CYPRUS: UNFICYP CHIEF POSITIVELY GRADES SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000306 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UN CY TU SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UNFICYP CHIEF POSITIVELY GRADES SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING REF: A. NICOSIA 301 ¶B. NAMI CABLES ¶C. NICOSIA 257 ¶D. EMBASSY-EUR/SE-USUN EMAIL OF 5/4/09 Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Readouts of UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer's April 30 briefing of the Security Council and of the May 5 meeting of Cypriot leaders Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat dominated the Ambassador's May 6 tour d'horizon with UNFICYP chief Taye-Brook Zerihoun. The Council had welcomed Downer's report on his Good Offices mission, Zerihoun reported, which presented a cautiously optimistic picture of progress achieved so far in the negotiations. UNFICYP would offer a more detailed accounting of the settlement talks in its regular report, whose submission had been advanced to mid-May so as not to fall during the Turkish UNSC presidency. While the report would cite prior instructions from the Security Council to keep UNFICYP's size and structure in line with developments on the ground, it would not send a "stronger message" on the mandate so as not to alarm Greek Cypriots during this key phase of negotiations. Positive atmospherics and continued determination to remain at the table had characterized the latest leaders meeting, Zerihoun stated, a welcome development in the highly-charged aftermath of the April 28 Orams verdict from the European Court of Justice. The UNFICYP leader discredited recent claims by the G/C negotiator that the proposed opening of the Limnitis Buffer Zone crossing was unrelated to a UN-proposed plan that envisaged Greek Cypriots providing electricity to the Turkish Cypriot military enclave in Kokkina. Progress on Limnitis and other CBMs remained slow in coming, due mainly to G/C fears of "upgrading the TRNC." On a positive note, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot military forces have softened restrictions on UNFICYP movement in the north. END SUMMARY. -------------- Secretariat, P-5 Praise Good Offices Effort -------------- ¶2. (C) Mention of "cautious optimism" and "slow and steady progress" featured in each of Downer's New York briefings, Zerihoun offered. While difficult issues remained, the Australian envoy had explained that the Cypriot leaders "were up to the task." He had been careful not to push the Secretariat or Security Council for fixed negotiations timetables, considering them a distraction to the leaders and their constituencies and ultimately counterproductive. That said, Downer had acknowledged that political "milestones" existed that would affect both the pace and substance of the talks, from the November/December Turkish EU accession review to T/C "presidential" elections in April 2010. Zerihoun mentioned that Greek Cypriots continued to balk at "asphyxiating timetables," but even they recognized that talks could not continue forever. ¶3. (C) Downer's presentations had gone over well with all involved, including the U.S. PermRep, Zerihoun gauged. While Zerihoun approved of the final text, he was frustrated with Turkey's attempts to alter its language in the deliberations period. Even after its passage, the GoT PermRep had told him Turkey considered the text unbalanced, but had decided to support it in order to strengthen Downer's hand in the negotiations. -------------- -------------- Reporting Plan Stipulates Second Good Offices Brief -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Not having cleared the content of his UNSC briefing with the sides, Downer had felt compelled to stick with generalities, and the Council posed few questions in response. The Good Offices mission would have a second chance to inform the international community of its progress in the upcoming UNFICYP report. Zerihoun confirmed the report would be delivered to the Secretariat for clearances earlier than normal (his assistant later told us he intended to transmit the first draft on May 6). Council consideration of the UNFICYP product, as well as deliberations over the UNSCR to roll over the mission's mandate, would occur on/about May 22 -- during the Russian Council presidency, at the behest of both Cyprus and Turkey. The effective date for the roll-over would remain as before, however: June 16. ¶5. (C) Downer planned to present a follow-up Good Offices oral briefing to the Council in September, timing it to NICOSIA 00000306 002 OF 003 coincide with the anniversary of this round of Cyprus negotiations (September 3). Zerihoun hoped that by then, the sides would have completed the first pass through the core issues, made progress in bridging differences, and generally passed a "point of no return" in the process. -------------- --- Reviewing Mandate and Force Structure a Constant -------------- --- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador queried whether Downer sought a purely technical rollover or wished to send a message with the language that the status quo -- including UNFICYP's continued presence on the island, in its current guise -- was untenable long-term. Zerihoun reacted somewhat defensively, lending credence to rumors that he and Downer differ on this point. The UN Secretary General had standing orders, most recently codified in a 2005 UNSCR, to review UNFICYP's mandate and force structure "in consultation with the parties, and based on observations from the field." That said, Zerihoun contended it was dangerous to craft direct links between the Good Offices mission observations and the status of the peacekeeping force. The fact that negotiations were proceeding apace did not relieve UNFICYP of its three-pillar mandate to prevent a recurrence of conflict, return the Buffer Zone to productive use, and foster a positive environment for settlement discussions. An abrupt withdrawal of the blue helmets conceivably could trigger a collapse in all three pillars, he thought. Further, DPKO planners in New York were actually deliberating a possible UNFICYP plus-up in the event of a settlement, in hopes of providing stability during the key transition period. ¶7. (C) Greek Cypriots would react negatively to changes in UNFICYP's force structure and/or mandate, Zerihoun reckoned. They would argue, rightly or wrongly, that the massive presence of Turkish troops on the island was the overriding reason for UNFICYP's