INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY MENON,S WASHINGTON VISIT:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000441 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ABLD ECON OFDP IN SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY MENON,S WASHINGTON VISIT: A PREVIEW REF: NEW DELHI 268 Classified By: CDA Steven White for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon will travel to Washington March 9-11 at the invitation of Special Representative Holbrooke to provide India's input to our Afghanistan policy review. While in Washington, Menon will meet with Ambassador Holbrooke, the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary Burns, and perhaps Department of Defense counterparts. Menon also plans to hold meetings on the Hill. Post provides a preview of some of the topics Menon is likely to raise. End Summary. -------------- First, political context: India election season has just begun -------------- ¶2. (C) With the March 2 announcement of national elections to be held April 16-May 13, the political season in India entered its final lap. The Indian political establishment, including the government, will be focused intensely on the elections and government formation for the next 11 weeks. Although the permanent government bureaucracy will continue to function, it will be marking time and waiting until a new Government is in place by June 2. The Government will no longer take any significant domestic or foreign policy decisions. Menon is expected to remain Foreign Secretary until his retirement at the end of July regardless of election results, providing continuity to our policy discussions. However he will likely not offer any bold new initiatives during his visit. He will seek reassurance that the foundations of the bilateral relationship are strong and that no matter what the shape of the next Indian government, the relationship will prosper. This would be an accurate assessment, with one significant caveat: if the new coalition turns out to be shaky and unstable, we could see a period of drift because the government may not be confident it could make the decisions needed to move the relationship forward. -------------- Afghanistan/Pakistan: concern grows with another attack in Lahore -------------- ¶3. (C) Reftel was the scenesetter for Special Representative Holbrooke's visit, and we refer to it for recent Indian thinking on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since the Holbrooke visit to India, however, Pakistan was hit by another terrorist attack, the March 3 ambush of the Sri Lankan cricket team, which has served to exacerbate concerns in India that: 1) Pak-based terror is out of control of the government; and 2) India may again soon be the victim of an attack. Indian media was quick to seize on one Pakistani minister's assertion that Indians were involved in the Lahore attack, and equally quick to report on subsequent statements, both in Islamabad and Colombo, shifting accusations to al Qaeda. As Menon is an integral part of the Composite Dialogue process, Post suggests we use these meetings to try to discern from Menon when and under what conditions dialogue might resume, as well as ways the U.S. may facilitate an honest broker role in coordinating law enforcement efforts on the Mumbai attacks. -------------- Counter-terrorism cooperation: low hanging fruit? -------------- ¶4. (S) Since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, there has been unprecedented cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, highlighted by the March 3 visit of FBI Director Mueller to India. National Security Advisor Narayanan, Home Minister P. Chidambaram and the Directors of India's Intelligence Bureau and National Intelligence Agency thanked Director Mueller for the Bureau's assistance into the case. Narayanan characterized the pace of the improving relationship since Mumbai as "frenetic." Because the GOI deemed U.S. assistance in the Mumbai valuable it has begun to seek a more cooperative relationship across the board on counterterrorism. Although many GOI officials thought there would be blowback from the public for the FBI,s involvement in the case, Menon himself noted that the reaction has been positive, enabling our agencies to work together more NEW DELHI 00000441 002.2 OF 004 closely. As Menon has expressed an interest in discussing next steps in the bilateral relationship, Post suggests using his Washington meetings to get his buy-in for making counter-terrorism cooperation an integral part of our strategic partnership, in particular institutionalizing recent gains made in our cooperation to make the point that we should be working proactively to prevent future attacks, and not just getting ready to respond to the next Mumbai. -------------- Civil Nuclear: Implementation Next Steps -------------- ¶5. (C) Implementation of civil nuclear cooperation with India requires progress on four issues: (1) ratification of India's IAEA Safeguards Agreement along with a declaration of safeguarded facilities to the IAEA; (2) designation of reactor park sites for U.S. firms; (3) consultations on a reprocessing arrangement; and (4) ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage to provide liability protection. The Safeguards Agreement and site designation are the most immediate concerns, and are also the most ripe for immediate action by India. The reprocessing arrangement consultations should begin as soon as possible, but will take time to complete. Liability protection must wait for Cabinet approval and passage by the new Parliament after the general elections, probably not before June. ¶6. (C) India signed its Safeguards Agreement Feb 3, but has yet to (1) bring it into force, which requires a Cabinet decision followed by written notification to the IAEA, or (2) provide the IAEA with a declaration of safeguarded facilities, the list of about 14 facilities that will be designated as 'civil' and thus fall under safeguards. The 123 Agreement implementing legislation required that the President certify to Congress that these two steps have been taken -- and that the facilities declaration not be materially inconsistent with India's 2005 Separation Plan -- before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) can license U.S. civil nuclear exports to India. With the Indian electoral code's prohibition on new policy initiatives in force since March 2, Indian officials may claim the Safeguards Agreement and the facilities declaration have to wait for the next government. Working-level MEA officials have assured us this is an on-going initiative; the government can move forward, but may decide not to for political reasons in an election season. Menon may be able to clarify this point. Further delay in ratifying the Safeguards Agreement will delay our own Presidential certifications and the issuance of the licenses necessary for U.S. firms to share sensitive technical information that Indian officials say is necessary to make progress toward commercial deals. The so-called "Part 810" licensing process and the NRC licensing process are separate and collectively could take several months. The French and Russians do not have this licensing problem, but at the same time, they cannot transfer materials until safeguards are in place. Until then, they can continue pressing ahead with planning and deal-making even if they can not transfer materials or break ground for new reactors. (Comment: Indian officials have given no compelling reason to delay bringing the Safeguards Agreement into force, suggesting there may be some political