NIGER -- ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW

UNCLAS NIAMEY 000089 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/RSA - C POMMERER, INL/AAE - A ALTON, AND DS/T/ATA A GONZALEZ E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC KCRM PARM PGOV PTER SNAR SOCI NG SUBJECT: NIGER -- ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING REF: STATE 5448 ¶1. The following is Post's response to provide input to help further define law enforcement and judicial training needs. Below are Post's responses to the questions posed: ¶A. What are the key internal or regional challenges the host government's non-military security apparatus confronts? (i.e., local/regional crime, trafficking of persons, narcotics, resource theft, smuggling, illicit small and light arms shipments, domestic and regional terrorism, etc.) In February 2007, the Tuareg rebel group, Movement of Nigeriens for Justice (MNJ),launched a series of attacks against military and strategic installations in the north. These attacks continued throughout 2007 and 2008. In response, the government declared a state of alert on August 24, 2007, which has remained in effect. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were some instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority. The Government of Niger security forces concentrate their attention on radical/militant Islamic elements and terrorist threats from external groups, such as Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Internally, the Government of Niger security forces are focused on the MNJ in Niger. The borders are very insecure and access across the borders is quite easy, especially in remote areas. Smuggling is an issue across all of Niger,s borders, with drugs (opiates and hashish) and contraband goods (cigarettes) being of primary concern on the border with Nigeria. Narcotics, illicit small arms and light weapons, and land mines are smuggled across northern Niger, taking advantage of the old historic trade routes across the Sahel and Sahara regions. Trafficking in persons has been reported as an issue in previous Human Rights Reports by the U.S. Embassy. There are no threats inside Niger that act beyond its borders. Since December 2008 and January 2009, with the kidnappings of UN Special Envoy Fowler and his associates, and four European tourists, security concerns have increased related to groups outside Niger crossing the border with Mali and making incursions into Niger for kidnapping raids, particularly in the regions immediately to the north and northwest of the capital, Niamey. ¶B. What are the host government's non-military sector's capabilities to respond to these challenges? Where ability to address these issues is lacking, please provide details: what knowledge, skills/training, equipment, relationships, policies and/or procedures are responsible for the lack of capacity? The Armed Forces (FAN),under the Ministry of National Defense, is responsible for internal and external security. The Gendarmerie, under the same ministry, has primary responsibility for rural security. The National Forces for Intervention and Security (FNIS),under the Interior Ministry, are responsible for domestic security and protection of high-level officials and government buildings. The National Police, also under the Interior Ministry, are charged with urban law enforcement. The Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DGDSE) is the primary body responsible for intelligence gathering. In many ways Niger is in the infant stages of development of full programs. Organizations and individuals at lower levels are fully motivated and ready to accept advice and aid. It does not appear the organizations at the lower level obtain full support, however, from the higher levels of government. The Gendarmerie units are small and have great areas to cover. They are very receptive to advice and willing to accept financial aid and training. They are not funded to perform their mission as well as the international community would like. The Gendarmerie is responsible for investigating police abuse; however, impunity is a problem. The DGDSE is headquartered in Niamey and has 10 regional offices in major cities and one at the Niamey International Airport. DGDSE officers are professional and well trained, but are hampered by a lack of resources and personnel. The police are largely ineffective due to lack of basic supplies such as vehicle fuel, radios, uniforms, handcuffs, batons, and badges. Patrols are sporadic and emergency response in Niamey can take almost an hour or more. Police training is minimal and only specialized police units have basic weapons-handling skills. Corruption remains pervasive. On the whole, security forces do not adequately police the border regions. The Government of Niger lacks capacity to control borders. Additionally, corruption in the form of bribes undermines controls in place. The possibility exists for outside groups to use the country as a temporary refuge. Niger has implemented anti-terrorist and anti-money-laundering legislation; however, the level of competency and training of law enforcement officials is questionable. In 2003-2004, a unit called CENTIF, made up of lawyers, police, and customs officials was created on paper, though never stood up. ¶C. Highlight any specific non-military security or judicial training requirements (basic, mid-level, specialized, institutional) and the intended host government recipient agency. The National Police intend to set up a Counter Terrorist unit. The police received ATA training in 2008 appropriate for this purpose (Interdicting Terrorist Activities) as well as ATA-funded equipment for tactical operations. Additional training directed at this effort would be greatly welcomed by the Director General of the National Police. ¶D. Host government's willingness to accept and be an effective partner in the implementation of USG assistance. The Government of Niger has been receptive to training offered through the Regional Security Office for non-military units. Two ATA courses were offered in FY 08, one in 2007, and four in 2006. The training has included, where appropriate, elements of the National Police and the Gendarmerie. For example, in 2008, the ATA course Airport Security Management included both police and gendarmerie officers responsible for airport security in Niamey. ATA plans to visit Niger from February 22-28, 2009, to conduct a Program Country Review. The host government has been extremely cooperative in preparation for this visit, and the Regional Security Office anticipates a pQductive visit by ATA. ¶E. Other efforts by international partners in providing non-military security assistance and/or training to law enforcement and judicial institutions of the host government. The Government of Niger also receives training from France (police, military, and intelligence),and has received training in the past from Libya and Algeria. There are cooperative agreements with Mali (e.g., right to pursue (i.e., "hot pursuit") between the two countries). The European Union has also provided training in the area of immigration control. ¶F. Is there any type of existing or planned non-military regional training center in your country, operated by either an international partner or host country? Only the military has a regional training center, and this is limited to higher-ranking officials. The National Police have one police academy training center located in Niamey. The Gendarmerie does partial training with the military throughout the country and the remainder of its training in Niamey. The European Union has provided funding for March 2009 to train police inspectors from the National Police (80 officers),FNIS (20 officers),and the Gendarmerie (20 officers),but the Gendarmerie withdrew its participation. ¶2. The point of contact for this cable is RSO Jeff McGallicher or ARSO Brian Caza, both of whom may be reached 24 hours through Marine Post One at 227-72-26-61, 62, or 63 ALLEN