SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE TURNS INTO WAR OF WORDS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002248 SENSITIVE SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CORRECTING PARA NUMBERS DEPT FOR SCA/INS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL CH IN SUBJECT: SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE TURNS INTO WAR OF WORDS (2ND CORRECTED COPY) REF: A. NA: NEW DELHI 01708 ¶B. B: BEIJING 03005 NEW DELHI 00002248 001.3 OF 003 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: India and China have launched a "war of words" over disputed territory in Arunachal Pradesh (AP). The GOI has been uncharacteristically bold in responding to Chinese moves, spurred on no doubt by unrestrained hyperventilation in the Indian media over Beijing's intentions. It seems China may have pushed too far when it contested India's application last spring for an Asian Development Bank loan for watershed projects in AP. Subsequent Chinese criticism of PM Singh's election-related travel to AP in October and the Dalai Lama's planned travel to Tawang November 8 has spurred India to critique China's development activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). Opinion makers believe India's newfound firmness indicates greater GOI confidence in its relationship with China. For the sake of domestic consumption, the GOI has to find ways to look tough on China, but ultimately it remains focused on boosting growing economic ties and avoiding serious confrontation, as illustrated by "business as usual" meetings between PM Singh and Premier Wen on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit and between EAM Krishna and FM Yang in Bangalore on the sidelines of the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilaterals. END SUMMARY. The Game Changer? Probably Not -------------- ¶2. (U) Breathless Indian media reports on theIndia-China "war of words" have struck a chord in India because, within Indian society, a sense of nervousness and mistrust dominates the relationship. In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Chinese PolCouns Hu complained about Indian media hype, and told us that China would like to "catch up" with the U.S. on people-to-people ties with India. Hu was referring to a string of bad news stories on China, including reports of a series of border incursions, during one of which the Chinese left behind insulting graffiti on India's side of the border, and the August publication of a Chinese think tank article on balkanizing India. The September collapse of a chimney at a Chinese built power plant that killed 35 Indian workers and the subsequent flight of the Chinese managers also led to criticism of what some view as China's economic arrogance. Indian media was also quick to take offense at harsh Chinese criticism of PM Singh's travel to AP during the state assembly elections and Chinese objections to the Dalai Lama's planned travel to AP. While providing fodder for the tabloids and India's multiple 24 hour news channels, these stories are nothing new. China experts like Jawaharlal Nehru University's Dr. Srikanth Kondappali point out that the recent media reports have all been about recurring points of friction that the two governments always downplay. ¶3. (U) The recent development that may be a game-changer is India's perception that China has gone public with disputes that were previously handled quietly at a bilateral diplomatic level. For example, China raised the border dispute in international fora with its spring bid to block India's ADB loan for watershed work in AP. China has also reportedly been issuing separate visas to Indian passport holders from Jammu and Kashmir and is projecting the state as an independent country in maps and other publications. The Indian government took a tougher stance in response to China's increasing assertiveness when the Indian MEA released a series of public statements in October which declared that AP is an "integral and inalienable part of India" and expressed disappointment at Chinese statements criticizing PM Singh's travel there. Another particularly pointed GOI statement, clearly in retaliation for the ADB loan block, said that China was "aware of Indian concerns" about development activities in PoK, and urged China to refrain from engaging in such activities in "illegally occupied" areas of Kashmir (Full text available at http://meaindia.nic.in/). To post's knowledge, this is the NEW DELHI 00002248 002.3 OF 003 first public rebuke India has given China over the issue of development activities in PoK. ¶4. (U) Most Embassy interlocutors, including Congress MP Rashid Alvi, maintain that China does not want conflict but wants merely to distract India from its other strategic goals for as long as possible. To avoid outright confrontation, both the Indian and Chinese governments continue to focus on the story of the peaceful and tranquil border area, and on the growing economic relationship. Alvi acknowledged that China is more powerful than India in many ways, but pointed out that in terms of the trade relationship, China and India each have much to lose if the relationship sours. Though he does not anticipate a conflict, he highlighted growing Indian confidence by reminding us that 2009 is not the same as 1962, when China humiliated India militarily. His view echoes what we hear from many retired military and other contacts. Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM) MP Sitaram Yechury also told us he can not envision an armed conflict with China: he is concerned primarily about "economic aggression." High Level Meetings: The Calm before the Storm? -------------- -- ¶5. (SBU) On October 28 the Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting in Bangalore, a regularly scheduled Trilateral, provided a platform for EAM Krishna and FM Yang Jiechi to demonstrate that, despite the recent media maelstrom, the India-China relationship remains on track at the leadership level. Media reported that the leaders characterized both meetings as "satisfying." EAM Krishna's statement characterized his meeting with FM Yang as a "warm" and "fruitful" exchange and emphasized the importance of developing high level exchanges, enhancing trade and economic cooperation, and progressing on defense contacts between China and India. It also noted an agreement to enhance media, cultural and people-to-people exchanges in the framework of celebrating the 60th anniversary of India-China relations. The RIC joint communiqu avoided any discussion of bilateral issues, but focused on the positive areas of cooperation among the three countries including international organization reform, climate change, economic cooperation, and regional security/stability. EAM Krishna announced after his meeting with FM Yang that he had accepted the latter's invitation to visit China next year. Some media reports anticipated that the ASEAN and RIC sideline meetings were only a lull before the Dalai Lama's upcoming visit to Tawang would spur a renewed "war of words." ¶6. (SBU) Painting a gloomier picture, Embassy contact Sandeep Dikshit of The Hindu (present in Bangalore during the RIC meeting) told Poloff that many signs indicate the RIC side meeting between Krishna and Yang was "not really cordial." He pointed to the absence of any comments about dates for President Patil's long-overdue China visit, or about the FM-level telephone hotline promised after the 13th round of border talks. He dismissed the announcement that Krishna would visit China next year as insignificant. A very high-profile visit such as the President's would be required to truly convey positive signals about the relationship, he indicated. Dikshit claimed that he observed tense body language in FM Yang when he left the meeting with Krishna. He also noted that Krishna's press statement indicating that the GOI had not only asked the Dalai Lama to refrain from political activity, but also to avoid asking border questions, was a significant first revealing a GOI effort to reassure China. He anticipates a great deal of quiet diplomatic activity will take place between China and India before the Dalai Lama's Arunachal Pradesh visit: the results will be reflected when the visit occurs, he said. NEW DELHI 00002248 003.3 OF 003 The Tibet Card -------------- ¶7. (U) In the end, the verbal jousting over Arunachal Pradesh's status is tied to the broader issue of Tibet. Like most aspects of the India-China relationship, the dispute over AP is nothing new; its roots date back to 1914, when officials in British India and then autonomous Tibet agreed on the McMahon Line that still serves as the working border separating AP from Tibet. However, China has not accepted this boundary and refers to AP as "South Tibet." From 1954 until the 1962 War, India was bound by a "Panch Shila" or "Five Guiding Principles" an agreement with Beijing in which it formally recognized Tibet as part of China. Fast forward to today and the picture looks different. According to Dr. Sujit Dutta, a well-known China expert long involved in high-level track-two dialogues with China, a newly confident India is not bound by the Five Principles and is bolstered by its growing relationship with the U.S. In his view, India feels that it can play a "Tibet card" as needed. Dutta and Kondappali both told us that if China starts to push too hard on its claim that Arunachal Pradesh is part of Tibet, the current GOI might eventually feel emboldened to try to play on China's Tibet sensitivities. This would be a distinct change from India's position that sensitive bilateral issues like the border dispute should be shunted aside into never-ending negotiations. ¶8. (U) COMMENT: If India and China had a Facebook page their relationship status would be "complicated." On the Indian side, attitudes about China are split. The recent GOI statements aimed at China were uncharacteristically bold, but follow-on statements by the Foreign Secretary and the outcome of the bilateral meeting of the foreign ministers at the RIC meeting show that the GOI remains focused on growing economic ties with China. The "war of words" points to the fact that people-to-people ties between the two countries have yet to take root. EAM Krishna and FM Yang hinted at this with their agreement to focus on such ties. The GOI must walk a fine line in order to sound tough on China at home while avoiding the most sensitive issue -- Tibet. Despite our academic contact's enthusiasm for the "Tibet card," we doubt India will be willing to play this in the near future. Given Chinese sensitivities over Tibet, the GOI would have to think long and hard before upping the ante over what amounts to a rhetorical dispute over territory India controls. END COMMENT. ROEMER