INDIA: U.S. POSTURE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 002389

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO ELISA CATALANO. DEPT ALSO FOR ISN/RA
RICHARD NEPHEW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2020
TAGS: PREL IR IN
SUBJECT: INDIA: U.S. POSTURE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND
NEXT STEPS

REF: SECSTATE 120288

Classified By: A/DCM Counselor Uzra Zeya. Reason: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) A/DCM discussed reftel points and key messages on
November 24 with Y.K. Sinha, Joint Secretary for Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Iran Affairs in the Indian Ministry of
External Affairs. Sinha stated that he had some insight into
current Iranian attitudes on the nuclear issue as he had
recently met with Iranian government officials in Tehran to
prepare for Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki's visit to India
and had sat in on Mottaki's November 16 meetings in New Delhi
with Prime Minister Singh, Foreign Minister Krishna, and Vice
President Ansari. He noted that the issue of Iran's nuclear
program was raised briefly in all three meetings (other
aspects of Mottaki's visit and Sinha's views on Af-Pak issues
will be reported septel),with the Indian side encouraging
Iran to cooperate with the international community.


2. (C) Sinha recounted that Iranian officials told him they
have three options to sustain their nuclear program: buy
uranium from a foreign supplier, enrich spent uranium in
Iran, or make some sort of agreement with the IAEA and
international community. Mottaki and other Iranian officials
told the Indians that they understood the Obama
administration was different from its predecessor and was
prepared to engage in dialogue; furthermore, they affirmed
Iran's interest in pursuing such dialogue and expressed
optimism that an agreement could be reached. At the same
time, the Iranians realize that dialogue can not go on
indefinitely and the U.S. and others are losing patience. A
complicating factor in Iran's decision-making process, Sinha
emphasized, is an ongoing struggle over power and economic
spoils between three groups: conservative clerics and allies
such as the brothers Larijani, Ahmadinejad and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps with affiliated militias (which
Sinha claimed had about 20 million members and supporters),
and "so-called moderates" such as Rafsanjani and Mousavi.


3. (C) In Sinha's view, this internal power struggle has made
it difficult for Iran to come to policy closure on the
nuclear issue. As evidence, he claimed that Ahmadinejad was
initially supportive of the proposed agreement that came out
of the October 1 meeting in Geneva, only to quickly back away
from the deal when it came under attack from Ali Larijani and
others. Citing another example of internal Iranian policy
perplexity, he said that Mottaki was unable to formulate a
coherent reply during his November 16 meeting with Prime
Minister Singh when Singh offered to carry a message to
President Obama regarding Iran's ideas on a way to resolve
the nuclear issue. Sinha stated that Singh and other Indian
interlocutors encouraged Mottaki to resolve the issue now
through direct dialogue. As Sinha stated, "we did not
lecture them but we told them this was their best
opportunity." He said the Iranians expressed optimism that
dialogue would succeed "so that Iran can move on." He also
noted that Iranian officials at various levels confided to
him that one problem of the proposed October 1 plan was
French involvement, as the Iranians expressed deep distrust
toward the French.


4. (C) Sinha opined that Iran is looking for a face-saving
way to negotiate a resolution of the nuclear issue in a way
"that does not look like surrender in the eyes of
hard-liners." He repeated the standard GOI line that
enhanced sanctions will not achieve USG goals. Sinha noted
that Iran is India's second largest supplier of crude oil and
that it would be difficult for India to find an alternative
supplier, adding that "we'll sup with the devil as long as we
get our crude." He stated that "warmth" went out of
Iran-India relations in 2005 when India first voted along
with the U.S. at the IAEA, a vote that "still rankles the
Iranians and they remind us of it often." Sinha said that,
as a rejoinder to Iranian officials, he points out that Iran
consistently votes in favor of India-bashing resolutions on
Kashmir in the OIC. In his dealings with Iranian officials,
Sinha said he has also had to rebut an allegation that India
"stabbed Iran in the back" with the IAEA vote in order to
curry USG favor and was rewarded with the U.S.-India Civil
Nuclear Agreement as a result. In reply to our point about
the need for close consultation in the run-up to the IAEA
Board of Governor's meeting, Sinha said that India welcomed
such coordination.
WHITE