BHARAT BALLOT 09: NO MAJOR CHANGES ANTICIPATED IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 000981 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK IN SUBJECT: BHARAT BALLOT 09: NO MAJOR CHANGES ANTICIPATED IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY REF: A. NEW DELHI 00968 ¶B. NEW DELHI 00451 ¶C. NEW DELHI 00960 Classified By: CDA Peter Burleigh for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (U) Summary: India's foreign policy is unlikely to change significantly, regardless of the outcome of the parliamentary elections. The political parties, with few exceptions, differ little in their approach to India's foreign policy. Such issues have not played a substantial role in the campaign. India analysts, opinion shapers, and opposition party advisors we talked to agree that the majority of voters are concerned with domestic issues, leaving political parties with little reason to differentiate their foeign policy approaches. Instead, they focus on more popular issues regarding the economy, rural development and governance. ¶2. (U) Summary Continued: Even under the wild card scenario in which a Communist Party-led Third Front alliance were to form a government, Indian foreign policy experts have expressed little concern about any temporary shifts which may take place, given pressure from both the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The bottom line for U.S. policy is that we can expect the next Indian government to continue to pursue the positive upward trend in our relations albeit with differences in tone and pace. End Summary. -------------- Many Scenarios, Few Foreign Policy Differences -------------- ¶3. (U) The two most likely election outcomes are 1) a Congress Party-led government, similar in composition to the current United Progressive Alliance (UPA),or 2) a BJP-led government similar to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that was in power 1999-2004. In these two cases, the status quo for India's bilateral relationships, with few minor exceptions, would remain. Should a UPA-like configuration include the communist parties, they may again try to tie the government's hands in dealings with the United States. In a third but less likely outcome -- a Third Front government, an alliance of smaller, regional parties, possibly led by the Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) -- these tendencies would be magnified. In this case, we could see efforts to rework the US-India Civil Nuclear Initiative or slow down military cooperation, but experts argue that countervailing pressure from UPA and NDA would work to balance such initiatives, bringing even a Left-dominated government back to center. The worst result from the U.S. perspective would be the cost of lost opportunities. -------------- A Growing Indo-American Relationship Expected -------------- ¶4. (C) Post expects continued progress in the U.S.-India relationship. We do not foresee a new government which would seek to modify India's relationship with the U.S. According to Tarun Das, Chief Mentor of the Confederation of Indian Industry, if Congress were to form the coalition government, progress in U.S.-India relations would continue unabated given the Prime Minister's "personal, dogged commitment to advancing the relationship." ¶5. (C) According to Brajesh Mishra, former National Security Advisor for the BJP, regardless of the composition of the coalition, "even if the CPI-M were to join the UPA," there would not be a break in the U.S.-India relationship. Ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar, former Foreign Ministry spokesperson and a well-recognized commentator, felt that the India-U.S. relationship would be more affected by the new U.S. administration than by the formation of a new Indian coalition. ¶6. (C) S.K. Arora, BJP Foreign Policy Advisor, told us that NEW DELHI 00000981 002 OF 005 foreign policy has never been an issue in elections, and the declarations different parties make with regard to the foreign policies they would implement if in power should not be taken as definitive statements. The differences between the Congress Party and BJP are not very acute, he explained. ¶7. (SBU) Ramesh Chandran, Advisor to the Forums of Parliamentarians -- among them, the India-US Forum ) concurred with Arora's explanation that the larger parties (i.e. Congress Party and BJP) tend to have very similar platforms for their foreign and economic policies. The only real partisan issue, with regard to foreign policy, has been on the Indo-US Civil-Nuclear Initiative last summer, an issue which appeared to be more divisive than it actually was. Chandran believes if the BJP had been re-elected in 2004, then they would have been promoting a similar deal. ¶8. (U) Ashok Malik, Senior Editor for The Pioneer, dismissed any concerns that the building of strong ties between Delhi and Washington might lose momentum, even in the case of a Left-led government, explaining that "the broader relationship has been built by civil society and business; governments and diplomats are catching up." The U.S. remains a principal engine for the Indian economy and India is desperately waiting for the U.S. to recover from the economic recession, according to Malik. He was confident that any loud rhetoric on protectionism made during the election season would not amount to much once a government was in place and had to carry out the business of governance. -------------- But Continued Opposition to Sign Non-Proliferation Initiatives -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite the expected continuation of close cooperation with the U.S., a change in government is unlikely to lead to a change in heart about becoming a signatory to the NPT and/or CTBT. With the exception of some on the Left, existing nonproliferation-related international agreements are still viewed here as discriminatory. "The BJP would not give up on becoming