MONCHEGORSK: CYPRIOTS BEGINNING TO SQUIRM

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000104 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, IO, NEA, ISN, L E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019 TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL PGOV SY IR CY SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: CYPRIOTS BEGINNING TO SQUIRM REF: NICOSIA 98 AND OTHERS Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This message contains an action request; please see Paragraph 7. ¶2. (C) Status of Ship: No changes since last report -- M/V Monchegorsk remains at anchorage in Limassol harbor, under maritime police observation. Conversations with Palace officials hint at discord between the RoC, ship's master and crew, and ship's owners, mainly over financial costs of remaining in Cyprus and/or transit to a third-country (i.e., not Syrian) port (Para 6). ¶3. (C) Diplomatic Activity: The Ambassador at 0900 hrs local (0200 DC) February 5 contacted Presidential Palace Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides. The United States regretted the RoC decision to send its unhelpful letter to the Iran Sanctions Committee (ISC),he began. Now that the conversations had shifted to New York, however, the critical issue on-island was to ensure the Monchegorsk did not escape RoC control. Pantelides assured that Cyprus would not allow the ship to depart. He repeated that the government sought UN cover for its actions and wanted to get the Monchegorsk and its cargo out of Cyprus, but only by putting it "in possession of the UN." The RoC had been in regular contact with Moscow on the matter, and was convinced the Russians would support its tack in New York. ¶4. (C) Pantelides called back at 1300 hrs, a touch frazzled and with a completely different message. "We want to find a way through this mess," the Cypriot diplomat insisted, admitting the government unlikely would receive the response it had sought via its letter to the ISC. Now Cyprus wanted to explore a third-country transfer option, which until this conversation, it had dismissed out-of-hand. ¶5. (C) "Unofficially" and without committing his government, Pantelides asked if Malta represented an acceptable venue to receive the goods. France and Italy had been too "high profile" for a third-party transfer, he explained. Neighboring Malta, however, was tiny, and RoC President Demetris Christofias would be comfortable dealing with the Maltese. Pantelides wanted to hear U.S. views on the proposal before fleshing it out further, and presented Ambassador a broad outline. Cyprus's thinking entailed ordering the ship and cargo to Malta, where the containers would be off-loaded. The Monchegorsk would depart, and the Maltese would take appropriate action in accordance with UNSCRs 1747 and 1803. Pantelides did not reveal, however, whether he had floated this proposal with Valletta, London or Paris. ¶6. (C) The only local impediment Pantelides saw was a possible demand from Monchegorsk's owners, crew or master for the RoC to cover transit costs and fees. He and the Ambassador eventually agreed, however, that those figures did not appear exorbitant for Cyprus, and that alone should not derail this options, if it were found otherwise to be workable. Ambassador committed to report the RoC approach back to Washington and later share the USG response, whatever it might be. ¶7. (C) Comment and Action Request: Without its desperately-sought "UN cover," we believe that Cyprus will continue to resist with all means available the off-loading of the Monchegorsk in Limassol. We also understand, however, that the EU is turning up the heat on the RoC to take action in line with EU Common Positions. Success in Brussels would be the best outcome to the Monchegorsk affair. Short of that, we request instructions from Washington on whether to encourage the RoC to pursue its Malta proposal (we will continue to track and report it regardless). If this option is determined to be workable, it will be imperative to have sufficient assets in place to ensure the ship does not break and run, as well as assurances from Valletta that it is willing and capable to accept the illegal cargo. Urbancic