INDIA: U.S. POSTURE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 002389 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO ELISA CATALANO. DEPT ALSO FOR ISN/RA RICHARD NEPHEW E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2020 TAGS: PREL IR IN SUBJECT: INDIA: U.S. POSTURE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NEXT STEPS REF: SECSTATE 120288 Classified By: A/DCM Counselor Uzra Zeya. Reason: 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) A/DCM discussed reftel points and key messages on November 24 with Y.K. Sinha, Joint Secretary for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran Affairs in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Sinha stated that he had some insight into current Iranian attitudes on the nuclear issue as he had recently met with Iranian government officials in Tehran to prepare for Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki's visit to India and had sat in on Mottaki's November 16 meetings in New Delhi with Prime Minister Singh, Foreign Minister Krishna, and Vice President Ansari. He noted that the issue of Iran's nuclear program was raised briefly in all three meetings (other aspects of Mottaki's visit and Sinha's views on Af-Pak issues will be reported septel),with the Indian side encouraging Iran to cooperate with the international community. ¶2. (C) Sinha recounted that Iranian officials told him they have three options to sustain their nuclear program: buy uranium from a foreign supplier, enrich spent uranium in Iran, or make some sort of agreement with the IAEA and international community. Mottaki and other Iranian officials told the Indians that they understood the Obama administration was different from its predecessor and was prepared to engage in dialogue; furthermore, they affirmed Iran's interest in pursuing such dialogue and expressed optimism that an agreement could be reached. At the same time, the Iranians realize that dialogue can not go on indefinitely and the U.S. and others are losing patience. A complicating factor in Iran's decision-making process, Sinha emphasized, is an ongoing struggle over power and economic spoils between three groups: conservative clerics and allies such as the brothers Larijani, Ahmadinejad and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with affiliated militias (which Sinha claimed had about 20 million members and supporters), and "so-called moderates" such as Rafsanjani and Mousavi. ¶3. (C) In Sinha's view, this internal power struggle has made it difficult for Iran to come to policy closure on the nuclear issue. As evidence, he claimed that Ahmadinejad was initially supportive of the proposed agreement that came out of the October 1 meeting in Geneva, only to quickly back away from the deal when it came under attack from Ali Larijani and others. Citing another example of internal Iranian policy perplexity, he said that Mottaki was unable to formulate a coherent reply during his November 16 meeting with Prime Minister Singh when Singh offered to carry a message to President Obama regarding Iran's ideas on a way to resolve the nuclear issue. Sinha stated that Singh and other Indian interlocutors encouraged Mottaki to resolve the issue now through direct dialogue. As Sinha stated, "we did not lecture them but we told them this was their best opportunity." He said the Iranians expressed optimism that dialogue would succeed "so that Iran can move on." He also noted that Iranian officials at various levels confided to him that one problem of the proposed October 1 plan was French involvement, as the Iranians expressed deep distrust toward the French. ¶4. (C) Sinha opined that Iran is looking for a face-saving way to negotiate a resolution of the nuclear issue in a way "that does not look like surrender in the eyes of hard-liners." He repeated the standard GOI line that enhanced sanctions will not achieve USG goals. Sinha noted that Iran is India's second largest supplier of crude oil and that it would be difficult for India to find an alternative supplier, adding that "we'll sup with the devil as long as we get our crude." He stated that "warmth" went out of Iran-India relations in 2005 when India first voted along with the U.S. at the IAEA, a vote that "still rankles the Iranians and they remind us of it often." Sinha said that, as a rejoinder to Iranian officials, he points out that Iran consistently votes in favor of India-bashing resolutions on Kashmir in the OIC. In his dealings with Iranian officials, Sinha said he has also had to rebut an allegation that India "stabbed Iran in the back" with the IAEA vote in order to curry USG favor and was rewarded with the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement as a result. In reply to our point about the need for close consultation in the run-up to the IAEA Board of Governor's meeting, Sinha said that India welcomed such coordination. WHITE