CYPRUS: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 15

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000266 SIPDIS FOR THE SECRETARY E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 15 MEETING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER MEHMET ALI TALAT REF: A. NICOSIA 186 ¶B. NICOSIA 199 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1 .4(b) and 1.4(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Your April 15 meeting with the leader of the Turkish Cypriot (T/C) community, Mehmet Ali Talat, is an opportunity to unambiguously register U.S. support for current efforts to re-unify Cyprus. This is a time of extreme crisis for T/C pro-solution forces, of which Talat is the undisputed leader. The slow pace of UN-brokered negotiations has left the secular, moderate Talat and his Republican Turkish Party (CTP) "government" open to attacks from anti-solution nationalists, who appear poised to triumph in April 19 "parliamentary" elections. Talat, who would still remain the T/C leader and main negotiator until "presidential" elections in April 2010, fears a stormy cohabitation and hard-line pressure at the negotiating table should anti-solution right-wingers take control of the T/C "parliament." End Summary. -------------- Pushing a Pro-Solution Agenda -------------- ¶2. (C) Since coming to power in December 2003, Talat and the center-left CTP "government" have been the driving Turkish Cypriot force to reunify the island under UN auspices as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. He has taken forceful steps to purge the education system of ethnic (anti-Greek Cypriot) bias, improve conditions for the 300-odd Greek Cypriots (G/Cs) remaining in the north, and repair endangered cultural heritage sites, mostly Greek Orthodox churches. Talat even hopes to engage Archbishop of America Demetrios and other prominent Hellenic-Americans during this visit. At home, however, he faces growing indifference and even support for a two-state solution among his fellow Turkish Cypriots, thanks mainly to the 2004 G/C rejection of the Annan Plan and rising disappointment with the lack of European Union and United States efforts to end T/C "isolation." ¶3. (C) Nevertheless, Talat still has a clear vision of a T/C future in a new, reunified federal Cyprus, wherein Turkish Cypriots have an effective voice in central decision making and control over local affairs in a T/C constituent state. He recently announced he would step down as T/C leader in 2010 if "his mission" to reunite the island failed. Talat 
believes in a Turkish Cypriot identity unique from Turkey. For him and most pro-solution Turkish Cypriots, being integrated into Turkey -- either by the in-migration of Turks or through de facto or de jure annexation -- is only slightly less palatable then being dominated by Greek Cypriots, his ultimate fear. ¶4. (C) Talat largely views his meeting with you as U.S. re-affirmation for his pro-solution outlook and efforts. Although disappointed that the strong T/C Annan Plan "yes" vote (65 percent) in 2004 did not deliver greater USG "rewards," such as direct air connections, Talat and the Turkish Cypriots consider the United States the only fair broker among the P-5. They were heartened by your recent statements in Ankara regarding Turkish Cypriot isolation and by your willingness to meet the T/C leader, as Secretaries Powell and Rice had done previously. T/Cs' mistrust many other international actors. They are largely frustrated with the EU and UN. In their eyes, the EU is unduly maniplated by the G/Cs, who sit as sole representatives of the Republic of Cyprus; Brussels has proven unable to deliver on promises to ameliorate T/C isolation -- for example, by extending direct trade privileges to Turkish Cypriots -- because Greek Cypriots regularly exercise a veto on matters requiring EU member-state consensus. ¶5. (C) Talat, who met with both of your immediate predecessors (in 2004 and 2005),is likely to raise the following during your meeting: -- the hope that the U.S. appoint a special Cyprus Envoy; -- the imperative of accelerating the on-going settlement effort through greater involvement of the UN and the international community; NICOSIA 00000266 002 OF 003 -- the benefits of increased engagement with T/Cs, which would cause G/Cs to become less intransigent; -- the need to end Turkish Cypriot isolation; and -- a comment from the U.S. to use the Annan Plan or "UN body of work" as the basis of future negotiations and as the starting point for the proposed U.S. special envoy. He will also refute Greek Cypriot calls for greater pressure on Ankara, claiming (largely correctly, we believe) that presently he is "his own man" in the negotiations. We recommend you commend Talat's pro-settlement efforts to date, especially his moderate public discourse and efforts to achieve ethnic harmony, and then focus the discussion on the continued need for flexibility and compromise from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. -------------- US Special Envoy Indispensable, He Thinks -------------- ¶6. (C) Talat believes that the appointment of a U.S. Cyprus envoy is crucial. He also knows that the Greek Cypriots oppose such a move, as does UN Special Envoy Alexander Downer. Talat nonetheless considers that, absent foreign envoys' contributions during the Annan process, the sides never would have reached the referendum stage; the same holds true today, he argues. While Talat accepted the G/C push for more limited foreign involvement in the present negotiations, he is convinced that, given the entrenched positions and bitter