active part in the talks and instead submitted proposals in a formal fashion hinted at growing distance from Christofias and his inner circle. Urbancic