presence; unless the Turks pulled out, the UN should stay. At some future point, Zerihoun could envision a drastically-reduced UN presence on Cyprus and/or a change to a military observer mission. In his upcoming report to the Council, he intended to parrot language from UNSCR 1642 (December 2005) that instructed the Secretary General to continue to assess mission requirements and report back to the Council with "recommendations as appropriate for further adjustments to UNFICYP's mandate, force levels, and concept of operations." Such a tack should not spook the G/Cs much, he thought. -------------- T/C Tempers Cooler in Latest Leaders Meeting -------------- ¶8. (C) Zerihoun had yet to receive a complete readout of the leaders' May 5 meeting, which, unlike most earlier gatherings, occurred without UN staff at the table. He understood the atmosphere in the room was less tense than expected, however, and agreed with the Ambassador that T/C fury over the April 28 Orams verdict (Refs A, B) was diminishing. As reported in the press, Talat had sought Christofias's buy-in for a joint statement assuring that only a political settlement (and not a legal one like Orams) could resolve the complex property issue comprehensively. The Greek Cypriot leader had refused, citing his own domestic audience. Christofias was cognizant, however, that the Orams-related damage done to the T/C side could ricochet against Greek Cypriots and the settlement process if it led to hard-liner new "TRNC PM" Dervis Eroglu winning the "presidency" in 2010. Christofias also had agreed on May 5 to a more robust negotiating schedule, at least in the short-term. Before the next leaders meeting (May 14),which Zerihoun hoped UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer would attend, negotiators George Iacovou and Ozdil Nami would meet at least three times to tackle economic issues. ¶9. (C) Despite the positive atmospherics on May 5, Turkish Cypriots continued to display a near-complete lack of trust in their G/C counterparts, Zerihoun lamented. Their fear of eventual absorption by the more-numerous G/Cs continued to dictate their negotiating positions, which often stipulated a need for formal agreements, EU Acquis derogations, or MOUs between the communities on various negotiating topics. If anything, the recent Orams verdict and T/Cs' resultant heartburn that G/Cs were prepared to challenge elements of the solution in international courts would create even deeper suspicions. -------------- -------------- NICOSIA 00000306 003 OF 003 Limnitis Opening and Kokkina Compromise Always Linked -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador next raised the proposed Limnitis Buffer Zone crossing, noting incredulously that G/C negotiator Iacovou two days earlier had insisted that the crossing's opening and a UN-brokered compromise on electricity for the Kokkina military enclave were not linked (Ref D). Christofias had offered the electrical hook-up to the T/Cs as an unrelated "humanitarian gesture," Iacovou had explained, that was currently under debate in the RoC National Council (NC). Zerihoun believed that Christofias had accepted the Limnitis-Kokkina arrangement in principle, but for domestic political reasons could not allow it to be portrayed as quid-pro-quo or another G/C concession. In the UN's eyes, the two had always been linked. Further, the Greek Cypriot leader -- whose political courage Zerihoun continued to question -- likely wanted to absolve himself of responsibility for the decision by punting it to the NC. -------------- -- CBMs Still Stalled, Recognition Issues to Blame -------------- -- ¶11. (C) Despite a gaudy public announcement three weeks earlier, Zerihoun admitted that progress was scant on implementation of other confidence-building measures that were first envisioned in July/August 2008. Ambulances had not begun to transit the Green Line unencumbered; G/Cs ambulance owners were refusing to obtain T/C insurance to travel north, and the RoC was insisting that not only ambulance drivers but EMTs as well be "true Turkish Cypriots" (and not mainland "settlers.") Zerihoun considered these explanations window-dressing, however, with the actual hold-up stemming from G/C fears that the RoC could not implement CBMs without engaging "official" T/Cs, which they considered tantamount to recognizing the "TRNC." -------------- -------------- Building Support for Solution Requires Grass Roots Feeding -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Zerihoun next raised a pet project, which he admitted remained a work-in-progress: improving Greek Cypriots' perception of Ankara and Turks in general. G/Cs viewed Turkey as the source of all evil in Cyprus, he explained; without greater trust between the two peoples, long-term success of any settlement looked doomed. Zerihoun sought to establish a type of "Track II" diplomacy on the island, perhaps as an offshoot of the bi-communal (T/C and G/C) programming the UN and others in the international community conducted. These programs held "psychological value," he explained, and had delivered positive results in other conflict zones where he had served, such as Rwanda and Mozambique. Acknowledging the Ambassador's concern that efforts to bring Turks and G/Cs together should not bypass Turkish Cypriots -- a deeply-held T/C fear, since G/Cs openly claim their true interlocutor on many elements of the CyProb is Ankara -- Zerihoun agreed that the campaign would require judicious stewardship so as not to become counter-productive. -------------- -------------- Turkish Restrictions on UNFICYP Movement Diminish -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Turkish Army and Turkish Cypriot Security Forces restrictions over UNFICYP movement in the north had become so problematic (Ref C) that Zerihoun sought New York's assistance, he confided, with the UN Political Undersecretary subsequently summoning the Turkish PermRep for discussions; news of the meeting had reached the north and had angered Turks and T/Cs alike. T/C negotiator and Talat confidant Nami recently had assured Zerihoun that "matters are now resolved," and UNFICYP had noticed an improvement in their freedom of movement. Zerihoun worried, however, that the local Turkish commander had ordered more lenient treatment solely to obtain more favorable mention in the upcoming UNFICYP report. An account would be made of the numerous restrictions, the UN diplomat assured, although the report's observations section might take note of the recently-improved climate. Urbancic