CYPRUS: G/C OPPOSITION LEADER FRUSTRATED WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000317 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: G/C OPPOSITION LEADER FRUSTRATED WITH CHRISTOFIAS Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( d) ¶1. (C) Summary: "Demetris Christofias is focusing on the (anti-solution) minority, not the (pro-solution) majority," DISY Chairman Nikos Anastassiades bitterly complained to the Ambassador on May 11. Anastassiades said that President Christofias was overly solicitous of his two hard-line coalition partners, Socialist EDEK and centrist DIKO, and failed to embrace or appreciate DISY's strong support for the ongoing UN-brokered peace process. He criticized Christofias for the slow pace of negotiations and for the latter's penchant of seeking petty tactical (vice strategic) victories over the Turkish Cypriots. The DISY leader also said that he was trying to meet with Turkish PM Erdogan (they met in 2005) to set up a channel of communication with AKP. Anastassiades claimed he still hoped to form a common pro-solution front with Christofias and his Communist AKEL party, but hinted that his patience and ability to do so was limited by AKEL's hostility -- which in turn fueled his own internal party opposition within DISY. End Summary. "We are building psychological walls" ¶2. (C) Anastassiades expressed dismay over the tactics of both President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot (T/C) Leader Mehmet Ali Talat, especially their habit of launching verbal brickbats at each other via the press. "We are building psychological walls," he complained, pointing out that Christofias's repeated public rejection of any continuation of Turkish guarantor powers in a reunified Cyprus, combined with Talat's insistence on them, made it nearly impossible to sell a compromise deal to the public. Anastassiades said that he had, to no avail, implored each leader to reserve such battles for the negotiating table, not the press. However, he criticized Christofias particularly strongly for the slow pace of the process. Christofias seemed to be slowing down the process on account of Turkey's EU accession review at the end of 2009, when he ought to be speeding the process up. ¶3. (C) The DISY leader was especially vexed over Christofias's inability to hammer out a deal with Talat to open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point in western Cyprus, a long-time G/C demand and key confidence-building measure. Anastassiades, who had spoken recently with UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer on the matter, said that he fully supported the UN plan to run electricity to the T/C enclave/military base of Kokkina (instead of allowing the T/Cs to transport fuel for generators) in exchange for opening the new crossing. "We supplied free electricity to all of the north for twenty years, even to the army," he added. Christofias had told Anastassiades that he still needed more time to sell the compromise to his solution-skeptical coalition partners EDEK and DIKO, however. ¶4. (C) In response to Anastassiades's question, the Ambassador said that he believed Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were ready to do a deal on Limnitis/Yesilirmak along the lines of the electricity proposal, although the sides still had to hammer out the details. Turkish Cypriots were waiting for a detailed G/C offer, he added. Anastassiades replied that opening this crossing point, as well as conducting a technical infrastructure survey of the abandoned G/C city of Varosha, were key to "breathing new life into the process." (Comment: The survey, a pet project of DISY-affiliated "exile" G/C Mayor of Famagusta Alexis Galanos, is a red flag for the Turkish military, which controls the abandoned city. Galanos and other G/C mayors of the "occupied areas" will be in the Department shortly for CyProb-related meetings and likely will raise the matter.) The Ambassador told Anastassiades that we believed opening the crossing should now be only a question of finding the political will to do it. The international community had weighed in with the Turks and gotten the answer from them that we wanted. Varosha would be much more difficult, however. "Let's find a way to join forces" ¶5. (C) Anastassiades said that his party still wanted to make common cause with the pro-solution AKEL in order to build the public momentum necessary to achieve a "yes" vote in a future referendum. He said that he had even suggested to AKEL to "join forces" in explaining to the Greek Cypriots the benefits of a solution and the steps, often painful, they would need to take to reunify the island. Unfortunately, he griped, AKEL was not reaching out to DISY; rather, the hard-left party was gripped by an "anti-DISY" complex. Anastassiades warned that he could not continue to pretend that AKEL was not staffing the bureaucracy with party hacks and conducting domestic policy anathema to DISY's free market principles. He hinted that his own internal party opposition made his unrequited support of Christofias and AKEL's moderate Cyprus Problem approach increasingly untenable. Wants to Meet PM Erdogan ¶6. (C) Anastassiades, who had met the Russian Ambassador earlier that morning, said he was trying, with the help of the Swedish Embassy, to meet Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey in the near future, a follow-up to their 2005 encounter. He noted that he used to meet with Erdogan and other AKP officials at gatherings of the European Peoples Party (EPP) political grouping, and he hoped to reestablish this contact after Erdogan stopped attending EPP events in ¶2007. AKP and DISY had agreed to exchange delegations, Anastassiades added, but were still working to "set up a channel." The Ambassador said he would pass on this information to Embassy Ankara. Comment ¶7. (C) Anastassiades' frustration with President Christofias over the latter's inability (or refusal) to toe a bolder line in reunification talks for fear of alienating his anti-solution coalition partners is clearly growing. The opposition leader's agitation during the meeting was noticeable; perhaps for dramatic effect, he even stopped mid-way to pour himself a large scotch (at noon, no less). Anastassiades's ability to encourage AKEL and Christofias to adopt a bolder approach appears extremely limited, however, absent a change of heart on the part of the President's erstwhile, nationalist "allies" EDEK and DIKO -- or major stiffening of Christofias's own political backbone. Urbancic