CYPRUS: PRO-SOLUTION TURKISH CYPRIOTS HEADED FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000271 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: PRO-SOLUTION TURKISH CYPRIOTS HEADED FOR DEFEAT IN "PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS" REF: A. NICOSIA 186 ¶B. NICOSIA 199 ¶C. NICOSIA 233 ¶D. NICOSIA 253 Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. Summary (C) The "governing" party in the Turkish Cypriot north, the pro-solution, center-left Republican Turkish Party (CTP),appears headed for defeat in April 19 "parliamentary" elections. The main opposition, solution-skeptical National Unity Party (UBP),has forged and held a double-digit lead thanks to the public's discontent with the economy and disinterest in, or disillusionment with prospects for, a Cyprus solution, CTP's raison d'tre. Still unclear, however, is whether UBP will score enough votes to "govern" independently or will have to form a coalition. Pro-solution forces worry that a UBP victory will damage the ongoing UN-brokered settlement talks, while the party itself claims to support the negotiations and only wants a voice at table. Ultimately, this election will bring neither long-awaited economic reform or political stability to northern Cyprus, but is likely to limit T/C leader Talat's flexibility and worsen his operating environment at home. End Summary -------------- Polls show continued UBP lead -------------- ¶2. (SBU) UBP has managed to hang on to a double-digit lead in a KADEM/KIBRIS poll conducted March 20-29 and released April 4, garnering 44.6 percent of the vote versus 27.4 percent for "governing" CTP. A similar poll conducted at the end of February and released on March 3 showed a similar outcome, with the margin between the leading parties at 15 points. Only two other parties pass the five-percent representation threshold in the latest poll: the center-right Democrat Party (DP) with 12.4 percent, and the center-left Social Democrat Party (TDP) with 7.4 percent. Those numbers would result in very weak UBP majority "government" in the 50-seat Turkish Cypriot (T/C) "parliament": UBP-26; CTP-16; DP-6; and TDP-2. ¶3. (SBU) Internal polling leaked to the Embassy on April 13 paints an even grimmer picture for the "governing" CTP: it scores a mere 26.9 percent, versus a whopping 53.1 for UBP. In the sampling, conducted at the end of March by a local T/C academic, only one other party crosses the threshold: DP, with 10.4 percent. Those numbers would translate into a strong UBP "government" of 32 deputies. Unlike in the RoC-controlled area, where one Greek Cypriot newspaper counted 60 publicly-released polls in the run-up to RoC presidential elections in February 2008, there have been few voter surveys released in the north. By "TRNC law," publishing public opinion surveys after April 4 is prohibited. -------------- "UBP will be in power next week" -------------- ¶4. (C) Embassy contacts generally confirm polling results released so far. Hasan Ercakica, the spokesman for T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat and a CTP insider, bluntly told us on April 13 that "UBP will be in power next week," having won between 25-30 seats in "parliament." Despite six weeks of active campaigning, he complained that his party's message did not seem to reach people. Ercakica joked that CTP was the political "solution" party and had not taken power in 2005 to reform the economy -- the main issue of the present campaign. Unal Findik, CTP Nicosia campaign manager, was somewhat more optimistic, but still conceded on April 14 that UBP would probably gain a first-place finish. ¶5. (C) Former UBP chief and "parliamentary" candidate Huseyin Ozgurgun in an April 15 meeting with Embassy officers downplayed UBP's chance for an overwhelming victory, however. He dismissed talk that the party would clear the 50 percent hurdle, as its present campaign slogan assures. Ozgurgun said that his door-to-door canvassing did show a clear UBP advantage, which he pegged at around 40-42 percent (versus about 32 for CTP) -- not enough for single-party rule. He thought that the contest had become a clear two-party race between UBP and CTP. DP leader Serdar Denktash told us on April 16 that his polling gave DP a third-place finish with NICOSIA 00000271 002 OF 003 16 percent of the vote, versus 40 for UBP and 26 for CTP. He credited Democratic Left (DSP) Sisli Mayor Mustafa Sarigul's alleged financial support for UBP's success. -------------- Ergenekon Charges Fall on Deaf Ears -------------- ¶6. (C) Attempts by CTP to tar UBP leader Dervish Eroglu with the Ergenekon scandal currently shaking Turkey also seem to have fallen flat, after CTP chief and "PM" Ferdi Sabit Soyer on April 9 ordered the T/C "Prosecutor General" to investigate links between Eroglu and detained Ergenekon suspect and "TRNC citizen" Mustafa Ozbek. Soyer claimed publicly that a document leaked to him indicated "deep state" meddling in favor of Eroglu in 1998 "parliamentary" elections. Ercakica subsequently told us the affair would, at most, energize the CTP base. Basaran Duzgun, a pro-solution newspaperman and CTP sympathizer, told Embassy officers on April 13 that the effect of Soyer's charges would be minimal, given widespread cynicism in the Turkish Cypriot community. Denktash told us that the move had probably even backfired on CTP. -------------- -------------- Will a UBP victory hurt the negotiating process? