INDIA-IAEA: SHARED CONCERN ON IRAN-SYRIA REPORT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000370 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2019 TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SYR TRGY IN PINS ENRG KCRM SUBJECT: INDIA-IAEA: SHARED CONCERN ON IRAN-SYRIA REPORT, DEFENSIVE ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL REF: A. SECSTATE 16285 ¶B. UNVIE 87 ¶C. SECSTATE 148969 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Les Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B and D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ministry of External Affairs Director for Disarmament and International Security Affairs Gaddam Dharmendra shared February 28 India's perspective on Iran-Syria and India's Additional Protocal, two items on the agenda of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting March 2-6. India claimed to share our concern about lack of cooperation from Iran and Syria detailed in Directer General ElBaradei's February 19 report, and planned to once again to work from within the Non-Aligned Movement to strengthen its statement and to craft a separate, more critical Indian national statement. Dharmendra was defensive about possible criticism of the late submission and limited scope of India's draft Additional Protocol, saying India had charted a middle course and had "come a long way." Dharmendra also confirmed that India would participate in the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) annual meeting in Vienna. END SUMMARY. Iran/Syria: Working To Strengthen Statements - - - ¶2. (C) Poloff delivered ref A demarche to Ministry of External Affairs Director for Disarmament and International Security Affairs Gaddam Dharmendra February 28, stressing Iran and Syria's lack of any meaningful cooperation with the IAEA as documented by Director General ElBaradei's February 19 report. Dharmendra replied, "We all know what is happening there," but he was uncharacteristically cautious about giving clues as to India's planned response. He shared that India was engaged in discussions with other Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states of a draft statement for the IAEA Board meeting, and that India was also preparing its own national statement. He suggested that India would resist from within NAM efforts by Iran and Syria to craft a statement supportive of their activities, and that India's national statement would be more critical. He refused to give any further hints and would not be drawn out on whether India supported releasing the Syria report to the public. He reiterated the standard position that India shared our concerns and did not want another nuclear weapon state in the region. Additional Protocol: "We've Come a Long Way" - - - ¶3. (SBU) Dharmendra reaffirmed India's hope that the IAEA's Board of Governors would approve its Additional Protocol (AP) at the March Board meeting (ref B). Dharmendra, who was part of the Indian team that negotiated its AP text, was defensive when asked about the possibility that some delegations might criticize India's late AP submission and its disappointingly limited scope. He said the explanatory notes circulated by the IAEA would address any specific questions about the contents of the draft text. More broadly, he said India decided to chart a course between those of China and Russia, which he characterized as "saying no to everything," and the U.S. approach, which he characterized as "saying yes, but subject to national security provisions." He mentioned Cuba's AP twice as one influential model. He said India could have ratified the U.S. AP with only the name of the country changed, but instead engaged in four rounds of serious discussions with the IAEA Secretariat. Anyone who doubted the sincerity of India's efforts should request a copy of the marked-up draft from the Secretariat, which he asserted would show that India was amenable to the Secretariat's suggestions. "A careful reading of the text will show that we have come a long way," according to Dharmendra. ¶4. (C) Dharmendra was dismissive of the possibility that a weak AP could be a precedent for Brazil or Pakistan. He said India's AP could not be a model for Brazil because Brazil has full-scope safeguards, though he conceded that Brazil might have other reasons to oppose a robust AP. He suggested Pakistan's AP was the least of India's worries about its Western neighbor. He concluded that it should be no surprise NEW DELHI 00000370 002 OF 002 that countries like New Zealand remained bitter about India's exception in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),adding, "They told us explicitly at that time that they would 'get us' when it came time to approve the AP." India to Attend Nuclear Smuggling Meeting - - - ¶5. (U) Dharmendra also confirmed, in response to ref C, that India will plan to send appropriate officials to the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) annual meeting in Vienna June 29-July 2, but he said he would have to wait for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in Mumbai to make formal nominations. Notably, Dharmendra commented that India would like to improve its officials' technical understanding of nuclear forensics, not only to prevent and prosecute nuclear smuggling, but also better engage in discussions of the IAEA's investigations into Syria's nuclear program central to ElBaradei's February 19 report. WHITE