CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER SHAKEN BY ECJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000301 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER SHAKEN BY ECJ DECISION REF: A. 08 NICOSIA 985 ¶B. MACRIS-NETOS APRIL 28 E-MAIL ¶C. PANICO-FITZPATRICK APRIL 30 E-MAIL ¶D. MONTREAL 128 Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( d) ¶1. (C) Summary: "The European Court of Justice (ECJ) broke our hands and legs with the Orams decision," Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat told the Ambassador on May 4. A demoralized Talat complained that the April 28 ECJ ruling (Ref B) had strengthened the Greek Cypriot (G/C) negotiating position that the original, legal owner has the ultimate right to enjoy the property as he chooses. Talat argued that the decision blindly had ignored the need to find a political solution at the negotiating table, not in the courts. He feared that Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias would now be loath to make concessions on his position on property, fearing a backlash from his own populace and fractious government. The T/C leader confided to the Ambassador that he was still evaluating his next steps, but warned he could not continue with the negotiations "as if nothing had happened." The Ambassador urged Talat to stay engaged, adding it would be a huge mistake not to continue with the present UN-brokered talks. He also told Talat that he would urge the Greek Cypriots to redouble their efforts to find a political, not legal, solution to the property question. End Summary. "EU threw a bomb in the negotiating room" -------------- ¶2. (C) In the aftermath of the landmark Orams decision, the Ambassador met Talat to gauge the T/C leader's bearing and ping him on next steps. A downbeat Talat allowed that the long-feared April 28 ECJ ruling was "very damaging." Its provision effectively allowing thousands of Greek Cypriot property owners to seize the non-Cyprus-based assets of EU citizens who own property in the north with "TRNC" title deeds had strengthened the G/C negotiating position on property, which calls for the original owners to use the property as they see fit. The ruling would undermine the fundamental Turkish Cypriot (T/C) demand for a mixed property regime (return, exchange, and compensation) crucial to prevent the numerically smaller Turkish Cypriot community from being swamped by a flood of Greek Cypriot returnees. Talat also predicted that the UK High Court -- which still must issue a decision, based partially on the ECJ input -- would ultimately rule in favor of the Greek Cypriot plaintiff Apostolides, although he hoped it might postpone the decision. ¶3. (C) The T/C leader expressed anger that EU member states showed little concern for the political repercussions the case would have on the negotiations. Further, the ECJ had ignored the intervention of the European Commission, which had tried to highlight the political fallout to the peace process a solely law-based decision might generate. The EU, Talat griped, "had thrown a bomb in the negotiating room." He also expressed anger at the British government over the process that had led to the Orams verdict -- despite high-ranking UK officials, including the High Commissioner in Nicosia, having announced that the Cyprus problem could only be solved through the present negotiating process. "ECJ will make Christofias even more intransigent on property" -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The ECJ decision, Talat said, would make Christofias "even more intransigent." He feared the G/C leader would not be able to show the flexibility needed to hammer out a property regime acceptable to T/Cs, i.e., one that contained a mix of return, exchange, and compensation. Talat said that Christofias and his team were already gloating that the rights of the original property owner had been vindicated. Hereafter, the G/Cs would simply table proposals in line with the Orams ruling. "I can't continue to negotiatie as if nothing has changed." -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Talat told the Ambassador he was still evaluating his next steps in light of the ruling, although he repeatedly acknowledged that negotiations were the only manner of reuniting the divided island. He bluntly stated he could not continue as if nothing had happened, however. Talat said he had spoken by telephone with UNSG Special Adviser Alexander Downer, who is away the island until May 18. Downer had expressed sympathy and, according to Talat, understood the damage done to the process by Orams. (Note: T/C lead negotiator Ozdil Nami canceled an April 30 meeting with his G/C counterpart George Iacovou, claiming that the Turkish Cypriots needed to develop a new policy post-Orams. Talat and Christofias did meet on May 5, but instead of discussing economic issues as planned, they focused on the repercussions of the Orams case and on an overview of the work done so far in their talks. Septel will report Nami's readout of the May 5 leaders meeting.) ¶6. (C) Turning to domestic politics, Talat said the five political parties represented in the T/C "parliament" were "suspect" regarding the negotiations. Right-wing parties such as UBP (currently forming a "government") wanted to suspend or end the present process entirely. While the left wanted to continue, all had lost faith in the negotiations. "Keep Moving Forward!" -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged the setback the Turkish Cypriots had suffered but underscored the U.S. belief that the negotiating process must continue; he urged Talat to "keep moving forward." The Ambassador promised Talat that he would deliver the same message to the Greek Cypriots and would urge the UN and the UK to do the same. Talat acknowledged the fundamental need for negotiations, but would not comment on his immediate strategy. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador took advantage of the call to press Talat on a civil aviation matter that potentially threatens the safety of American citizens, raising the International Civil Aviation Organization's recent recommendation (Ref D) to establish a communications link between Larnaca and Ercan Airports' air traffic control centers in hopes of preventing cross-chatter and reducing the possibility of mid-air collisions. Talat was skeptical of the compromise plan. He claimed that the proposed routing of communications via Eurocontrol and Ankara would effectively imply that northern Cyprus was a "province" of Turkey. ¶9. (C) Comment: While Talat is clearly demoralized, we do not think he will leave the talks given a dearth of other positive options (our May 5 meeting with Nami bears this out.) Given that Ankara supports the present round of negotiations, Talat likely will take no action more drastic than a tactical protest maneuver, largely to calm his own public. We cannot discount the T/C leader's fear, however, that the Orams decision has limited Christofias's flexibility to deal on property; G/C hard-liners will protest loudly against any regime that radically differs from the precedent suggested by the ECJ ruling. Urbancic