an independent nuclear weapons state," according to Arora, who explained that even though the BJP would not be over anxious to undo the 123 Agreement, it would refuse to fully accept limitations. "Until a complete and total disarmament agreement is signed, India must have nuclear weapons," he stated, adding that India would not sign the CTBT, but absent an "absolute necessity", India would be unlikely to test. Arora also pointed to the improbability of adopting a "no-first-use" policy before other countries, namely Pakistan, did so. Despite Arora's sound-bite phrases, he admitted that in practice, there is not much tinkering with policies already in place when a new government comes into power -- a concept reinforced by BJP Prime Minister candidate L.K. Advani, who, according to press reports, said on May 14 he would not scrap the nuclear deal if the BJP forms the next government. ¶10. (U) In a televised interview on May 11, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist),Prakash Karat, said his party would be unwilling to sign the NPT or the CTBT unless a timeframe for total (global) nuclear disarmament was established. Karat said a Left-backed government would seek unidentified changes in the nuclear deal but recognized that such changes would be the result of negotiations with the U.S. ¶11. (U) According to Malik, we should expect to see a sharp increase in rhetoric toward the U.S. in the case a weaker Congress Party is backed by the Left, or in the unlikely event the coalition formed is led by the Left, but there would be no real maneuvering to slow down the implementation of the 123 Agreement. Such "bad atmospherics" could last several months, but the government would then come under pressure by lobbying groups to give way. This might play out - although to a much lesser degree - under a BJP-led government, Malik predicted. NEW DELHI 00000981 003 OF 005 -------------- BJP Pledges Less Focus on Pakistan, Greater Emphasis on Region -------------- ¶12. (C) The BJP has made a pledge to implement a more "balanced" foreign policy, distributing its attention across South Asia and to "refashion" its relations with Russia and Central Asia to keep pace with current realities. Arora pointed to the Congress Party's "mistake" in not placing enough of an emphasis on South Asia as a region and focusing too much effort on Pakistan. While the BJP would like to have friendly relations with Islamabad, he explained, it has little faith in Pakistan's leadership, and India would be able to live with a hostile neighbor if necessary. ¶13. (C) Arora suggested that a more stable Pakistan is not necessarily better for India, a position which reflects the hawkish stance more often heard in the 1990's, and he dismissed concerns about nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands, as nobody would be "stupid" enough to use them. Echoing Arora's sentiments, and sharing his pessimistic outlook on prospects for rapprochement with Pakistan, Mishra stressed that the U.S. and India have parallel goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan and that a Taliban victory in either state would not be acceptable to India. Advani also, during talks with the Charge, expressed concern over the rising influence of the Taliban in Pakistan and discussed the difficulties of dealing with a neighbor whose command structure is obscure and where it is not clear who has the last word (reftel A). ¶14. (C) Interlocutors agreed that the chances of resumption in the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue (CD) are low as long as cross-border terrorism continues, and barring the Left parties, New Delhi is unlikely to resume the stalled talks with Islamabad. Both the Congress Party and BJP hold that Pakistan would need to take effective steps against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks before the dialogue is resumed, and the Left Parties appear to be the only ones favoring restoration of the CD on a parallel track with the process of bringing the Mumbai attackers to justice. Regardless of formation of government, in the event of a Mumbai-like attack, "all bets are off," and India would be forced to retaliate, says Malik. -------------- Delhi Unlikely To Change its Stance toward Iran -------------- ¶15. (U) Malik was confident India would not take a harder line on Iran, and explained that ONE driver in the bilateral relationship is Delhi's belief that if the U.S. pulls out of Afghanistan after several years, India, Russia, and Iran would have to fill the gap. Ambassador Bhadrakumar offered a similar, more forward-leaning view that the new government, regardless of its composition, would probably make some effort to repair the damage to its relationship with Iran which, he explained, resulted from external pressure from third countries (Note: read: America). ¶16. (C) India's relationship with Iran is based strictly on India's domestic political interests at the time, according to Arora, who justifies this viewpoint by making references to the political weight of India's large Shia Muslim population (reftel B). In the past, when asked if the U.S. could continue to count on India opposing Iran's nuclear weapons development, Arora has answered it would depend on what India's interests are at the time. "India is the least interested state in seeing Iran develop a nuclear weapon," he explained, but India would not oppose Iran simply to enhance its relationship with the U.S. or to improve relations with Europe. ¶17. (C) Arora, who served as India's Ambassador to Iran in the 1990's, said that despite what he characterized as NEW DELHI 00000981 004 OF 005 India's "better relationship" with Iran under BJP rule than under Congress governments, "we always have the feeling in the back of our minds that Iranian-Islamic fanaticism must be tackled." -------------- China Not a Factor in Elections; Policy Expected to Remain at Highest Levels -------------- ¶18. (C) India's