CYPRUS: UN'S DOWNER SUGGESTS SUBTLE NUDGING OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000327 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TU CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UN'S DOWNER SUGGESTS SUBTLE NUDGING OF GREEK CYPRIOTS REF: A. NICOSIA 257 ¶B. NICOSIA 306 Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( d) ¶1. (C) Summary. "Greek Cypriots (G/Cs) must develop a sense that the status quo is over," UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer confided to the Ambassador during their May 15 meeting. Downer suggested that a low-key discussion on the future of UNFICYP might help break the G/Cs of their perception that failure in the current round of settlement negotiations had no real downside. Regarding the stalled opening of the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point, the UN envoy said he had unsuccessfully urged Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat to accept a G/C counter-offer conceding the main T/C demand (electricity to the Turkish Cypriot Kokkina enclave) but refusing a minor one (overland supply of a limited amount of fuel). On the negotiations in general, Downer wanted to achieve real progress this summer on executive branch governance and power-sharing (a key area of disagreement) to give Talat the confidence to show flexibility in other chapters. He welcomed the appointment of Ahmet Davutoglu as Turkey's foreign minister and hoped the influence of Turkish MFA CyProb hard-liners would wane. Downer was equally optimistic regarding the upcoming Swedish EU presidency, especially after a "lackluster" Czech term. Regarding the other P-5 members, he sought to capitalize on perceived Turkish-Russian rapprochement to convince Moscow to adopt a less militantly pro-G/C outlook, and planned to visit Russia in June. The UN envoy was noncommittal in response to the Ambassador's multiple suggestions that he spend more time on-island. End Summary. "Greek Cypriots need to be worried" ¶2. (C) Downer voiced concern that unless Greek Cypriots understood that failure of the present negotiations carried real costs, they would not be inclined to make the necessary compromises to ink a deal. "They need to be worried that this is a new game," he said. The best approach, he said, was to begin to voice subtle rumblings regarding the future of UNFICYP, with an eye toward possible changes in the December renewal. Downer praised a recent comment to this effect by the U.S. PermRep in New York. He warned, however, that such hints must be delivered with the greatest finesse; otherwise, the Greek Cypriots "would go feral." Downer revealed that President Demetris Christofias had earlier told him that he would not be "blackmailed" by the possibility of an UNFICYP non-renewal and would abandon the talks if that were to occur. The Ambassador said that the USG would work to support Downer and agreed on the need for a coordinated tack with the UK. The reaction of the Hellenic lobby in Washington would have to be figured into this strategy as well, he added, concurring that the May renewal was not the time actually to draw down the force. "UNFICYP renewal process fine this time" ¶3. (C) Downer said that his April 30 oral brief to the Security Council and the resulting Council Presidential Statement (PRST) had been satisfactory, and that the just-underway UNFICYP renewal process was proceeding well. Aside from "keeping pressure on the Greek Cypriots" regarding UNFICYP, he needed no additional USG support in the May rollover exercise. Downer ventured that the language of the PRST should be put to use in the rollover resolution, especially its references to "expectations of significant progress" in the negotiations. He had discussed the draft UNFICYP report with Talat in their May 15 meeting, in which he previewed UNFICYP's change of semantics in referring to Turkish Cypriots' isolation (from "sense of isolation" "feeling of isolation" -- Talat was supportive) and noted that the report would mention Turkish hindrance of UNFICYP access/activity in the north, while noting improvements in recent weeks. Turkish Cypriots need to strike deal on Limnitis/Yesilirmak ¶4. (C) Downer next mentioned continuing difficulties in opening the Limnitis/Yesilirmak buffer zone crossing. He had recommended that Talat drop his continuing demands to send small amounts of fuel (for three vehicles) overland to Kokkina, especially since Christofias apparently had accepted, after much hesitation, the main UN compromise that G/Cs run electricity to the T/C military base/enclave in Kokkina in exchange for opening the crossing. Downer informed that