NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR REJECTS FURTHER NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001833 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM KNNP ENRG PK IN SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR REJECTS FURTHER NUCLEAR TESTS Classified By: Ambassador Timothy Roemer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In several media interviews August 29-30, National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan defended India's 1998 nuclear tests against claims by a former defense scientist that its hydrogen bomb was a "fizzle" and that India should therefore refuse to sign the CTBT until its thermonuclear capability was demonstrated conclusively. Echoing the views of senior atomic scientists, Narayanan asserted that the allegation was not based on any new scientific evidence. Narayanan described India's commitment to its voluntary testing moratorium as "steadfast," but expressed concern that international opinion would paint the allegation as a "devious" attempt by the Indian government to justify further testing. Narayanan reportedly balked when asked about the government's position on the CTBT, saying "a full-fledged discussion of the CTBT" was necessary. While for all practical purposes the Congress Party-led government chose to forego testing by signing the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, managing popular concerns about security and status will count more than the technical merits of testing as India debates the CTBT. END SUMMARY. Fizzle, Schmizzle: Narayanan Rejects Claim Test Failed - - - ¶2. (SBU) In a series of media interviews over the weekend August 29-30, National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan poured cold water on a simmering debate about whether India's 1998 nuclear test was in fact a success and, consequently, whether India could consider signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) absent further tests. Narayanan defended the Pokhran II tests and described India's commitment to its voluntary testing moratorium as "steadfast." ¶3. (SBU) K. Santhanam, a former Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) scientist working at the Pokhran test site in 1998, sparked the debate when he claimed at a think-tank seminar on the CTBT August 27 that the thermonuclear device tested on May 11, 1998, was a "fizzle," meaning its actual yield fell short of the planned 45 kilotons for which it was designed. Santhanam, who led the DRDO team that prepared the test shafts in 1998, cited unspecified "seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over" to become the first Indian official directly involved in the tests to question publicly the yield of the thermonuclear device. He concluded that India should proceed with further tests and not sign the CTBT until its thermonuclear capability could be demonstrated conclusively. Atomic and Defense Establishments Differ - - - ¶4. (SBU) Former Chairman of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and current Principal Scientific Advisor to the Government of India R. Chidambaram -- who led the team that designed, manufactured, and tested the devices in 1998 -- responded acidly August 28 that without scientific evidence to back up Santhanam's charge "this kind of statement means nothing." Chidambaram has argued in scientific journals that western seismologists underestimated the yields due to the dampening effect of the sandy Thar Desert testing site. He also claimed that testers deliberately aimed for a lower yield because the test shafts could not be sunk further without risking detection. Subsequent radioactive testing confirmed the target yield of 50 kilotons with a margin of error of 10 kilotons, according to Chidambaram. Chidambaram told media he had yet to see a published critique of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center's (BARC) scientific assessments by any laboratory-based scientist abroad. NEW DELHI 00001833 002 OF 003 ¶5. (SBU) Citing a former senior official of the BJP-led Vajpayee government, journalist Siddharth Varadarajan reported August 28 that the BARC atomic scientists and the DRDO weapon designers had differed in their assessments in the wake of the May 1998 tests. DRDO experts, including Santhanam, did not have access to the secret weapon designs. Former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra reportedly brokered a consensus opinion on the basis of the radioactivity analysis. Varadarajan further noted that Santhanam's celebratory claims over the past 10 years were "hard to reconcile" with his current assertion that the test was unsuccessful. Concern About International Fallout - - - ¶6. (SBU) In his comments to media, Narayanan dismissed Santhanam as "a bit of a maverick" and clarified that DRDO had nothing to do with measuring the yield of the devices. Narayanan cited "authorized and proven measurements" of yields calculated by current DAE chief Anil Kakodkar and S.K. Sikka of BARC, and noted that Santhanam's critique was not based on flaws in scientific analysis or any independent set of measurements. Playing to the galleries, Narayanan added that Western analysts had questioned the Pokhran tests because they refused to recognize India as a nuclear weapons power capable of detonating a fusion device. ¶7. (SBU) While refuting Santhanam's claim, Narayanan seemed more concerned about the effect of his statements on international opinion than on implications for further testing. "The international community is going to say that this is one of India's very devious methods of preparing for a test, that (our) scientists are saying that was a fizzle, therefore India may find it necessary to prove itself once again," mused Narayanan, "This is my worry. I hope it doesn't happen." Narayanan reaffirmed the voluntary testing moratorium, but reportedly balked when asked about the government's position on the CTBT, saying, "I think we need to now have a full-fledged discussion of the CTBT. We'll cross that hurdle when we come to it." Comment: Politics of the CTBT - - - ¶8. (C) Surprisingly, the policies of the previous BJP-led government, now in opposition, may provide the current government with the political cover necessary to support the CTBT in two important ways. First, the current government has never clarified its position on the CTBT, nor has it rejected Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's September 1998 statement that India "would not stand in the way" of the CTBT entering into force, which has been interpreted to mean India would sign the treaty if others whose ratification was required for the CTBT to enter into force -- including the U.S. and China -- did so. Taking cover behind the policy of its predecessor may help the government follow the Nuclear Weapon States in ratifying the CTBT. Second, the government is aided by the fact that the 1998 tests were conducted by the BJP-led government, which would be loathe to admit that this signature accomplishment was not fully successful. If the opposition wished to oppose the CTBT on strategic grounds without tarnishing this legacy, it would have to maintain that the 1998 tests were successful while claiming that further tests were nevertheless necessary. It would also have to justify the cost in terms of civil nuclear cooperation that would be jeopardized by further testing. ¶9. (C) While the party politics of the CTBT appear more favorable that might be expected, Santhanam's critique stabs at the heart of the debate over the CTBT. India's lower NEW DELHI 00001833 003 OF 003 yield plutonium-based fission devices are thought to be sufficient to deter Pakistan, which has relatively few densely populated urban centers located near India's own territory, but are not viewed as adequate to deter China, with its relatively sophisticated and hardened nuclear arsenal spread across its vast territory. Doubts about India's thermonuclear deterrent thus diminish India's strategic stature -- putting it more on par with Pakistan than China -- thereby stoking popular perceptions not only of insecurity, but also of inferiority. For all practical purposes, the government chose to forego future testing by signing the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, but choosing not testing is not the same thing as agreeing never to test. Managing these popular impulses about security and status will count more than the technical merits of further testing as India debates the CTBT. ROEMER