SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE TURNS INTO WAR OF WORDS

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SUBJECT: SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE TURNS INTO WAR OF WORDS
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REF: A. NA: NEW DELHI 01708

B. B: BEIJING 03005

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1. (U) SUMMARY: India and China have launched a "war of
words" over disputed territory in Arunachal Pradesh (AP).
The GOI has been uncharacteristically bold in responding to
Chinese moves, spurred on no doubt by unrestrained
hyperventilation in the Indian media over Beijing's
intentions. It seems China may have pushed too far when it
contested India's application last spring for an Asian
Development Bank loan for watershed projects in AP.
Subsequent Chinese criticism of PM Singh's election-related
travel to AP in October and the Dalai Lama's planned travel
to Tawang November 8 has spurred India to critique China's
development activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).
Opinion makers believe India's newfound firmness indicates
greater GOI confidence in its relationship with China. For
the sake of domestic consumption, the GOI has to find ways to
look tough on China, but ultimately it remains focused on
boosting growing economic ties and avoiding serious
confrontation, as illustrated by "business as usual" meetings
between PM Singh and Premier Wen on the sidelines of the
ASEAN summit and between EAM Krishna and FM Yang in Bangalore
on the sidelines of the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilaterals.

END SUMMARY.

The Game Changer? Probably Not
--------------

2. (U) Breathless Indian media reports on theIndia-China
"war of words" have struck a chord in India because, within
Indian society, a sense of nervousness and mistrust dominates
the relationship. In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Chinese
PolCouns Hu complained about Indian media hype, and told us
that China would like to "catch up" with the U.S. on
people-to-people ties with India. Hu was referring to a
string of bad news stories on China, including reports of a
series of border incursions, during one of which the Chinese
left behind insulting graffiti on India's side of the border,
and the August publication of a Chinese think tank article on
balkanizing India. The September collapse of a chimney at a
Chinese built power plant that killed 35 Indian workers and
the subsequent flight of the Chinese managers also led to
criticism of what some view as China's economic arrogance.
Indian media was also quick to take offense at harsh Chinese
criticism of PM Singh's travel to AP during the state
assembly elections and Chinese objections to the Dalai Lama's
planned travel to AP. While providing fodder for the
tabloids and India's multiple 24 hour news channels, these
stories are nothing new. China experts like Jawaharlal Nehru
University's Dr. Srikanth Kondappali point out that the
recent media reports have all been about recurring points of
friction that the two governments always downplay.


3. (U) The recent development that may be a game-changer is
India's perception that China has gone public with disputes
that were previously handled quietly at a bilateral
diplomatic level. For example, China raised the border
dispute in international fora with its spring bid to block
India's ADB loan for watershed work in AP. China has also
reportedly been issuing separate visas to Indian passport
holders from Jammu and Kashmir and is projecting the state as
an independent country in maps and other publications. The
Indian government took a tougher stance in response to
China's increasing assertiveness when the Indian MEA released
a series of public statements in October which declared that
AP is an "integral and inalienable part of India" and
expressed disappointment at Chinese statements criticizing PM
Singh's travel there. Another particularly pointed GOI
statement, clearly in retaliation for the ADB loan block,
said that China was "aware of Indian concerns" about
development activities in PoK, and urged China to refrain
from engaging in such activities in "illegally occupied"
areas of Kashmir (Full text available at
http://meaindia.nic.in/). To post's knowledge, this is the

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first public rebuke India has given China over the issue of
development activities in PoK.


4. (U) Most Embassy interlocutors, including Congress MP
Rashid Alvi, maintain that China does not want conflict but
wants merely to distract India from its other strategic goals
for as long as possible. To avoid outright confrontation,
both the Indian and Chinese governments continue to focus on
the story of the peaceful and tranquil border area, and on
the growing economic relationship. Alvi acknowledged that
China is more powerful than India in
many ways, but pointed out that in terms of the trade
relationship, China and India each have much to lose if the
relationship sours. Though he does not anticipate a
conflict, he highlighted growing Indian confidence by
reminding us that 2009 is not the same as 1962, when China
humiliated India militarily. His view echoes what we hear
from many retired military and other contacts. Communist
Party of India Marxist (CPM) MP Sitaram Yechury also told us
he can not envision an armed conflict with China: he is
concerned primarily about "economic aggression."