after the leaders had debated Limnitis at their meeting on May 14, the UN urged the "unrelenting" T/C leader to "cut his losses" and announce its future opening. Downer sensed that Ankara was behind Talat's hard line on Limnitis; he planned to raise the issue in his meetings with Davutoglu and the MFA on May 18. (Comment: Embassy officers got the same all-or-nothing attitude on fuel to Kokkina from T/C negotiator Ozdil Nami at a May 14 meeting.) Ambassador encouraged Downer to pursue that line in his upcoming meetings in Ankara May 18-19. Talat in Reasonable Spirits ¶5. (C) Talat's spirits were "not too bad," Downer gauged, somewhat surprising after late April's twin blows: the T/C leader's CTP party's electoral defeat on April 19, and the European Court of Justice's verdict in the Orams property case a week later. Downer reported that, despite the losses, Talat was behaving "reasonably" in the negotiations and was repeating his desire to reach the referendum stage by the end of 2009 or early 2010. T/Cs had even agreed to work during part of the August vacation period. While careful not to set specific deadlines, Downer hoped that both sides would soon finish a first reading of all negotiating chapters and return to "governance and power sharing" before the summer break. The sides should be able to cover quickly the two outstanding topics, "territory" and "security," as the distance between their positions could only be bridged in the subsequent "give and take" period. (Note: G/C sources claim they will also insist the leaders tackle another chapter, provisionally titled "Migration," dealing primarily with Turkish "settlers" on the island.) Downer said Talat had agreed with his observation that T/Cs would be more flexible in negotiating other chapters were they first to obtain the political equality in the federal government that they so desperately sought. "Don't want to lose time on CBMs" ¶6. (C) Downer claimed he did not want to lose a lot of time on 22 already-agreed confidence building measures (CBMs), whose full implementation has been stalled largely over G/C fears of "upgrading" the north. He pointedly asked one of his aides to investigate the present state of allowing ambulances from both sides to cross the Green Line freely, which to date has been stymied by a G/C refusal to purchase insurance coverage for the north. (Note: Downer's aide reported on May 16 that the insurance issue had been resolved and that ambulances should be able to cross in the next day or two.) "Recent events not all bad" ¶7. (C) Downer aimed to capitalize on the recent appointment of Ahmet Davutoglu as Turkey's foreign minister and the upcoming Swedish EU Presidency in order to move the settlement process forward. He hoped that the arrival of Davutoglu, the architect of Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" policy, would result in waning influence on Cyprus for hard-line MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan. (Note: Our pro-solution T/C contacts share the same hope.) Downer expected an energetic Swedish EU presidency, especially needed after a "do-nothing" Czech one, and hoped to meet FM Carl Bildt soon -- although getting to Stockholm was "difficult." Getting Russian on board ¶8. (C) Downer hoped he could utilize a perceived slight shift in Russia's Cyprus policy -- thanks to apparent Russian-Turkish rapprochement on energy and Armenia -- to weaken Moscow's hitherto slavishly pro-G/C stance. According to rumors Downer relayed, Putin supported a more balanced Russian approach on Cyprus, while the Foreign Ministry continued to argue for traditional pro-Greek Cypriot policies. Downer noted that he planned to visit Moscow in late June. Downer Non-committal about spending more time on island ¶9. (C) The Ambassador recommended strongly that Downer spend more time on the island in order to be able to defuse unseen crises. The U.S. and UK had had to engage in urgent triage after the Orams-ECJ crisis, but simply could not fill Downer's shoes owing to G/C suspicions over "Anglo-American" motives. The UN envoy praised the Ambassador and British High Commissioner Peter Millett for their efforts to calm Talat and keep him at the negotiating table in the aftermath of Orams. In parrying the Ambassador's request, however, he joked that he already lived "in a wonderful country (Australia)." Downer did regret his absence at the May 14 leaders' meeting, where Christofias and Talat had battled inconclusively over Limnitis. He would remain in the region until June 3, his time on the island punctuated by trips to Ankara and Athens, then return to Cyprus after a short vacation. Urbancic