bilateral relations with China are often described as "complex" by our Indian interlocutors, and Indian strategic policy on China is reserved for an elite few in India's senior ranks. Although historically the BJP has been more China-phobic than other parties and CPI-M has had a soft spot for China, we could not detect any signs of major Indian political parties differing to any significant extent in their views about what India's relationship with China should be. Malik does not see a change on the horizon for this relationship, and most interlocutors did not even address the Indo-Sino relationship when asked about possible changes in India's foreign policies. Arora made a passing reference to increased Indo-Sino cooperation, but quickly flagged India's concern with China's "attempt to establish a presence in our neighborhood." Post believes India's China policy will remain in the hands of the most senior levels of the government and bureaucracy, with India continuing to pursue healthy economic relations with its erstwhile rival for regional power, leaving contentious issues such as border disputes and Indian Ocean naval access on the back burner while India plays catch-up for the next several years to reduce the political and economic power gaps separating Beijing and Delhi. -------------- Slight Differences in Political Parties' Approach toward Nepal & Sri Lanka -------------- ¶19. (C) BJP Prime Ministerial candidate L.K. Advani has criticized the Congress Party for neglecting India's interests in Sri Lanka and Nepal, claiming Indian influence in these states has "dissipated," making more room for China (reftel A). Arora believes that the Congress Party should have intervened and assisted the Nepalese government in dealing with the rise of the Maoists. On Sri Lanka, Arora toed the party line, saying BJP wants to ensure no discrimination against Tamils and criticized the ruling Congress Party's lack of intervention. ¶20. (C) However, contacts brushed off promises of a change in policy toward Nepal or Sri Lanka. Bhadrakumar believes that even under the BJP -- which often accuses Congress of not being decisive enough -- the new government's policies toward Nepal and Sri Lanka would continue to be based on a rhetorical approach of non-interference. And according to Malik, despite all the rhetoric, the new government, be it a Congress Party, BJP, or Third Front coalition, would be unlikely to change its approach toward Sri Lanka, explaining it would continue to be "quite happy with the Sri Lankan military operations" in hopes that Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam leader Prabhakaran would be eliminated and this long standing issue with domestic ramifications in Tamil Nadu would finally be settled. -------------- Even Wildcards are a Safe Bet -------------- ¶21. (C) In the event that a Third Front coalition is formed, the communist parties will undoubtedly wield a great deal of influence in government, but Delhi would be unlikely to implement any radical changes to its bilateral relationships or regional role. According to Chandran, if there were any cause for concern, it would lie with the smaller, regional parties, such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) led by Uttar NEW DELHI 00000981 005 OF 005 Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati or her local political rival, the Samajwadi Parti (SP) led by Mulayam Singh Yadav. Mayawati is "clueless" when it comes to foreign policy issues, says Chandran, and ONE need not inquire further about SP's foreign policy ideology after listening to Yadav,s archaic "no English, no computers" campaign promise. That said, such rhetoric is simply intended for candidates' local constituencies and public consumption, but as Malik explained, "nobody wants a dramatic change." ¶22. (C) Shashank Shekhar, the Cabinet Secretary to Mayawati, told Ambassador Burleigh on May 4 that he foresees no change in Indian foreign policy should Mayawati become Prime Minister, commenting that what little the BSP leader has said about foreign policy issues ) particularly, not supporting the Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Initiative last summer ) was just rhetoric, and driven by the fact that the Samajwadi Party, had supported the deal (reftel C). (Comment: the chances of Mayawati becoming Prime Minister at this time are slim. End Comment.) ¶24. (C) Comment: Following the Mumbai attacks in November 2008, it appeared as though national security issues would play a larger role then they traditionally have during election season in India. Many political analysts in Delhi expected issues such as terrorism emanating from Pakistan or Delhi,s approach to problems in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka to play in this election. But as the polls come to a close this week, it appears foreign policy issues, as always, have played no significant role in shaping voters' choices. This is essentially good news for the U.S., as it appears the general consensus is that the next Indian government, regardless of who leads it, will be inclined to continue to pursue enhanced relations with the U.S. even if it lacks a clear vision for where our foreign policy objectives should mesh. The opportunity therefore exists for us to take the lead in shaping the direction of the relationship. It will take the new Indian government some time to form and get up to speed, but the U.S. should be ready to engage the new government as soon as possible, taking the lead on pushing the global partnership to the next level. While cooperation with India will continue to move more slowly than we would like because of the nature of Indian decisionmaking and hesitancy to change, Post expects the new government will want to demonstrate success in its U.S. policy, and that the next several months will offer unprecedented opportunity to engage India on foreign policy objectives. BURLEIGH