High Level Meetings: The Calm before the Storm?
-------------- --

5. (SBU) On October 28 the Russia-India-China
(RIC) meeting in Bangalore, a regularly scheduled Trilateral,
provided a platform for EAM Krishna and FM Yang Jiechi to
demonstrate that, despite the recent media maelstrom, the
India-China relationship remains on track at the leadership
level. Media reported that the leaders characterized both
meetings as "satisfying." EAM Krishna's statement
characterized his meeting with FM Yang as a "warm" and
"fruitful" exchange and emphasized the importance of
developing high level exchanges, enhancing trade and economic
cooperation, and progressing on defense contacts between
China and India. It also noted an agreement to enhance
media, cultural and people-to-people exchanges in the
framework of celebrating the 60th anniversary of India-China
relations. The RIC joint communiqu avoided any discussion
of bilateral issues, but focused on the positive areas of
cooperation among the three countries including international
organization reform, climate change, economic cooperation,
and regional security/stability. EAM Krishna announced after
his meeting with FM Yang that he had accepted the latter's
invitation to visit China next year. Some media reports
anticipated that the ASEAN and RIC sideline meetings were
only a lull before the Dalai Lama's upcoming visit to Tawang
would spur a renewed "war of words."


6. (SBU) Painting a gloomier picture, Embassy contact Sandeep
Dikshit of The Hindu (present in Bangalore during the RIC
meeting) told Poloff that many signs indicate the RIC side
meeting between Krishna and Yang was "not really cordial."
He pointed to the absence of any comments about dates for
President Patil's long-overdue China visit, or about the
FM-level telephone hotline promised after the 13th round of
border talks. He dismissed the announcement that Krishna
would visit China next year as insignificant. A very
high-profile visit such as the President's would be required
to truly convey positive signals about the relationship, he
indicated. Dikshit claimed that he observed tense body
language in FM Yang when he left the meeting with Krishna.
He also noted that Krishna's press statement indicating that
the GOI had not only asked the Dalai Lama to refrain from
political activity, but also to avoid asking border
questions, was a significant first revealing a GOI effort to
reassure China. He anticipates a great deal of quiet
diplomatic activity will take place between China and India
before the Dalai Lama's Arunachal Pradesh visit: the results
will be reflected when the visit occurs, he said.

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The Tibet Card
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7. (U) In the end, the verbal jousting over Arunachal
Pradesh's status is tied to the broader issue of Tibet. Like
most aspects of the India-China relationship, the dispute
over AP is nothing new; its roots date back to 1914, when
officials in British India and then autonomous Tibet agreed
on the McMahon Line that still serves as the working border
separating AP from Tibet. However, China has not accepted
this boundary and refers to AP as "South Tibet." From 1954
until the 1962 War, India was bound by a "Panch Shila" or
"Five Guiding Principles" an agreement with Beijing in which
it formally recognized Tibet as part of China. Fast forward
to today and the picture looks different. According to Dr.
Sujit Dutta, a well-known China expert long involved in
high-level track-two dialogues with China, a newly confident
India is not bound by the Five Principles and is bolstered by
its growing relationship with the U.S. In his view, India
feels that it can play a "Tibet card" as needed. Dutta and
Kondappali both told us that if China starts to push too hard
on its claim that Arunachal Pradesh is part of Tibet, the
current GOI might eventually feel emboldened to try to play
on China's Tibet sensitivities. This would be a distinct
change from India's position that sensitive bilateral issues
like the border dispute should be shunted aside into
never-ending negotiations.


8. (U) COMMENT: If India and China had a Facebook page their
relationship status would be "complicated." On the Indian
side, attitudes about China are split. The recent GOI
statements aimed at China were uncharacteristically
bold, but follow-on statements by the Foreign Secretary and
the outcome of the bilateral meeting of the foreign ministers
at the RIC meeting show that the GOI remains focused on
growing economic ties with China. The "war of words" points
to the fact that people-to-people ties between the two
countries have yet to take root. EAM Krishna and FM Yang
hinted at this with their agreement to focus on such ties.
The GOI must walk a fine line in order to sound tough on
China at home while avoiding the most sensitive issue --
Tibet. Despite our academic contact's enthusiasm for the
"Tibet card," we doubt India will be willing to play this in
the near future. Given Chinese sensitivities over Tibet, the
GOI would have to think long and hard before upping the ante
over what amounts to a rhetorical dispute over territory
India controls.
END COMMENT.
ROEMER