CYPRUS: CODEL BERMAN DISCUSSES PROSPECTS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000278

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CODEL BERMAN DISCUSSES PROSPECTS FOR
CYPRUS SOLUTION

REF: NICOSIA 00256

Classified By: POL: J. Rhatigan, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs Howard Berman on April 14 led a six-member
Congressional delegation to Cyprus to discuss progress
towards the island's reunification. In their meetings with
Greek Cypriot (G/C) leaders, the Codel heard repeatedly that
"the obstacle to a solution is Turkey, especially the
military," and that while the talks were moving slowly, the
G/Cs could not accept timetables and/or international
arbitration. Turkish Cypriots (T/Cs),on the other hand,
actively sought greater involvement from the international
community, especially in easing the "isolation" of their
community. From UN Special Advisor Alexander Downer, the
Codel received a cautiously optimistic picture of the
negotiations; the ongoing talks are probably "the last best
hope for a solution," the Australian envoy stressed. End
Summary.

--------------
Christofias: No Timetables, No Arbitration
--------------


2. (C) Republic of Cyprus President Demetris Christofias
informed Berman that G/Cs want a "Cypriot solution" to the
island's division, not a foreign one. The 2004 Annan Plan --
which was "imposed from the outside" -- had been a bitter
pill for Greek Cypriots. The time was right for a solution,
Christofias continued, since he and T/C leader Mehmet Ali
Talat, a fellow left-wing politician, had a history of
fighting together for the rights of ordinary people and for
rapprochement. "If I were alone with Talat, we'd solve this
problem," Christofias declared, alluding to the alleged
invisible hand of Turkey. Big differences between the two
sides remained, however, on the structure of the federal
executive and on property claims. In spite of any
disagreements between the G/C and T/C sides, the bigger
problem was Turkey and especially its military establishment,
the G/C leader contended. While Turkish Prime Minister
Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul generally support a
federal solution for Cyprus and want to align Turkey with
Europe, the Turkish "Deep State" had different ideas.
Christofias urged Berman to ensure the USG and P-5 remained
supportive of the Republic of Cyprus in its drive to reach a
solution and requested that the international community not
push G/Cs to accept strict timetables or arbitration. It
would be a "disaster" to repeat the mistakes of the Annan
Plan, Christofias concluded, "since no one can impose how we
are going to live."

-------------- --------------
Kyprianou: "Process is Moving...Even Though Pace is Slow"
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou urged the Codel not
to read too much into the slow pace of the negotiations. The
process was moving slowly, he explained, but the subject
matter was difficult and the positions distant. As long as
time was not being wasted, the process should be allowed to
continue under its current framework. Kyprianou clarified
that in his role as Foreign Minister, he was not involved
directly in the negotiation process. On Turkey's role, he
was concerned as to whether the GOT was on the same page as
the Turkish military. Should a solution be put to a
referendum, however, Kyprianou expected it would be
impossible for the Turkish military to work against it.

-------------- --------------
Nami: "Ready to Regain Our Place in the World's Family"
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Meeting the Codel one day prior to Secretary Clinton's
meeting with T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat, Chief Turkish
Cypriot Negotiator Ozdil Nami and "Presidential Advisor"
Kutlay Erk thanked the Members for increased USG interest in
Cyprus. Stating that "we are ready to regain our place in
the world's family," Nami hailed the "quick, successful"
start to the negotiations, which already had a firm basis in
the mutually agreed bizonal, bicommunal federal solution with
political equality for the two communities, and a single
international personality, citizenship, and sovereignty for
the reunified island. While admitting some differences
existed between the two sides, Erk ruled out any suggestion
that the T/Cs favored a confederation of prior independent
states. With three of six core negotiating areas already
covered and a good amount of convergence tallied, Nami added,

NICOSIA 00000278 002 OF 002


a first reading of the issues should be completed by early
May; this would be followed by a month-long second reading.
After this, another two or three months will be devoted to a
give-and-take period, after which an agreement should be
ready to be put to a referendum, hopefully by the end of the
year.


5. (C) Nami told Berman there were two main sticking points
in the negotiations: property and the question of how to
elect a president. Turkey and its troops were not holding up
negotiations, he assured; no one should question Ankara's
desire for a solution, since it had already "declared openly"
that it wanted a solution and supported the Annan Plan.
Stressing that G/Cs had less motivation to find a solution,
with its only "big" motivating factor being the property
issue, Nami said the Talat-Clinton meeting would send an
important message to the G/Cs, namely, that they could not
"hold T/Cs hostage" or keep them isolated from the
international community. Erk and Nami urged Berman to push
for greater international involvement in the negotiations,
whether facilitation, mediation or arbitration. In response
to a question from the Chairman, Nami stated that a symbolic
number of Turkish troops must be allowed to stay in Cyprus in
order to satisfy T/C fears of G/C domination and in so doing
assure a T/C "yes" vote in any referendum. "We are dealing
with a population four times larger than ours; without a
security force, T/Cs wouldn't feel secure in their homes," he
asserted.

--------------
Downer: "Flashes of Pragmatism"
--------------


6. (C) UN Special Advisor Alexander Downer told the Codel
that if the settlement negotiations did not succeed now, they
might not ever. While admitting that there had been
disagreements between the two sides, he was cautiously
optimistic due to the strong commitment of the two leaders.
Downer contended that the most difficult issues were property
and the ongoing presence of Turkish troops after a solution.
On the latter, he thought that, should the G/Cs obtain a
favorable "border" delineation between the two constituent
states, they might be amenable to a small number of Turkish
troops remaining on island. Downer remained concerned that
the sides faced difficulty in "making the sale" and
convincing their communities to vote "yes" in a referendum,
with the G/Cs more of a question mark than the T/Cs. Downer
told the Codel that the U.S. enjoyed a great deal of leverage
with Turkey due to the two countries' strong and multifaceted
relationship. For the U.S., Downer had two suggestions:
first, the U.S. should not appoint a special representative
to Cyprus, as this would suggest to G/Cs that it was planning
to intervene in the negotiations; and second, the U.S.
Congress should not pass an Armenian genocide resolution, as
this would sour relations with Turkey and cause it to adopt a
harder-line on Cyprus.


7. (U) Codel Berman did not have an opportunity to clear this
message before departing.
Urbancic