opposition to operationalizing the U.S. deal prior to elections. This is alarming because it raises the possibility that a future government might change course. End Comment.) ¶7. (C) GE and Westinghouse in particular need reactor park sites designated for U.S. firms. Menon told the Charge February 28 that a decision has been made about site designations and that he might bring this information to his meetings in Washington. Media reports claim that the government has designated seven or eight sites, four of which are coastal sites for reactor parks. These coastal sites are rumored to be West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and Jaitapur in Maharashtra (already designated for France),with two for U.S. firms and an additional site for Russia. Menon previously told Ambassador Mulford that that pressure from West Bengal had subsided and that Andhra Pradesh was likely for one site. Local GE representatives have made clear that NEW DELHI 00000441 003.2 OF 004 the Gujarat site is most favorable, followed by Andhra Pradesh. It is not clear whether the government decision on site designation will be binding following the elections or whether it plans to announce the decision publicly. ¶8. (C) The silver lining to the delay in bringing the Safeguards Agreement into force is that it gives the U.S. several months to make progress on the reprocessing arrangement negotiations -- under Article 6 Section 3 of the 123 Agreement -- thereby removing a major impediment to competitiveness compared to the French and Russians. An agreement on reprocessing arrangements would also permit U.S. uranium suppliers to sell to India once the safeguards are in place. Dr. Kakodkar clearly told the USIBC delegation that these consultations can go ahead regardless of the elections. The Indians have made clear they cannot purchase fuel from the U.S. until they know the terms under which it could be reprocessed. The consultations must begin within six months of the formal request from India on February 3, so by August 3, and conclude within one year from the date they begin. It is in our commercial interest to complete these consultations as quickly as possible. Menon told Ambassador Mulford he does not think it will be controversial. However, India resents U.S. policy supporting a global ban on further transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology being pursued in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India regards this ban as a matter of policy, not of law, and therefore subject to revision. ¶9. (C) U.S. firms say they need liability protection in the form of ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage to do business in India. Indian officials tell us the Convention awaits Cabinet approval and then a decision by the new Parliament, perhaps in June. While U.S. firms are clear they need the Convention ratified, Indian officials are aware that they have made exceptions in the past. Westinghouse made the strategic decision to enter into a commercial deal and begin construction on a nuclear reactor in China, presumably in the hope that China would ratify the Convention before the plant becomes active. -------------- Defense Cooperation and End Use Monitoring -------------- ¶10. (C) Post sees an excellent opportunity to use the Menon visit to advance and potentially resolve the issue of End-Use Monitoring (EUM). In recent weeks, the Indian Navy signed the DSP-83 for the sale of the P-8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and positive discussions regarding the newly rediscovered 1951 Mutual Defense Agreement seem to augur well that questions over "use" conditions of the EUM could be quickly resolved, leaving only differences over "physical inspections." But it may not be that straightforward. The Americas Director of the External Affairs Ministry, Vani Rao, told Post on March 6 that MEA believes the draft EUM language India submitted to Admiral Wierenga at Aero India in February should be the starting point for continued discussions on the issue. Regardless, Menon, who has the authority to negotiate this deal (although Post believes the final text will need Cabinet Committee on Security approval),has promised numerous American interlocutors that he hoped to resolve EUM "soon." On February 28, he told Charge that the MOD and MEA were working hard on coming up with useful language. Post believes Under Secretary Burns -- in conjunction with a senior DoD counterpart -- could take advantage of this meeting to have a heart-to-heart with Menon on EUM, clearly laying out U.S. redlines, the negative consequences of letting this issue fester, and pressing Menon on what the GOI,s plan is to get EUM resolved. Post does not believe that Indian restrictions on major policy initiatives during elections precludes resolution of EUM during this election time. -------------- New York tax case/new Mumbai Consulate -------------- ¶11. (C) We expect Menon to raise the New York tax case, and suggest that we in turn raise our issues regarding construction of the new Mumbai Consulate General. GOI concerns about potential tax liabilities has led the Indian NEW DELHI 00000441 004.2 OF 004 government to take steps that have delayed construction of the Mumbai consulate and have cost us money. The State Department has been working diligently to lay the foundation for a resolution to the New York tax case. The process has begun and is a management priority, but it must now be vetted with the new administration before it can move further. It is premature to speculate on how long the process will take. At the same time, in order to resolve United States government objections to various utility bills and cesses levied on the new consulate site (NCC) in Mumbai which are based on a percentage of the rateable value of the property, State Department legal experts have been studying worldwide utility rates and billing procedures in an effort to identify rate structures and methodologies that are agreeable to the governments of India and the United States for diplomatic missions. This study was agreed to by both sides in June, ¶2008. ¶12. (C) The GOI has stated that until the New York City tax case is resolved, it is invoking reciprocity by impeding completion of the NCC in Mumbai. Until the Government of India tries to sell the government-owned building in New York, there will be no cost to the Government of India from the New York City tax case. The New York City tax issue is causing no operational impact on the Government of India in New York or Washington, and on principle, the Indians will never pay the taxes due. Here in India, however, the Ministry of External Affairs is actively impeding completion of the NCC in Mumbai by instructing municipal authorities not to cooperate in the inspection and permit issuance process until we pay contested utility and municipal bills and cesses, and until the New York tax case is settled. Our prime contractor has filed claims of $21 million due to delays and extra work associated with the tax dispute and the non-issuance of building permits. If the permits are not issued in the next week, costs will continue accruing at an estimated eight hundred thousand dollars per month until the MEA obstruction is lifted. Charge sent a letter to Menon on the tax issue on March 6. ¶13. (C) Post believes we should tell Menon directly that we find the "reciprocal" actions of the GOI to be uneven and unfair. Menon promised the Charge on February 28 that he would see about whether progress was possible, but footdragging has become very costly for us and is impeding operations. WHITE