Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NEWDELHI1797
2009-08-27 13:00:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIA TO INVESTIGATE RDX SALE TO SYRIA, UPDATE ON PENDING CASES

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP ETTC IN IR SY 
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RUEHPW RUEHSL RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNE #1797/01 2391300
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271300Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7831
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0272
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1786
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8414
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001797 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

ISN/CATR FOR MICHAEL ROLLERI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019
TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, ETTC, IN, IR, SY
SUBJECT: INDIA TO INVESTIGATE RDX SALE TO SYRIA, UPDATE ON
PENDING CASES

REF: A. STATE 86122
B. STATE 53015
C. STATE 53356

Classified By: Political Counselor Uzra Zeya for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001797



NOFORN

SIPDIS



ISN/CATR FOR MICHAEL ROLLERI



E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019

TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, ETTC, IN, IR, SY

SUBJECT: INDIA TO INVESTIGATE RDX SALE TO SYRIA, UPDATE ON

PENDING CASES



REF: A. STATE 86122

B. STATE 53015

C. STATE 53356



Classified By: Political Counselor Uzra Zeya for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)



1. This is an action request; see paragraphs 4, 6 and 8.



2. (S) SUMMARY. Ministry of External Affairs Technology Unit

Director Sandeep Arya said India would investigate the

proposed sale of the SCOMET-controlled explosive RDX to a

Syrian entity (ref A),and requested further details.

Pressed on the status of two long-pending export control

cases (refs B and C),Arya offered updates and requested

further information. Arya, whose new office focuses on

export controls, expressed an interest in learning more about

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA)

sanctions as a possible model for similar Indian legislation.

END SUMMARY.



India to Investigate Proposed RDX Shipment to Syria

- - -



3. (C) PolCouns delivered ref A demarche August 19 to

Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Joint Secretary for the

Americas Gaitri Kumar, who agreed to pass it to the

appropriate officials for action. Noting that we often do

not receive replies on such cases for weeks or months -- if

ever -- PolCouns asked that special attention be given to

this case. PolOff followed up on ref A demarche August 20

with MEA Technology Unit Director Sandeep Arya, the MEA's

only dedicated official working on export control issues.

(Note: Established earlier this year, the Technology Unit is

being incubated within the MEA's Disarmament and

International Security Affairs Division (DISA) prior to its

eventual launch as a separate division. End Note.) Arya

said he would have to follow an inter-agency coordination

process before conveying an official response, but shared his

views informally.



4. (S) Arya agreed that 500 tons of RDX was a "huge"

quantity, and confirmed that RDX was included on India's

Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment, and

Technologies (SCOMET) list of dual use and sensitive items

whose export is prohibited without appropriate end-user

certification. He also confirmed that the Ordnance Factory

Board (OFB),a large public enterprise with extensive ties to

the Indian Armed Forces, was aware of the SCOMET process and

had filed SCOMET applications in the past, but that OFB has

not yet submitted a SCOMET application for this proposed

transaction. Arya said there was "no way" OFB would proceed

with such a sale without going through the SCOMET process.

Nevertheless, he confessed to being "surprised" OFB would

invite a Syrian delegation to discuss the sale without first

confirming whether RDX was on the SCOMET list. He said he

would make sure the case was investigated, but cautioned that

the process often took several weeks. He requested further

information about another Indian firm involved in the

discussion described in ref A as "MKU Pvt. Ltd.," which would

help the Indian Government in its investigation.



5. (C) As an aside, Arya expressed an interest in learning

more about the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation

Act (INKSNA) sanctions. As the head of a fairly new office,

he was engaged in a review of India's export control policies

and laws. He was interested in INKSNA as a possible model

for similar Indian legislation.



Update on Outstanding Export Control Cases

- - -



6. (S) Pressed on the status of two long-pending export

control cases, Arya offered updates and requested further

information that he said would help the Indian Government

move its process forward. Arya said there was still "action"

but so far no "conclusion" on the Hind High Vacuum Company's

transfer of a sample capacitance diaphragm gauge to an

individual associated with Iran's nuclear program (ref B).



NEW DELHI 00001797 002 OF 002





Arya recalled that the sample gauge was very small in size

and may have been delivered "through the mail bypassing

proper shipment procedures." Arya requested three additional

pieces of information. First, who was the "consignee" in

Jakarta? Second, is there any information about further

shipments, i.e. did the recipient place a follow-on order?

Third, what is the application of the gauge and how is it

used? Specifically, why was it not controlled by the Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG) if it had dual-use applications?



7. (S) With regard to the proposed shipment of high density

graphite by Nickunj Eximp Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. to Iran's

Ward Chemical Company (ref C),Arya said the case was

proceeding through a "legal process, which takes time." The

SCOMET list caps the quantity of exportable nuclear-grade

graphite, but Arya indicated he is reviewing the cap with a

view toward raising it. He said technology had evolved to

such a degree that nuclear grade graphite was often a cheaper

alternative for a wide variety of legitimate industrial

applications. He said this issue was not unique to India,

but rather should be taken up by the NSG and Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR).



COMMENT

- - -



8. (SBU) Post intends to cultivate Arya as a welcome addition

in a key role at MEA. MEA's prior lack of responsiveness on

export control issues may have had at least as much to do

with a lack of adequate staff and resources as reluctance to

cooperate on these shared concerns. The conclusion of the

U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement has also led

to increased cooperation from India's nonproliferation

bureaucrats. Arya shared that the Ministry was aware of its

resource constraints and was considering how best to develop

a dedicated cadre of diplomats with expertise on

nonproliferation in a manner similar to the Ministry's

regional specialists. In addition to the specific

information on the pending cases requested in paras 4 and 6,

Post would be grateful for any further detail about INKSNA

that can be shared with Arya.



ROEMER

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