Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NICOSIA104
2009-02-05 15:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:
MONCHEGORSK: CYPRIOTS BEGINNING TO SQUIRM
how-toVZCZCXRO3909 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHNC #0104 0361519 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 051519Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9607 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6466 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0290 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2135 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEFNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1343
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000104
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, IO, NEA, ISN, L
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL PGOV SY IR CY
SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: CYPRIOTS BEGINNING TO SQUIRM
REF: NICOSIA 98 AND OTHERS
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000104
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, IO, NEA, ISN, L
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL PGOV SY IR CY
SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: CYPRIOTS BEGINNING TO SQUIRM
REF: NICOSIA 98 AND OTHERS
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (U) This message contains an action request; please see
Paragraph 7.
2. (C) Status of Ship: No changes since last report -- M/V
Monchegorsk remains at anchorage in Limassol harbor, under
maritime police observation. Conversations with Palace
officials hint at discord between the RoC, ship's master and
crew, and ship's owners, mainly over financial costs of
remaining in Cyprus and/or transit to a third-country (i.e.,
not Syrian) port (Para 6).
3. (C) Diplomatic Activity: The Ambassador at 0900 hrs
local (0200 DC) February 5 contacted Presidential Palace
Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides. The United
States regretted the RoC decision to send its unhelpful
letter to the Iran Sanctions Committee (ISC),he began. Now
that the conversations had shifted to New York, however, the
critical issue on-island was to ensure the Monchegorsk did
not escape RoC control. Pantelides assured that Cyprus would
not allow the ship to depart. He repeated that the
government sought UN cover for its actions and wanted to get
the Monchegorsk and its cargo out of Cyprus, but only by
putting it "in possession of the UN." The RoC had been in
regular contact with Moscow on the matter, and was convinced
the Russians would support its tack in New York.
4. (C) Pantelides called back at 1300 hrs, a touch frazzled
and with a completely different message. "We want to find a
way through this mess," the Cypriot diplomat insisted,
admitting the government unlikely would receive the response
it had sought via its letter to the ISC. Now Cyprus wanted
to explore a third-country transfer option, which until this
conversation, it had dismissed out-of-hand.
5. (C) "Unofficially" and without committing his government,
Pantelides asked if Malta represented an acceptable venue to
receive the goods. France and Italy had been too "high
profile" for a third-party transfer, he explained.
Neighboring Malta, however, was tiny, and RoC President
Demetris Christofias would be comfortable dealing with the
Maltese. Pantelides wanted to hear U.S. views on the
proposal before fleshing it out further, and presented
Ambassador a broad outline. Cyprus's thinking entailed
ordering the ship and cargo to Malta, where the containers
would be off-loaded. The Monchegorsk would depart, and the
Maltese would take appropriate action in accordance with
UNSCRs 1747 and 1803. Pantelides did not reveal, however,
whether he had floated this proposal with Valletta, London or
Paris.
6. (C) The only local impediment Pantelides saw was a
possible demand from Monchegorsk's owners, crew or master for
the RoC to cover transit costs and fees. He and the
Ambassador eventually agreed, however, that those figures did
not appear exorbitant for Cyprus, and that alone should not
derail this options, if it were found otherwise to be
workable. Ambassador committed to report the RoC approach
back to Washington and later share the USG response, whatever
it might be.
7. (C) Comment and Action Request: Without its
desperately-sought "UN cover," we believe that Cyprus will
continue to resist with all means available the off-loading
of the Monchegorsk in Limassol. We also understand, however,
that the EU is turning up the heat on the RoC to take action
in line with EU Common Positions. Success in Brussels would
be the best outcome to the Monchegorsk affair. Short of
that, we request instructions from Washington on whether to
encourage the RoC to pursue its Malta proposal (we will
continue to track and report it regardless). If this option
is determined to be workable, it will be imperative to have
sufficient assets in place to ensure the ship does not break
and run, as well as assurances from Valletta that it is
willing and capable to accept the illegal cargo.
Urbancic
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, IO, NEA, ISN, L
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL PGOV SY IR CY
SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: CYPRIOTS BEGINNING TO SQUIRM
REF: NICOSIA 98 AND OTHERS
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (U) This message contains an action request; please see
Paragraph 7.
2. (C) Status of Ship: No changes since last report -- M/V
Monchegorsk remains at anchorage in Limassol harbor, under
maritime police observation. Conversations with Palace
officials hint at discord between the RoC, ship's master and
crew, and ship's owners, mainly over financial costs of
remaining in Cyprus and/or transit to a third-country (i.e.,
not Syrian) port (Para 6).
3. (C) Diplomatic Activity: The Ambassador at 0900 hrs
local (0200 DC) February 5 contacted Presidential Palace
Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides. The United
States regretted the RoC decision to send its unhelpful
letter to the Iran Sanctions Committee (ISC),he began. Now
that the conversations had shifted to New York, however, the
critical issue on-island was to ensure the Monchegorsk did
not escape RoC control. Pantelides assured that Cyprus would
not allow the ship to depart. He repeated that the
government sought UN cover for its actions and wanted to get
the Monchegorsk and its cargo out of Cyprus, but only by
putting it "in possession of the UN." The RoC had been in
regular contact with Moscow on the matter, and was convinced
the Russians would support its tack in New York.
4. (C) Pantelides called back at 1300 hrs, a touch frazzled
and with a completely different message. "We want to find a
way through this mess," the Cypriot diplomat insisted,
admitting the government unlikely would receive the response
it had sought via its letter to the ISC. Now Cyprus wanted
to explore a third-country transfer option, which until this
conversation, it had dismissed out-of-hand.
5. (C) "Unofficially" and without committing his government,
Pantelides asked if Malta represented an acceptable venue to
receive the goods. France and Italy had been too "high
profile" for a third-party transfer, he explained.
Neighboring Malta, however, was tiny, and RoC President
Demetris Christofias would be comfortable dealing with the
Maltese. Pantelides wanted to hear U.S. views on the
proposal before fleshing it out further, and presented
Ambassador a broad outline. Cyprus's thinking entailed
ordering the ship and cargo to Malta, where the containers
would be off-loaded. The Monchegorsk would depart, and the
Maltese would take appropriate action in accordance with
UNSCRs 1747 and 1803. Pantelides did not reveal, however,
whether he had floated this proposal with Valletta, London or
Paris.
6. (C) The only local impediment Pantelides saw was a
possible demand from Monchegorsk's owners, crew or master for
the RoC to cover transit costs and fees. He and the
Ambassador eventually agreed, however, that those figures did
not appear exorbitant for Cyprus, and that alone should not
derail this options, if it were found otherwise to be
workable. Ambassador committed to report the RoC approach
back to Washington and later share the USG response, whatever
it might be.
7. (C) Comment and Action Request: Without its
desperately-sought "UN cover," we believe that Cyprus will
continue to resist with all means available the off-loading
of the Monchegorsk in Limassol. We also understand, however,
that the EU is turning up the heat on the RoC to take action
in line with EU Common Positions. Success in Brussels would
be the best outcome to the Monchegorsk affair. Short of
that, we request instructions from Washington on whether to
encourage the RoC to pursue its Malta proposal (we will
continue to track and report it regardless). If this option
is determined to be workable, it will be imperative to have
sufficient assets in place to ensure the ship does not break
and run, as well as assurances from Valletta that it is
willing and capable to accept the illegal cargo.
Urbancic