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite its fire-breathing "pro-TRNC" rhetoric, including a November 2008 "Cyprus Resolution" lauding separation as the solution, UBP officially claims to support the ongoing UN-brokered process. Ozgurgun told us that the party's only demand regarding the talks is a seat at the negotiating table, either for the "Foreign Minister" or a party-appointed representative. He added that on "big picture" items -- political equality between the two communities, the need for Turkish guarantees, and a constituent state for T/Cs within the unified republic -- there was no light between UBP and Talat. ¶8. (C) Outside observers agree that UBP, eager to mend fences with Turkey's AKP, will probably not repeat its 2002 performance, when it launched a head-on assault against the Annan Plan in the face of AKP support for it. Party leaders know that Turkish officials have voiced full backing for Talat's efforts, last seen in an April 16 announcement by visiting Turkish EU Negotiator Egemen Bagis. Press spokesman Ercakica told us that Turkish MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan gave the same message privately to Eroglu and other "interested" parties in the north. Furthermore, any new "government" will be dependent on Turkish aid, even to meet the next "civil service" payroll. Zeren Mungen, the T/C "Finance Ministry undersecretary," told us on March 19 that Turkey expects to sign a tough "Technical Cooperation Protocol" targeting public sector reform before releasing even part of the 500 million USD credit approved earlier in the year for the "TRNC." ¶9. (C) Nevertheless, CTP and Talat insiders fear that even a nominally obedient UBP will use, at the very least, the bully pulpit of "government" to pressure Talat on the Cyprus question. Ercakica said that the present pro-solution CTP "government" had always worked to minimize conflict with Greek Cypriots and provide cover for the T/C leader. For example, it fully supported Talat's unpopular decision during 2008 preliminary negotiations to accept a "single sovereignty" for the unified state -- a G/C demand -- without receiving in return a commitment that residual powers would fall to the constituent states, a crucial T/C desire. A UBP "government," on the other hand, would magnify problems and incite the public against painful but necessary compromise. Ercakica also thought that UBP would upset the delicate balance between Talat and Ankara, fearing that the nationalist party would build alliances with anti-solution elements in the Turkish bureaucracy. -------------- Single Party "Government" or Coalition? -------------- ¶10. (C) Under Article 106.2 of the "TRNC Constitution", "President" Talat is obligated to give the task of forming a "government" to the deputy who can win a vote of confidence -- not to a representative of the number-one vote-getter. NICOSIA 00000271 003 OF 003 That individual has a two-week deadline to build a coalition. While 26 seats form a simple majority in the 50-seat "parliament," most observers we contacted believe that 27 or 28 is a minimum for functionality. A party would need between 48-52 percent of the vote to form a "government" independently, a tall order. A three-party coalition is possible, but, according to our contacts, highly awkward and never executed here. ¶11. (C) Below is a list of feasible two-party coalitions: -- UBP/CTP Grand Coalition: Reportedly favored by the Turkish MFA in order to institute painful "public sector" reform. Never achieved in the past. Ideological differences hinder its formation at present, though UBP has told us they would be willing to try. CTP appears less keen. -- UBP/DP Coalition: Not favored by either UBP or the Denktash family, given bad blood between Father Rauf Denktash and Eroglu that was recently enflamed by Ergenekon charges. Serdar Denktash told us that he is against such a union unless his party is close to being an equal partner. He is more willing, however, to support a UBP minority government. Power may tempt the younger Denktash, however; -- UBP/TDP Coalition: Tried in the past (1998),and both sides now tell us privately they would consider the option. TDP's pro-solution fervor and clean image is a plus. This option depends, however, on a very good showing by TDP of at least 10-12 percent; -- CTP/DP Coalition: Former coalition broken by "PM" Soyer in 2006, a decision he and CTP now regret. Combination of pro-solution forces and pragmatic nationalist Serdar Denktash. Its formation would depend on one of the two parties doing much better than present polling indicates. Excellent relations between Serdar Denktash and Talat are a plus, though AKP remains distrustful of the entire Denktash clan. This option might be possible if CTP finishes a very close second to UBP; -- CTP/ORP Coalition: Continuation of the present "government." This option would be amenable to both parties as well as AKP, and cause the least disruption to the negotiating process. It would depend, however, on an extremely good finish by either ORP or CTP. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) We expect a UBP first-place finish, though not of the magnitude to form a single-party "government." While CTP has certainly not delivered on a solution and made a mess of "governance," UBP offered no new ideas during the campaign and its septuagenarian leader, Dervish Eroglu, is widely disliked and has proven extremely inarticulate in public appearances. In forging its advantage, UBP has exploited an economic downturn and the T/C public's perception that Turkish Cypriots were left in the lurch by both the EU and the U.S. after the 2004 T/C Annan Plan "Yes" vote. We do not expect a UBP-led "government" to be innovative or courageous enough to tackle long-overdue public sector reform, barring pressure from Ankara, and even then it will be a struggle. The party will also pester Talat over the negotiations limiting his flexibility, but probably not enough to hurt the process substantially given continued AKP support for it. UBP's impact on the outcome of an eventual referendum could be more of a concern. Urbancic