histories of both sides, it will be impossible to ink a deal without a push from outside actors. Talat reckons the most opportune time for a U.S. appointment would be after two complete readings of all the negotiating topics, which he expects by September. In his view, the U.S. envoy might then contribute to the give-and-take, crucial to reaching a final agreement by late 2009 / early 2010. -------------- -------------- Need to Speed Up the Process Through Greater UN Involvement -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Talat feels the current negotiations are too slow and will push you for a greater UN and international community role in facilitating them. He initially thought the sides could conclude a deal by December and then put it to their respective populations in simultaneous referenda, but to date they have covered only half of the core topics. Talat laments that UN envoy Downer is "just watching" and not playing a sufficiently active role, attributing his reluctance to G/C pressure. While Downer is slowly turning up the heat, for example by bringing in foreign experts to draft "food for thought" papers, the present UN profile is far lower than during the 2002-2004 Annan period. The G/Cs, on the other hand, are happy with the current pace and level of UN and IC involvement and will actively resist changes. -------------- Greek Cypriots Don't Need a Solution -------------- ¶8. (C) Talat believes the Republic of Cyprus's international recognition and EU membership insulates the Greek Cypriots from any negative results of the possible failure of the present negotiations. While G/C leader (and RoC President) Demetris Christofias wants a solution, Talat argues, he has no incentive to take risks and reach compromise, given Christofias's default position as head of a wealthy, recognized state. Talat fears that his G/C counterpart secretly wants to drag things out until Turkey's EU progress report comes due in November/December, a period when G/Cs believe the T/C and Turkish side will be weaker and other more pressure to make concessions. Conversely, Talat will complain he is saddled with the disadvantages of "TRNC" non-recognition, which include dependence on Turkey for most basic services (telephone/internet, post, and air connections, for example) and the inability to trade directly with the outside world. -------------- End Turkish Cypriot Isolation Now! NICOSIA 00000266 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶9. (C) Talat will argue that the only way to force Greek Cypriots to compromise is by positive international engagement with Turkish Cypriots that ends their G/C-imposed isolation. He believes that his people should no longer be punished for the division of the island, given the G/C "No" vote in 2004 and consequent EU and U.S. promises to lift T/C isolation. Talat may ask for increased U.S. investment -- including the establishment of branded franchises (which would result in those franchises being excluded in the south) -- and some mechanism to allow flights into Ercan Airport in the north. He may also ask you to use your good offices with the EU to lobby for implementation of the stillborn 2004 Direct Trade Regulation. -------------- A Word on T/C - Turkish Relations -------------- ¶10. (C) Talat rejects Greek Cypriot claims that he is a "puppet" of Ankara. In fact, the T/C leader has deftly capitalized on a confluence of interests with Turkish PM Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP government to bolster pro-solution forces on the island and win Turkey's acceptance for his "Turkish Cypriot" vision. At this stage in the talks Talat is the dominant player, although he and his team are in regular contact with Ankara. While Turkey's role will certainly grow once issues like security guarantees and territory are discussed, Talat apparently has succeeded for the time being in convincing PM Erdogan not to interfere on issues not of existential Turkish concern, such as governance, property restitution/compensation, EU matters and economics. Nevertheless, Talat and CTP hint that anti-solution groups within AKP and the Turkish bureaucracy may not share Erdogan's willingness to trust Talat. Talat worries that these elements might grow bolder if Turkey's EU bid is put on hold, AKP is seriously weakened at the ballot box, or the nationalist, anti-solution Turkish Cypriot opposition comes to power. -------------- And on the Need for a Photo Op -------------- ¶11. (C) With "TRNC parliamentary" elections just one week away -- and with Talat's CTP trailing nationalist, hard-line UBP by a significant margin -- many in the international community have been searching for means to buoy pro-solution T/C forces. Talat's visit constitutes just such a tool in our kit. For maximum electoral bounce, however, and to ward off attacks from UBP that Talat's status in Washington has been downgraded, the T/C leader needs to be received in similar fashion to 2004 and 2005. While there will be no press at your meeting, Talat is bringing a large-by-Cypriot-standards journalist contingent. He considers at least a shot of a handshake by the official photographer essential (the decision not to have photos upset Talat when we briefed him on April 13, undoubtedly because he surmised the UBP-ers would seek to capitalize on this as a "downgrade" of his standing.) The Embassy fully understands the sensitivities involved, especially amongst the Greek- and Greek Cypriot-American community. That said, allowing a quick photo shoot would be consistent with past State practice and go a long way towards helping Talat electorally. Urbancic