INDIAN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO SR HOLBROOKE: PAKISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 000415 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IN SUBJECT: INDIAN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO SR HOLBROOKE: PAKISTAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HOLDS THE KEY Classified By: Leslie Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) In a February 16 meeting with Special Representative Richard Holbrooke, National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan emphasized that Pakistan's relationship with India would be driven by the Pakistani military. Defense Secretary Vijay Singh, who also attended, noted that the Indian and Pakistani militaries had minimal contact, but India had a direct interest in Pakistan's effectiveness in conducting counter-insurgency operations in the west. On Afghanistan, both sides discussed the upcoming election and Holbrooke urged GOI officials to tell visiting Afghan Lower House Speaker Qanuni to accept the August 20 election date. ¶2. (C) Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, accompanied by Ambassador, met February 16 with Indian National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan. Also in attendance from the U.S. side were Deputy Commander PACOM Lt. Gen. Douglas Fraser, Deputy Commander CENTCOM Lt. General John Allen, the Special Representative's Military Advisor Major General Burton Field, and Paul Jones, Deputy Special Representative; the Indian side also included Defense Secretary Vijay Singh and NSA staff. Holbrooke explained his responsibilities as Special Representative and emphasized the importance of Indian views in the formulation of the new administration's Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. ¶3. (C) Narayanan welcomed U.S. willingness to consult with New Delhi on Afghanistan and Pakistan and take India's perspective into account when the U.S. conducted its strategic review. Narayanan said his meeting with General Petraeus at last week's Munich Security Conference had been useful in understanding the scope of the review. ¶4. (C) Narayanan and Secretary Singh appreciated readouts on the military situation in Pakistan from Lt. General Allen and Major General Field. Singh noted that the Indian and Pakistani military had few, if any contacts. Nevertheless, India's interests were directly affected by Pakistan's success in fighting a counter-insurgency campaign in the west. India had learned the hard way about the difficulties of counter-insurgency operations. Singh noted that New Delhi had even offered suggestions to Pakistan in the past about such operations but Islamabad had not acted on the advice. ¶5. (C) Narayanan stressed that the Pakistani military establishment and, in particular, Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and ISI Director General Pasha, would play the critical role in determining the tenor of Indo-Pakistani ties. If Kayani was committed to taking steps that would lead to a more productive relationship, then India could consider doing more itself. At the same time, Narayanan expressed skepticism that such change was possible, arguing that the Pakistan military establishment must be aware of the presence of Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) training camps in Punjab. ¶6. (C) At a later lunch focused on Afghanistan, discussion centered on the presidential election date in Afghanistan. Narayanan shared concerns that the upcoming election process should not add to instability. He noted that Afghan Lower House Speaker Mohammad Yunis Qanuni was currently in Delhi, and said India supported the Election Commission's proposal for August 20 polling. Holbrooke urged GOI officials to tell Qanuni to accept the August 20 election date. The security situation and police training were also touched on during the lunch. ¶7. (U) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message. WHITE